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Intellectuals and the Politics of the French Socialist Party Since 2002 
Harriet Lynne Morgan  
Abstract 
There has historically been a deep, if unstable, connection between intellectual culture and 
the French socialists. However, in the 1980s and 1990s historians were arguing that the 
decline of confidence in Marxism, the nature of François Mitterrand’s politics, the growth of 
expertise and professionalization, the rise of the mass media (especially television) and the 
more educated nature of the public, were breaking down historic intellectual models. The 
terms of the debate have moved on significantly and this thesis attempts to update the 
analysis by re-examining the connections between left-wing intellectuals, the French Socialist 
Party and wider society since 2002, when the socialist candidate Lionel Jospin failed to make 
the run-off in the presidential elections, being pushed into third place by the Front National 
candidate, Jean-Marie Le Pen. This thesis opens up the central problem of why, in the 
country that gave birth to the very notion of intellectual engagement, intellectuals have been 
struggling to help the PS to develop a deeper reflection on its social mission. It takes three 
examples: one, the 2002 socialist defeat; two, an intellectual figure - Vincent Peillon - who 
has been trying to renew socialist politics from within the PS and three, an issue of profound 
significance within society itself - equality - from the angle of intellectual debate. It argues 
that a combination of the problems of socialist party culture and the difficulties of 
contemporary democracy, have significantly reduced the space for left-wing intellectuals to 
make an impact in socialist politics. These interlocking examples cover the different ways in 
which intellectuals, party and civil society interact in contemporary democracy, allowing for 
a better understanding of how left-wing intellectual culture can strive - and fail - or strive - 
and succeed modestly - to rebuild an intellectual connection between party and society in 
contemporary times.  
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Introduction 
In March 2015, faced with the far-right Front National (FN) party’s anticipated success in the 
upcoming local elections, Prime Minister Manuel Valls deplored the silence of left-wing 
intellectuals: ‘Où sont les intellectuels? Où sont les grandes consciences de ce pays, les 
hommes, les femmes de culture qui doivent monter eux-aussi, au créneau [contre le FN] ? Où 
est la gauche?’1 On a superficial level this outcry was a scapegoating exercise, but it is also a 
testament to the persistent place of intellectuals in socialist political culture. Intellectuals have 
become a collective ‘site of memory’ in France. This thesis draws on Sudhir Hazareesingh’s 
argument that intellectuals remain a central component of French civic pride. He asks how far 
the socialist movement in France has lost touch with its intellectual roots and to what extent 
this has been a long-term problem affecting French political culture more generally.2 
Historically, there has been a deep connection between intellectual culture and the French 
socialists. The relationship has rarely been smooth, as was demonstrated during the Popular 
Front Government of 1936-7, when left-wing intellectuals rallied enthusiastically to the 
government before becoming quickly disillusioned.3 Christophe Prochasson suggested: 
‘Jusqu’à la Deuxième Guerre mondiale, le Parti socialiste entretint avec le monde des 
intellectuels des relations, certes heurtées, mais finalement confiantes.’ Leading figures of the 
French socialist movement, Prochasson continued, all shared a significant intellectual culture; 
they spent time reading and their speeches were peppered with precise intellectual 
references.4  
                                                             
1 Manuel Valls cited in ‘Manuel Valls, les intellectuels et l’inculture triomphant’, Le Figaro (20.03.2015) at 
www.lefigaro.fr (viewed 23 October 2015). 
2 Sudhir Hazareesingh, How the French think. An affectionate portrait of an intellectual people (London 2015), 
p. 10.  
3 Christophe Prochasson, ‘Les intellectuels et le Parti socialiste: vieux schémas, nouvelle donne’, Recherche 
socialiste 39-40 (June-September 2007), p. 112. 
4 Ibid., p. 113.  
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The loss of confidence in this historic relationship between the intellectual world and the 
socialists, expressed by Manuel Valls, was not new. His statement consciously echoed that of 
the socialist government’s spokesperson Max Gallo who, in 1983, provoked a protracted 
debate about the ‘demise’ of the French left-wing intellectual when he lamented the ‘silence 
of the intellectuals’ and asked: ‘Has the left abandoned the battle for ideas?...Where are the 
Gides, Malraux, the Alains and the Langevins of today?’5 This sense of doubt about the place 
and identity of left-wing intellectuals in French politics and society has also given rise to the 
study of intellectuals as a discrete field of study in French history, and this has been driven 
forward through the work of Jean-François Sirinelli, Pascal Ory, Jacques Julliard, Michel 
Winock and Christophe Prochasson.6 In the 1990s, these French analyses were challenged 
and deepened by the publication of significant Anglophone studies, which were concerned 
with a comparative perspective on the phenomenon of intellectual engagement.7 These works 
all suggested that a combination of the decline of confidence in Marxism, the nature of 
Mitterrand’s politics (in the French context), the growth of expertise and professionalization, 
the rise of the mass media (especially television) and the more educated nature of the public, 
were breaking down historic intellectual models. Thus, by 1990, Sirinelli was wondering: 
‘Faut-il sonner le glas des intellectuels?’8 
Despite the conscious parallels between the words of Valls and Gallo, the terms of the debate 
have moved on significantly since the 1980s and 1990s. This thesis thus seeks to update the 
analysis by re-examining the connection between intellectual culture and the PS since 2002, 
                                                             
5 Max Gallo cited in Martyn Cornick, ‘The silence of the left intellectual in Mitterrand’s France’ in Mairi 
Maclean (ed.), The Mitterrand years. Legacy and evaluation (Basingstoke, 1998), p. 301. 
6 Pascal Ory and Jean-François Sirinelli, Les intellectuels en France de l’affaire Dreyfus à nos jours (Paris, first 
edition 1986, second edition 1992); Jean-François Sirinelli, Intellectuels et passions français. Manifestes et 
pétitions au XXè siècle (Paris, 1996) ; Christophe Prochasson, Les intellectuels et le socialisme (Paris, 1997); 
Julliard and Winock, Dictionnaire des intellectuels français. Les personnes, les lieux, les moments (Paris, 1996); 
Michel Winock, Le siècle des intellectuels (Paris, 1997). 
7 For example, Jeremy Jennings and Anthony Kemp-Welch (eds.), Intellectuals in politics. From the Dreyfus 
Affair to Salman Rushdie (London, 1997). 
8 Sirinelli, Intellectuels et passions français, p. 249. 
8 
 
when the socialist candidate Lionel Jospin failed to make the run-off in the presidential 
elections, being pushed into third place by the FN candate, Jean-Marie Le Pen. The question 
remains a pressing one. Since the turn of the century, there has been a mounting sense of 
crisis in France, which has undoubtedly intensified since the tragic terrorist attacks in 2015 
and the gains of the FN in subsequent regional elections. Valls’ comment demonstrates that 
the contemporary crisis has been, in part, an intellectual one. This has particularly been the 
case for the French centre left, whose recent turbulent history has been characterized by a 
repeated inability to articulate what its own values are when it comes to the questions of 
globalization, identity and citizenship, which have dominated the politics of the twenty-first 
century. The socialists’ traditional working and lower-middle-class electorate has been 
increasingly turning to the FN and there has thus been a continued search for an intellectual 
counter-discourse to the populist rhetoric of the far right. Hazareesingh, however, has 
demonstrated that the intellectual response in the public sphere has been increasingly 
monopolized by the rise of neo-conservative declinist thought, dominated by pessimism, 
nostalgia and an inward-looking republicanism which has, at times, descended into ‘ethnic 
nationalism’, and which has been fuelling extreme right-wing ideas.9 
This thesis opens up the central problem of why, in the country that gave birth to the very 
notion of intellectual engagement and where there has historically been such a profound, if 
unstable, connection between intellectual life and the socialists, intellectuals have been 
struggling to help the PS to develop a deeper reflection on its social mission and to devise a 
social democracy and discourse adapted to both the nature and concerns of contemporary 
society. The problem has not been a uniquely French one. Since the 1990s, the decline of 
                                                             
9 Hazareesingh, How the French think, pp. 310-311; Hazareesingh, ‘Ce pays qui aime les idées’, la Cité des 
livres studio de Sudhir Hazareesingh, Fondation Jean-Jaurès (19.11.2015) at www/jean-
jaures.org/Evenements/Cite-des-livres/Ce-pays-qui-aime-les-idees-la-Cite-des-livres-studio-de-Sudhir-
Hazareesingh/(language)/fre-FR (viewed 21 November 2015).  
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communism and the increasingly global and financial nature of capitalism have sparked a 
crisis of social democracy across Europe. The problem has, however, been particularly 
interesting, acute and profoundly felt in the French context due to a combination of the long-
term pre-eminence of the French Communist Party and the historic importance of intellectual 
reflection. 
The French concept of intellectual engagement dates back to the Dreyfus Affair (1894-1906), 
a crisis of civic political culture which gave rise to the intellectual in the modern sense. It set 
the precedent for a uniquely French functional definition of the intellectual, as someone who 
uses a prestige gained in the cultural and/or academic sphere to intervene in the public 
political sphere as a guardian of universal humanitarian values. Since the Dreyfus Affair, the 
model of intellectual engagement has been continually constructed and deconstructed and has 
been a source of enduring debate.10 Determining whether an individual should be classed as 
an ‘intellectual’ is thus no easy task, especially in the twenty-first century when there is a 
sense that historic models have broken down. This thesis defines the intellectual according to 
the Dictionnaire des intellectuels français, which focuses on the criteria of political 
engagement and authority. An intellectual is ‘un homme ou une femme… qui applique à 
l’ordre politique une notoriété acquise ailleurs’. This notoriety, however, must be based on 
legitimate and relevant expertise; an intellectual is someone who ‘entend proposer à la société 
tout entière une analyse, une direction, une morale que ses travaux antérieurs le qualifient 
pour élaborer’.11  
In order to tackle the problem of the decline of the intellectual in French socialist politics and 
structure the thesis, it is suggested that since the Dreyfus Affair intellectual engagement has 
                                                             
10 Jeremy Jennings, ‘Of treason, blindness and silence. Dilemmas of the intellectual in modern France’, in 
Jennings and Kemp-Welch, Intellectuals in politics, p. 71. 
11 Jacques Julliard and Michel Winock, Dictionnaire des intellectuels français, p. 12. 
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centred on a complex triangular relationship between intellectuals, socialist politics and 
society (both in terms of intellectuals engaging with and reflecting on society). In an analysis 
of the Dreyfus Affair, the historian Jacques Julliard, for example, noted that while the French 
political left like to claim the event as their own, it actually marked the separation of the left 
into a political and an intellectual component: ‘C’est comme si, à ce tournant du siècle, la 
gauche jusqu’alors unijambiste se mettait à marcher sur deux pieds: d’une part l’action 
politique, de l’autre l’action intellectuelle.’12 The problem of the intellectual deficit in French 
socialist political culture is thus addressed by looking at how intellectuals have struggled to 
rebuild, or perhaps simply to build, an authoritative voice as part of the relationship between 
party and society in contemporary times. It is argued that during the last fifteen years the 
space for intellectual voices to make an impact in PS politics has been significantly restricted. 
There are therefore several interlinked sub-questions, which relate to three elements: why 
have intellectuals been unable to connect with the PS? Why have they been struggling to 
interact with civil society? What impact might these broken connections between intellectuals 
and politics, on the one hand, and intellectuals and society, on the other hand, have for the 
relationship between socialist politics and society (politicians and the electorate)?  
Since the sense of disillusionment with Marxism in the 1980s and early 1990s, some 
historians have begun to recognize the long-term drawbacks of Jean Jaurès’s decision to seek 
party unity in 1905. Gérard Grunberg and Alain Bergounioux argued that due to the 
dominance of a commitment to revolutionary rupture in the political culture of the French 
left, which harks back to the Marxist orthodox line of Jules Guesde, the socialist movement’s 
relationship with power has been characterized by an unstable mix of ambition and remorse: 
the desire to gain power in order to enact a revolutionary programme, followed by a 
pragmatic reformism necessitated by the constraints of government, then a remorseful return 
                                                             
12 Jacques Julliard, Les gauches françaises 1762-2012: histoire, politique et imaginaire (Paris, 2012), p. 431. 
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to an orthodox left-wing programme.13 This thesis takes Grunberg and Bergounioux’s 
argument in a slightly different direction, arguing that the downsides of unity are about more 
than the issue of power. The orthodox strain’s focus on a rigid doctrine has marginalized 
intellectual voices, yet the socialists have largely abandoned the revolutionary reference since 
the Jospin years.14 The far left’s response, which has become increasingly backward-looking 
and inward-looking and has been opposing contemporary developments like globalization, 
combined with its long-term pre-eminence on the left, has prevented the socialists from 
engaging with left-wing intellectuals who have been attempting to articulate post-Marxist 
ideas. This line of argument draws on the work of left-leaning historians, including Vincent 
Duclert and Jacques Julliard. Duclert has argued that intellectual reformists like Léon Blum, 
Pierre Mendès-France or Michel Rocard, who tried to develop centrist policies in the PS, 
were, necessarily, dissident voices.15 Julliard, coming from his own Proudhonian socialist 
perspective, which advocates an alternative federalist model of socialism and argues against 
the top-down models of state socialism, has contended that moral authority within socialist 
argument has historically resided with the far left, which explains the socialists’ inability to 
articulate a coherent intellectual response to society’s contemporary problems.16  
Although socialist politicians never stop calling for a renewal of their ideas, the socialist 
movement has been increasingly reduced to political management, which has created a 
distance between the political elite on the one hand and party militants and the electorate on 
the other. This trend was recognized by some at the time of party unity over a century ago. 
Eugène Fournière, one of the leaders of the ‘independent’ socialist strand, wrote: ‘Socialist 
action [is] enclosed more than ever within the world of politics, where classic formulae 
                                                             
13 Alain Bergounioux and Gérard Grunberg, L’ambition et le remords. Les socialistes français et le pouvoir 
(1905-2005) (Paris, 2005). 
14 Julian Wright, ‘Socialism and political identity: Eugène Fournière and intellectual militancy in the Third 
Republic’, French Historical Studies 36.3 (2013), p. 458. 
15 Vincent Duclert, La gauche devant l’histoire. A la reconquête d’une conscience politique (Paris, 2009). 
16 Jacques Julliard, Le malheur français (Paris, 2005), pp. 65-68. 
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replace ideas and where a handful of men… participate in the real action and reduce the mass 
of the party to being like a crowd at a race meeting, praising their horses when they win and 
abusing them when they lose.’17 These long-term problems, identified by Fournière and 
particular to the French socialists, have then been exacerbated in recent years by more 
general developments in French political life.  
The presidentialization of the Fifth Republic, for example, has intensified the reduction of the 
party to an inward-looking electoral machine. Prochasson also used a sporting metaphor to 
describe the internal workings of the PS since the 1980s: the trend has been one of 
‘footballization’; the role of militants has been reduced to cheering on the PS leadership 
‘team’ during election campaigns.18 A further contributing factor has been the increasing 
professionalization and mediatization of contemporary politics. Hazareesingh noted how, 
rather than being products of the Ecole Normale Supérieur, political elites have been formed 
in grandes écoles like the Ecole Normale d’Administration (ENA). These énarques’ 
weaknesses, he suggested, include ‘an inability to think creatively, a tendency towards 
formalism and rule-following, a socially exclusive and metropolitan outlook [and] a 
corporatist, bunker mentality’.19 The historian of ideas and political theorist Pierre 
Rosanvallon has thus reflected that since 1983 the socialists have adopted a ‘culture of 
government’; but they have continually confused it with a ‘culture of management’: ‘La 
culture de gouvernement est nécessaire, car on ne peut pas se cantonner à la protestation et à 
                                                             
17 Eugène Fournière cited in Wright, ‘Socialism and political identity’, p. 461. 
18 Christophe Prochasson, La gauche est-elle morale? (Paris, 2010), pp. 99-100. 
19 Sudhir Hazareesingh, ‘From left bank to left behind: where have all the French thinkers gone?’, The guardian 
(13.06. 2015) at www.theguardian.com/books/2015/jun/13/from-left-bank-to-left-behind-where-have-the-great-
french-thinkers-gone (viewed 17 June 2015).  
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l’utopie irréalisable. Mais la gauche ne peut se contenter d’accompagner la modernisation du 
monde, elle doit aussi inventer une culture de transformation sociale.’20  
Such trends have thus combined to reduce the authoritative space for intellectuals within 
socialist political institutions. The political analysts Laurent Bouvet and Laurent Baumel, for 
example, observed that the divorce between intellectuals and the PS dates back to the 
Mitterrand era. Intellectuals distanced themselves from PS structures after the Grande Arche 
Congress (December 1991) which, promising to be the long-awaited ‘Bad Godesberg à la 
française’ (a reference to the German Social Democratic Party’s 1959 Bad Godesberg 
convention, when the commitment to a ‘break with capitalism’ was abandoned for more 
social-democratic ideological positions) sounded the death knell for partisan intellectual 
engagement with the socialists.21  
This thesis argues that there has been an increasing lack of space for thoughtful, more 
challenging intellectual voices in the public and media sphere, because of the simple ways in 
which an intelligent public and the mass media have been responding to, and influencing the 
nature of, political debate in this period. The intellectual’s relationship with the public has 
always required them to manipulate the media, since the days of Emile Zola’s article 
‘J’Accuse’, launching the intellectual campaign for revision of the Dreyfus case in a front-
cover newspaper splash. In the 1970s and 1980s, however, scholars were already reflecting 
upon the intellectual constraints of modern forms of communication and suggesting that it 
was increasingly the media that was defining the agenda and form of intellectual debates.22 
The left-wing philosopher Régis Debray, for example, argued that developments in the 
                                                             
20 Pierre Rosanvallon, ‘Les chantiers de Hollande’, L’Obs (30.05.2012) at 
http://bibliobs.nouvelobs.com/actualites/20120518.OBS5839/les-chantiers-de-hollande-par-pierre-
rosanvallon.html (viewed 22 July 2016). 
21 Laurent Bouvet and Laurent Baumel, L’année zéro de la gauche. Fragments d’un discours réformiste (Paris, 
2003), pp. 23-25, 78-79. 
22 Robert Gildea, France since 1945 (Oxford, 1997), p. 185.  
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distribution of symbolic power in France could be divided into three cycles: the university 
cycle of the academic (1880-1930), the publishing cycle of the writer in the literary review 
(1920-1968) and the media cycle dominated by the television celebrity (1968- ) and 
epitomized by Bernard-Henri Lévy (B-HL) and the New Philosophers.23 He denounced the 
latter as ‘an Americanised intelligentsia in a Europeanised France [which] puts the emphasis 
on smiles, good teeth, nice hair and the adolescent stupidity known as petulance’.24 
This thesis updates these discussions by taking into account the key developments in French 
cultural and political life since the turn of the twenty-first century. It thus intersects with 
significant and ongoing debates about the problems of contemporary democracy. It 
particularly draws on Pierre Rosanvallon’s recent series of publications on contemporary 
democracy and political culture.25 He rejects the conventional thesis that, since the 1990s, 
citizens have become increasingly passive and politically apathetic.26 He has demonstrated 
instead that democracy has been evolving from a direct to an indirect form, made possible by 
new media (especially the internet) and the better-educated and more informed nature of 
today’s public.27 Civil society has become more involved than ever in political life, but it has 
been challenging political power and registering its discontent in new ways.28 Until these 
different forms of ‘counter-democratic’ action are consolidated and institutionalized, 
however, he contends that there is a danger of them descending into populism.29 In a similar 
vein, Jacques Julliard has argued that contemporary democracy is characterized by the 
                                                             
23 Régis Debray, Le pouvoir intellectuel en France (Paris, 1979), pp. 61-143. 
24 Régis Debray cited in Jeremy Jennings, ‘Introduction’ in Jeremy Jennings (ed.), Intellectuals in twentieth-
century France. Mandarins and samurais (London, 1993), p. 7. 
25 Pierre Rosanvallon, La contre-démocratie. La politique à l’âge de la défiance (Paris, 2006); La légitimité 
démocratique. Impartialité, réflexivité, proximité (Paris, 2008); La société des égaux (Paris, 2011); Le bon 
gouvernement (Paris, 2015). 
26 Pierre Rosanvallon translated by Arthur Goldhammer, Counter-democracy. Politics in an age of distrust 
(Cambridge, 2008), pp. 1-2, 18. 
27 Ibid., p. 25, 55-56. 
28 Ibid., pp. 67-70, 295-296.  
29 Ibid., pp. 265-273, 299-300. 
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permanent intervention of public opinion in representative democracy. This trend, he 
reflected, is particularly problematic for the left because it represents the disintegration of the 
historic relationship between science and the left that has traditionally provided it with 
intellectual and moral hegemony over society.30 
The historic model of the intellectual from aristocratic times – someone who intervenes in the 
public political sphere in order to enlighten and speak on behalf of the masses against an 
over-mighty state – has thus entirely broken down.31 In the twenty-first century there has, so 
far, increasingly been a direct line between public opinion and politicians and it is more and 
more public opinion and its manifestation through the internet which holds the power. Michel 
Winock thus even went so far as to suggest that, in the contemporary period, ‘nous sommes 
tous des intellectuels.’32 Such a comment, which implies that to be an intellectual no longer 
requires any external authority or expertise, demonstrates how nebulous the contemporary 
treatment of intellectuals has, at times, become. It has, however, been increasingly difficult 
for deeper intellectual voices to be heard in a cacophonous public sphere. In response, many 
intellectuals have retreated into their research, a trend that has been exacerbated by the nature 
of the contemporary research environment; since the 1980s, the number of academics has 
expanded exponentially and research has become increasingly narrow and specialized.  Those 
intellectuals who have been visible in the public sphere have often been skilled 
communicators with a tenuous relationship to the world of academic research.33 The 
expansion of the mass media over the past two decades (the proliferation of private television 
and radio channels) has replaced the intellectual media celebrity with a greater number of 
                                                             
30 Jacques Julliard, La reine du monde. Essai sur la démocratie d’opinion (Paris, 2009), pp. 19-20. 
31Michel Winock, ‘A quoi servent (encore) les intellectuels?’, Le débat 110 (2000), pp. 42-43.  
32 Ibid., p. 43. 
33 Prochasson, ‘Les intellectuels et le Parti socialiste’, pp. 116-119. 
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‘professional intellectuals’, who are drafted in to make general comments on the day’s 
events. In 2000, B-HL, for example, referred to his ‘métier intellectuel’.34  
It is important to put the current crisis into historical context. It is, of course, just the latest 
episode in a long running saga where the left wrings its hands for not being intellectual 
enough. There has never been a golden age when the relationship between intellectuals, the 
PS and wider society was functioning perfectly and when intellectuals were both willing and 
able to prompt the socialists to continually renew and rethink their ideology and discourse as 
society evolved. Prochasson reflected: ‘Il n’est pas… certain que les grands noms qui 
peuplent encore le Panthéon de la vie intellectuelle française aient beaucoup fait pour enrichir 
le stock d’analyses et de propositions dont disposait la gauche.’35 Furthermore, the Liberation 
generation of left-wing intellectuals (c.1945-1956), epitomized by Jean-Paul Sartre, who 
succeeded in both capturing the imagination of the public and in maintaining close ties with 
left-wing political structures (in this case not the socialists but the French Communist Party), 
arguably led the political left into an ideological impasse. The British historian Tony Judt, for 
example, virulently criticized the intellectual engagement of these post-war French 
intellectuals for their conscious blindness towards soviet totalitarianism.36 This thesis 
attempts to shed light on the nature of the problem in contemporary times, while also 
suggesting that the disintegration of the connections between intellectuals, socialist politics 
and wider society has, so far, been particularly acute and problematic in the twenty-first 
century. On the one hand, the old Marxist answers have no longer been resonating with the 
rapidly changing nature of capitalism and of society and, on the other hand, the public has 
                                                             
34 Bernard-Henri Lévy cited in Winock, ‘A quoi servent (encore) les intellectuels?’, p. 40. 
35 Prochasson, ‘Les intellectuels et le Parti socialiste’, p. 118. 
36 Tony Judt, Past imperfect. French intellectuals, 1944-1956 (Oxford, 1992).  
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been clamouring for a more direct and unmediated involvement in political life, made 
possible by modern forms of communication.  
Prochasson reflected that historians have approached the study of intellectuals from either a 
political, sociological or an intellectual angle. Each of these methods, Prochasson contended, 
have weaknesses: political history focuses on actions at the expense of the person; 
sociological history views intellectuals’ work as a product of their sociological environment, 
therefore denying autonomy to their ideas, and intellectual history ignores the influence of the 
social and political context. He believed that these approaches were not incompatible and that 
any serious attempt at intellectual history should combine the three.37 This thesis seeks to rise 
to Prochasson’s challenge. It develops its arguments through three different and concrete 
examples. Chapter one approaches the problem from the perspective of a political moment - 
the 2002 presidential elections. Analysing the before, during and after of the catastrophic 
socialist defeat in the first round of those elections, it is argued that this political event 
reflected how, for some time, intellectuals, the socialists and society had been moving in 
different directions. Having set up the problem of the breakdown of these connections, 
chapters two and three move on to look at two intellectual attempts to rebuild them, by 
fashioning a social democracy for contemporary times. Chapter two turns to look at an 
individual – Vincent Peillon – a rare example of an intellectual who is also a socialist 
politician and has been trying to bridge the gap between the intellectual and political worlds. 
It explores the difficulties encountered by this figure and highlights the tension between his 
personal theory of intellectual engagement and how it has spun out in practice in PS politics. 
The third and final chapter looks at an issue of profound significance within society itself – 
equality – from the angle of intellectual debate. It focuses on Pierre Rosanvallon’s individual 
                                                             
37 Christophe Prochasson, ‘Intellectuals as actors: image and reality’ in Jennings (ed.), Intellectuals in twentieth-
century France, pp. 59-79. 
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work, as well as the production of his ‘atelier intellectuel’- the République des idées - 
founded in 2002.38 It appraises the progress that has begun to be made on the issue of equality 
in intellectual circles, both in terms of rethinking social democracy and in terms of fashioning 
a new form of intellectual engagement more suited to the demands of contemporary 
democracy.  
These three interlocking examples cover the different ways in which intellectuals, party and 
civil society interact in contemporary democracy. They move from a presidential moment in 
which these connections collided in the public sphere, to an individual intellectual working to 
renew socialist politics from within the PS, to attempts to rethink social democracy in the 
intellectual sphere and to make an impact on PS politics from the outside, through civil 
society itself. The three chapters thus allow for a better understanding of how left-wing 
intellectual culture can strive – and fail – or strive – and succeed modestly – to rebuild an 
intellectual connection between political party and civil society in contemporary times.  
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République des idées see www.repid.com/ (viewed 01 June 2016). 
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Chapter One: The 2002 Presidential Elections 
This chapter contends that the historic defeat of the incumbent Prime Minister and socialist 
party candidate, Lionel Jospin, in the first round of the 2002 French presidential elections by 
the far-right FN candidate, Jean-Marie Le Pen (16.1% and 17% respectively) was a political 
moment that reflected the breakdown of the relationship between intellectuals, socialist 
politics and society. It thus sets up the problem of the disintegration of these connections 
through a history of this particular event, looking at the before, during and after of the 
disastrous first round result.  
There was something incongruous about the result itself and it is reasonsable to suggest that it 
was, in part, an historical ‘accident’. The five-year period of Plural Left government (1997-
2002) was widely perceived to have been one of the most successful in the Fifth Republic, 
both in terms of economic and social reforms and in terms of Jospin’s leadership and 
popularity. Furthermore, the incumbent President and Rassemblement pour la République 
(RPR) candidate, Jacques Chirac, had lost considerable credibility, due to a combination of 
the defeat of the right in the 1997 parliamentary elections and a series of alleged corruption 
cases from his time as Mayor of Paris (1977-1995) (he was granted immunity while he 
remained President).39 The PS spokesperson, Vincent Peillon, asserted that ‘Le clef [to 
explaining the defeat], c’est que tout le monde pensait que Jospin serait président.’40 The 
French two-round election system allows minor parties to come to the fore in the first round. 
But this arrangement proved problematic in 2002; there is plenty of evidence to suggest that 
                                                             
39 Laurent Bouvet, ‘The tragedy of the French left’, Open democracy (07.08.2002) at 
www.opendemocracy.net/democracy-newright/article_393.jsp (viewed 03 April 2016). 
40 Vincent Peillon cited in Eric Dupin, Sortir la gauche du coma. Comprendre les racines d’un désastre (Paris, 
2002), p. 13.  
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voters would have selected Jospin in round one, had it not been for the widely held 
assumption that there would be a Jospin-Chirac second round run-off.41 
Despite this element of accident, the disaster of the first round for Jospin and the PS was 
highly revealing. There was a sense that the socialists had been in crisis since the Mitterrand 
era, when the PS had become the dominant party on the left and had reconciled both with the 
market economy and with being a party of government, but had failed to bring about a 
concurrent doctrinal renewal.42 The 2002 political moment can thus be viewed as the first 
time that these deep-seated problems began to have clear electoral consequences. Several 
historians, for example, have suggested that the socialists’ electoral successes since the 1980s 
had only been due to the weaknesses and tactical mistakes of the right.43 This chapter argues 
that the 2002 political moment demonstrated that intellectuals, politics and wider society had 
all increasingly been moving in different directions.  
Part one of this chapter argues that the connections between intellectuals, the PS and voters, 
already unstable since the Mitterrand era, was becoming increasingly so after 2000. It takes 
the March 2001 municipal elections as a starting point as, one year before the presidential 
elections, they foreshadowed many of the problems that were then exposed in 2002. It 
assesses Jospin and the PS’s inability to analyse, and respond to, the issues of society 
revealed by the municipals and thus to prepare effectively for the presidential election. Such 
immobility both reflected and exacerbated the lack of institutional space for intellectual 
voices within the PS. Outside the party left-wing intellectuals, due to a combination of the 
socialists’ state of ideological disarray, the increasing monopoly of the media sphere over 
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public political discussions and their own actions, had in many cases become increasingly cut 
off from contemporary realities and, thus, from politics and the concerns of society. In the 
face of this dearth of political and/or intellectual responses to twenty-first century problems, 
many people were turning to populist discourses that, at the very least, recognized and gave a 
voice to their concerns.  
Part two of this chapter moves on to look at how the links between intellectuals, the socialists 
and the wider voting public played out during the campaign itself (broadly defined as from 
the moment when Jospin declared his candidacy on 21 February 2002). It argues that Jospin 
and the socialists, unable to reflect upon and devise a new vision for contemporary times, 
peddled a highly technocratic programme, obsessively focused on Chirac’s personality and, 
constrained by their long-term ideological confusion and the amount and diversity of left-
wing candidates, gave contradictory messages about their political positioning. Many people 
were cut out of the campaign at a time when they were desperate for explanations of, and 
responses to, the contemporary challenges of globalization and identity. The reflection of 
those few intellectuals who were directly involved in the socialist campaign was swallowed 
up by the party machinery and by the PS’s internal difficulties. Other intellectuals, finding 
little in the socialist programme to inspire debate or engagement, and faced with the 
challenges of being heard in the public sphere, largely watched passively on as the FN rose in 
the polls.  
Part three begins to consider the wider ramifications of the 2002 political moment, which 
chapters two and three of this thesis then expand. It begins by looking at the political 
responses to the result and analyses how socialist politics unfolded until the Dijon Congress 
(16-18 May 2003). It is argued that the obsessions of the politicians, notably blaming Jospin, 
the other left candidates, or ideological positioning, pushed intellectual reflection to the 
sidelines and prevented a convincing doctrinal clarification, which may have helped to put 
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the PS back in touch with society. Given that there was so little room for intellectual renewal 
from within PS structures, this part then turns to the immediate aftermath of 2002 in the 
intellectual sphere. It takes the project Il s’est passé quelquechose… le 21 avril 2002, a 
collection of essays by researchers in the social sciences, which all analysed 2002 from the 
perspective of their own specialisms, as a case study. It argues that some intellectuals did 
seek to engage with the wider significance of the defeat and to rethink the connections 
between intellectuals, the socialists and the rest of society. These attempts, however, 
floundered in the face of the challenges to intellectual engagement in the contemporary 
context, beyond just the lack of space in PS politics. It then contends that these continued 
difficulties, in both the political and intellectual spheres, were compounded by the 2005 
referendum on the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe. This new shock repeated 
and intensified many of the problems revealed in 2002.  
Part I: Before the Presidential Campaign 
The disastrous result of the first round of the 2002 presidential elections has often been 
referred to as a ‘shock’ or ‘earthquake’, yet there were signs that the socialists had ingrained 
problems long before 2002.44 A combination of a deep-seated inability to update their 
doctrine since the decline of Communism, and the demands of upholding the unity of the 
Plural Left while in government, meant that Jospin and the socialists largely failed to take on 
board the setback of the March 2001 municipal elections and retreated into political 
management and ministerialism respectively. Pierre Moscovici and Pierre Mauroy tried to get 
their voices heard, to involve intellectuals and to re-launch doctrinal debates in preparation 
for the presidential elections. While first and foremost politicians and not intellectuals, the 
fact that they found themselves on the margins of PS discussions illustrates the lack of space 
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for intellectual renewal in socialist politics at this time. In the intellectual sphere, left-wing 
intellectuals had themselves also become increasingly insular; many had either retreated into 
their own research, settled into a far-left radicality, or were reasserting strong nationalist neo-
republicanism. By the time the campaign got underway in earnest at the end of February, 
there were already signs of a marked and problematic separation between intellectuals, 
socialist politics and the rest of society.  
The electoral analyst Pierre Martin stated that the results of the March 2001 municipal 
elections ‘ont confirmé la faiblesse de l’assise électorale du gouvernement Jospin, la percée 
de l’extrême gauche antigouvernementale, la force des Verts, le déclin du parti communiste 
et la persistance de l’influence électorale de l’extrême droite malgré sa division’.45 These 
elections therefore revealed some troubling trends for the left in general, and for the PS in 
particular. The socialists lost twenty-three towns of more than thirty-thousand inhabitants and 
leading PS ministerial figures, notably Pierre Moscovici, Catherine Trautmann, Jack Lang 
and Elisabeth Guigou, all lost their seats. The results also suggested that the PS electorate 
was shifting sociologically. The PS won traditionally conservative and bourgeois cities like 
Paris and Lyon, but were defeated in many predominantly working-class towns.46 
These defeats were acknowledged by the PS leadership, which diagnosed some of the central 
problems at their conseil national on 27 March 2001.  Principally, the socialists identified a 
rising preoccupation with insecurity amongst the lower classes, now that unemployment had 
begun to be tackled, and a growing frustration over what were felt to be the insufficient 
benefits of economic growth.47 Those socialist figures who tried to produce a more cogent 
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critique of the results and to provoke a renewal of socialist doctrine, however, were 
continually frustrated. In Un an après, which considered the 2002 presidential election defeat 
one year on, Pierre Moscovici, then Minister for European Affairs, claimed that in the wake 
of the municipal elections he had conversations with intellectuals and specialists and then 
wrote a note to Jospin that highlighted how the government and the socialists had lost the 
support of the working classes.48 The attempt to build an alliance between the excluded, the 
working classes and the middle classes, he contended, had squeezed them out. Moscovici 
considered that the working classes were not feeling the benefits of the improved economic 
climate, which could ‘accentuer une forme de divergence entre les classes moyennes, qui 
pourraient maintenant se contenter de mesures de régulation économiques et sociales, et les 
classes populaires, qui demeurent inquiètes et demandeuses de mesures plus 
interventionnistes tout en se sentant parfois frustrées des bienfaits de l’embellie’.49 The 
socialists, he suggested, needed to be more in touch with social realities, stop focusing on the 
successes of their governmental record and start work on a revised project for 2002. 
Moscovici, who has connections with the progressive intellectual think tank the Fondation 
Jean-Jaurès, thus indicated that a lack of reflection by the government and the PS on the 
nature of contemporary society was leading to a popular dissatisfaction with socialist 
supply.50 
Moscovici claimed that he had reflected on the lack of ideas and debate within the PS, which 
he had then tried to address by encouraging Jospin to set up a group, which would have 
included intellectuals, to work on a revised project from the spring of 2001. Jospin, he 
maintained, had rejected the idea, asserting that the best way to regain credibility with the 
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public was simply to see the government through.51 Such a managerial attitude, and the 
corresponding resistance to any change of direction, is corroborated by the leading PS 
minister and the founder of the Fondation Jean-Jaurès, Pierre Mauroy.52 Mauroy wrote in his 
memoirs that as early as 1999, and especially since the municipal elections, he had repeatedly 
drawn attention to a destructive gap between a government which believed it was enacting 
positive reforms and many citizens who, on an individual level, felt excluded from this 
‘France qui gagne’. Like Moscovici, he held that his analyses were ignored.53 
These examples, while only two accounts and written with hindsight and perhaps and element 
of self-justifiction, suggest that there was little room for intellectual reflection in socialist 
politics, which was, in turn, rendering Jospin and the PS unable to take on board the element 
of sanction already being expressed by the electorate. Rather than using the election period to 
look to the future, an approach which is arguably central to the socialist movement whose 
political culture focuses on the idea of social transformation, they fell into political 
management and an off-putting defence of their governmental record to date.54 The 
relationship between intellectual reflection, the PS and the electorate, was already looking 
increasingly dysfunctional. The literature produced by PS members between September 2001 
and April 2002 further demonstrates that the socialist approach to the campaign was, from the 
outset, often inward and backward looking. Bénédicte Delorme-Montini, for example, 
observed that the predominant theme in such writings was ‘autosatisfaction’.55 The first 70% 
of Jospin’s campaign book, for example, focused on his political career and the government’s 
record, leaving only eighty-one pages for the ‘réflexions et projets’ section, the first part of 
which was spent denouncing Chirac.56 Jospin’s wife, the intellectual Sylviane Agacinski, 
                                                             
51 Ibid., p. 167. 
52 The Fondation Jean-Jaurès was founded in 1992 and Pierre Mauroy was its president up until 2013.  
53 Pierre Mauroy, Mémoires‘“Vous mettrez du bleu au ciel”’ (Paris, 2003), pp. 474-476. 
54 Ibid., pp. 475-476. 
55 Bénédicte Delorme-Montini, ‘La campagne présidentielle à travers des livres’, Le débat 21 (2002/4), p. 22.  
56 Lionel Jospin with Alain Duhamel, Le temps de répondre (Paris, 2002). 
26 
 
even admitted in her published diary that Jospin dedicated most of his time to the first section 
and rushed to complete the final part.57 
The turn towards political management is particularly revealing because it could be argued 
that Jospin, despite being an énarque, has been one of the most reflective socialist politicians 
of recent years. In the 1990s, he seemed to be making considered attempts to reduce the 
Mitterrandian gap between discourse and practice and to articulate an intelligent and modern 
left-wing reformism around the distinction ‘Oui à l’économie de marché, non à la société de 
marché.’58 The progressive inability to theorize his social democracy, and to adapt it to the 
early twenty-first century context, therefore illustrates the extent to which long-term issues 
were continuing to haunt the PS. Julliard, for example, has contended that in the late 
twentieth and early twenty-first centuries, revolution as a means of change has been 
discredited and that the revolutionary reference has even been largely abandoned by the 
socialists. Reformism, however, he argued, has continued to be demonized, despite the lack 
of a credible alternative. The socialists’ internal debates have therefore no longer been 
between revolution and reform but, paradoxically, between reform and the maintenance of 
the status quo. Such arguments, he reflected, have been preventing the socialists from 
articulating a global vision, which could respond to society’s increasingly diverse and 
conservative tendencies.59 The only progressive discourse that has been able to unite the left 
in recent years, he noted, has been a vague human rights moralism (the defence of minority 
rights). Pursued on its own, Julliard asserted, such a discourse has been putting the socialists 
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increasingly out of touch with their traditional electorate, which has therefore been turning to 
populist groups like the FN.60  
In the context of the lead-up to the 2002 presidential campaign, Julliard’s understanding of 
the triangular relationship between intellectual reflection, the PS and wider society, is 
evidenced by the ramifications of maintaining unity across the Plural Left, which was 
becoming increasingly difficult to manage due to the pull of the 2002 elections. The 
challenge was particularly problematic since the changes to the electoral calendar (the 
presidential elections would, for the first time, precede the legislative elections) had put an 
extra focus on the presidentials. Jospin progressively pursued a vague pluralism. The first 
detailed study of Jospin’s social and economic policy, published in this pre-campaign period, 
for example, was entitled Monsieur ni-ni, l’économie selon Jospin and it highlighted Jospin’s 
tendency to define his positions in the negative and to prioritize balance over a clear way 
forward.61 As the socialist historian and member of the PS Alain Bergounioux observed, 
Jospin’s reformism had become inward-looking, making PS ideology simply ‘la résultante 
moyenne des idées et des courants qui vont du centre à l’êxtreme gauche’.62 PS doctrine was 
formed in relation to the other left parties and to the PS’s own courants, rather than by 
analysing society and its demands as they evolved.  
In the aftermath of the municipal elections, for example, Jospin and the socialists proved 
unable to provide a cogent response to the electorate’s rising concerns about insecurity. 
Security has been a particularly divisive issue for the left. Hervé Algalarrondo, a journalist 
for the Nouvel Observateur, for example, demonstrated that it has been too problematic for 
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the PS to take a tougher stance on security because of the continued strength of human rights 
and libertarian discourses.63 At the PS’s conseil national immediately following the municipal 
elections, Jospin thus explained that he was not willing to run the risk of ‘making his plural 
left explode’ over security policy.64 This inability to articulate a clear social-democratic 
response to society’s contemporary issues, of which insecurity is just one example, risked 
legitimizing further-left discourses. This perhaps goes some way to explaining the 
multiplicity of candidates on the left in 2002 and the continued strength of the extreme anti-
capitalist and anti-globalization left, as well as that of the far right.65 
While politicians like Moscovici and Mauroy tried to get their voices heard and to renew 
socialist ideology, there seems to be little evidence of intellectuals themselves directly 
attempting to have an influence within the PS in this period. The aftermath of the municipal 
elections therefore illustrated and exacerbated the long-term decline of partisan intellectual 
engagement with the PS which, as discussed in the introduction to this thesis, had been 
particularly marked since the Grande Arche Congress (December 1991).66 Unable to engage 
with the socialists, many left-wing intellectuals had themselves retreated from contemporary 
realities, severing the connections between intellectuals and wider society. Highly interlinked 
developments in the intellectual sphere were thus further compounding the disintegration of 
the relationship between intellectual reflection, the socialists and society.  
The decline of partisan intellectual engagement, for example, was particularly problematic in 
France due to the lack of alternative spaces for intellectuals to get involved in political 
discussions. In particular, in 2002, France largely lacked the think-tank culture that had 
developed in other countries, like the United Kingdom. Contemplating the reasons for the 
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2002 result, the historians and socialist sympathizers Vincent Duclert, Christophe Prochasson 
and Perrine Simon-Nahum wrote: 
Il existe bien un problème de réflexion au sommet… comment ne pas remarquer 
que la France se caractérise à la fois par une séparation, quasiment inédite dans les 
autres grandes démocraties, entre les mondes académique, politique, administrative 
et économique, et par une connivence, détachée de toute exigence de penser, d’une 
fine couche non représentative de ces différents sphères ? Quels sont, dans 
l’Hexagone, les lieux communs de réflexion sur le réel et d’élaboration de projets 
pour l’avenir, qui réunissent ces univers qui s’ignorent ?67  
The media sphere was consequently being given a significant monopoly over political 
discussions and, as these intellectuals explained from their own experiences with the media, it 
was often hostile to researchers.68 This twofold marginalization of intellectuals, both by the 
PS and by the media, caused many to withdraw into their own specialisms, creating a 
distance between their work and contemporary French politics and society.69 Contemplating 
the 2002 result, the left-wing philosopher Nicolas Tenzer, for example, noted that many 
intellectuals were actively defending their work against any possible practical implications.70 
While intellectuals had to be responsible and aware of the limitations of what research could 
do in politics, he argued, they nonetheless had a role to play in, for example, the political 
battle against the far right.71 In a similar vein, Duclert deplored the lack of serious academic 
studies on the far right and criticized historical work on the Republic, which, he observed, 
often failed to explain its possible implications for the here and now.72  
The decline of ‘realist’ intellectuals, who were otherwise sympathetic to the socialist cause, 
was being exacerbated by the increasing dominance of oppositional (to the PS) left-wing 
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groupings which, moreover, were receiving much more media attention. Hazareesingh 
demonstrated, for example, that nostalgia for a perceived golden era of intellectual 
engagement has meant that the media and the wider French public have retained a soft-spot 
for intellectual radicality which, as opposed to more moderate intellectual reflection, is more 
in touch with the legacy of intellectual engagement.73 Since the mid-1980s, after the cooling 
down of the anti-totalitarian critique, there had been a breakdown of the liberal intellectual 
consensus and the rise of a hard left that has been rethinking Marxism, anarchism or the 
green agenda (for example the eminent sociologist and ‘public intellectual’ Pierre Bourdieu, 
the sociologist and philosopher Edgar Morin, the sociologist Christian Laval and the 
philosophers Etienne Balibar, Miguel Abensour, Jancques Rancière, Pierre Dardot and 
Bernard Stiegler). This radical left seems to have been little involved in the 2002 presidential 
election campaign, but the movement demonstrates that many intellectuals had, for some 
time, no longer been PS sympathizers. Furthermore, Julliard argued that these intellectuals, 
specifically the grouping around Bourdieu, were themselves cut-off from the working classes. 
Disappointed with the working classes’ growing conservatism, Julliard contended, they had 
substituted immigrants for the proletariat, creating a sense of mutual distrust between 
intellectuals and the working classes which, in turn, was feeding populism.74  
Another group of opposition left-leaning intellectuals, which particularly emerged in 
response to the 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks in America, was the disparate group of 
media-savvy neo-republican intellectuals, many of whom rallied to Jean-Pierre 
Chevènement’s candidacy (announced as early as 4 September 2001).75 They were 
reasserting strong nationalist and secularist republicanism, as a response to questions of 
globalization, immigration and identity. Those directly supporting Chevènement notably 
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included the eminent intellectual and student of French left-wing republicanism Régis 
Debray, the journalist, politician and biographer of Jaurès Max Gallo, the philosopher and 
journalist Paul Thibaud, the historian and specialist of political ideas and institutions Claude 
Nicolet, the historian Emmanuel Todd, the writer and founder of the French news magazine 
Marianne Jean-François Kahn, and the eminent historian of ideas, philosopher and political 
analyst Pierre André Taguieff. In a polemical essay published in the aftermath of 2002, the 
liberal historian Daniel Lindenberg, close to Rosanvallon, argued that these intellectuals, 
which he derisively termed the ‘new reactionaries’, were complicit in Jospin’s elimination.76 
There are problems with the essay; Lindenberg tended to criticize individuals rather than 
truly tackling their ideas and he conflated the views of ideologically diverse figures. 
However, he convincingly demonstrated the early signs of a breakup of the left liberal 
progressive grouping and the retreat of these intellectuals into various forms of  ‘declinism’.77 
In the 2002 campaign year, these intellectuals produced a large amount of literature deploring 
France’s ‘collapse’.78 One such essay, for example, was Patrick Bloch, Emmanuel Pierrat and 
Marc Gauchée’s La culture, quand même! Pour une politique culturelle, which argued that 
European and international regulations threatened France’s cultural exception.79 As with the 
radical intellectual movement, this phenomenon was undermining the relationship between 
intellectuals, the PS and the voting public. Not only were these intellectuals opposing the 
socialists, they also largely failed to connect with the electorate yet, due to the media 
coverage they received, they influenced the intellectual climate of the campaign and, by 
espousing similar themes, they actively, if unwittingly, legitimized the far right. While 
Chevènement was credited with as much as 15% in the polls at the beginning of 2002, for 
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example, his score rapidly began to flag once Le Pen entered the field.80 Chevènement’s 
movement was above all an intellectual one. Delorme-Montini therefore reflected: ‘le Pôle 
républicain [the organization of committees supporting Chevènement] est plus un phénomène 
intellectuel qu’un rassemblement politique, dont le succès s’estime au regard du nombre 
d’auteurs qu’il attire plus qu’au nombre de suffrages qu’il récolte.’81 
The aftermath of the municipal elections thus illustrates the extent to which intellectuals, the 
socialists and the public were out of step. A combination of the socialists’ state of ideological 
confusion and the demands of the public media sphere meant that socialist politicians and 
many left-wing intellectuals had become increasingly insular. They were thus isolating 
themselves both from each other and from the public, which, as a result, was already turning 
to populism and abstention.82 
Part II: The First Round Presidential Campaign  
At the end of February, Jospin was polling 23 % of voter intentions, yet on 21 April he scored 
only 16 %.83 This crucial drop of seven percentage points suggests that the campaign itself 
played a significant part in the final outcome. The flawed and lacklustre nature of Jospin’s 
campaign was a sign of the continued breakdown of the connections between intellectual 
reflection, the socialists and the concerns of the electorate, which had already become 
increasingly apparent in the lead up to the campaign. The presidential platform, the 
significance and implications of the electoral slogan ‘Présider autrement’, Jospin’s 
contradictory comments about his political positioning and the lack of involvement of those 
intellectuals who were supposedly sympathetic to the socialist cause all played their part. 
                                                             
80 David S. Bell, ‘France: the left in 2002 – the end of the Mitterrand strategy’, Parliamentary Affairs 56 (2003), 
p. 31.  
81 Delorme-Montini, ‘La campagne présidentielle à travers les livres’, p. 31.  
82 In the municipal elections 37% of Plural Left sympathizers did not come out to vote. Amongst the working 
classes abstention was 40% and 53% for under 25s. Figures taken from Mauroy, Mémoires, p. 474.  
83 Denis Pingaud, L’impossible défaite (Paris, 2002), p. 10.  
33 
 
Unable to formulate a vision for the future, Jospin and the socialists armed themselves with a 
technocratic and uninspiring programme, focused on criticizing Chirac above and beyond 
ideas and convictions and struggled to articulate what it meant to be on the left. In the 
process, many people were cut out of the socialist campaign. Those few intellectuals who 
were directly involved in setting out the presidential platform ended up fulfilling a largely 
technocratic role, while others found little of inspiration in the socialist campaign. Faced with 
the continued hostility of the public media sphere, intellectuals largely failed to get involved 
publicly with the campaign.  
The Socialist Campaign 
Prochasson argued that since Communism has largely been discredited, the French left has 
either been stuck in realism, in the case of the centre left, or dogmatism and moralism, in the 
case of the far left, and that neither of these discourses are in touch with the humanist values 
of the left’s political culture, which could help clarify its identity in the present. He reflected 
that, no longer knowing what they are aiming for, socialist programmes have become 
increasingly technical - a sign of their ‘presentism’:  
Son programme n’est plus porté par une vision ambitieuse de transformation. Ce 
qui ne signifie pas qu’il faille en revenir aux vieilles lunes des lendemains qui 
chantent et de la rupture avec le capitalisme qui n’est pas à l’échelle humaine. Mais 
un programme confié aux technocrates qui réduisent la politique au règlement de 
problèmes qui tous auraient une solution… conduit la gauche à perdre sa vocation 
et sa singularité… En bref il manque à la gauche une ossature morale et 
intellectuelle.84  
Prochasson’s analysis is supported by Jospin’s presidential programme, released on 18 
March. The project contained many practical and discernibly left-wing proposals, including 
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the creation of a right to life-long training, the reduction of housing tax, a universal housing 
provision, a new stage in administrative decentralization, a constitutional commitment to the 
development of a European federation of nation states and the abolition of the debt of 
developing countries.85 Both the media and the public, however, saw little difference between 
Jospin’s programme and Chirac’s; the platform thus largely failed to connect with the public 
and did little to advance the campaign.86 The discrepancy between the content of the 
document and its reception can partly be explained by the damaging effects of cohabitation, 
which had blurred the distinction between the two candidates.87 In line with Prochasson’s 
analysis, however, it also further demonstrated that Jospin and the socialists had largely 
abandoned reformism for a culture of management and were increasingly unable to define 
and project what they stood for. The long-winded, forty-page, document lacked an 
overarching theme and was, above all, an unmemorable catalogue of practical measures.88 
Jospin’s presidential programme thus epitomized the PS’s retreat into a managerial, as 
opposed to a theoretical, reformism, which came at the expense of a wider vision to engage 
and inspire the public. The programme also provides a further insight into the dysfunctional 
nature of the connection between the PS and intellectuals because it was actually put together 
by those few intellectuals who were still actively engaged with socialist politics. The team in 
charge of the programme was headed by Moscovici, supported by his political advisor and 
the managing director of the Fondation Jean-Jaurès, Gilles Finchelstein, Vincent Peillon, the 
party spokesman but also a philosopher and devotee of late nineteenth and early twentieth-
                                                             
85 Lionel Jospin, Je m’engage, accessible at http://miroires.ironie.org/socialisme/www.psinfo.net/ (viewed 10 
March 2016). 
86 Even Le Monde interpreted the programme as centrist. See, for example, Ariane Chemin and Michel 
Noblecourt, ‘Lionel Jospin présente, à son tour, son programme aux Français’, Le Monde (18.03.2002) at 
www.lemonde.fr (viewed 12 April 2016); According to L’Express, 74% of the electorate could not tell the 
difference between Jospin’s programme and Chirac’s: L’Express (12.04.2002) cited in David Howarth and 
Georgios Varouxakis, Contemporary France. An introduction to French politics and society (London, 2003), p. 
81. 
87 Bouvet, ‘The tragedy of the French left’. 
88 Pingaud, L’impossible défaite, p. 178. 
35 
 
century left-wing thinkers, and the socialist historian Alain Bergounioux. These intellectuals 
have all produced detailed and thoughtful work on questions of social democracy in the 
academic sphere.89 The final nature of the programme, however, demonstrates that they 
largely failed to make an impact intellectually in the campaign. Bouvet’s and Baumel’s 
comments about the death of partisan intellectual engagement should therefore be nuanced. 
There was still a small intellectual core within the PS, but there was such a marked lack of 
space for considered reflection, that any intellectual impact was often lost in favour of more 
technocratic work. 
These intellectuals were highly frustrated with the process of creating the document. The film 
director Denis Pingaud, who was helping to make a documentary about the PS campaign and 
had regular access to socialist meetings, related that Moscovici and Finchelstein took 
themselves for an hour-long walk around Paris together after the final meeting about the 
programme because they were so infuriated that Jospin’s penchant for synthesis across the 
left’s ideological spectrum had perverted their ideas.90 Although there is an element of 
hindsight and, probably, self-defence to their comments, Bergounioux and Moscovici have 
corroborated this sense of exasperation. Bergounioux asserted that the project ‘a été discuté, à 
de nombreuses reprises, par les principaux ministres socialistes du gouvernement et les 
dirigeants socialistes. Ce mode d’élaboration lui a donné plus l’aspect d’un programme 
législatif, que le caractère d’une vision pour la France.’91 Continuing his comments on the 
aftermath of the municipal elections, Moscovici wrote that Jospin, still believing that the 
governmental record would speak for itself, had failed to prioritize the programme and 
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simply did not give the team the time to think deeply (work on the project only got started 
properly in February). Recognizing the limitations of the project, he noted:  
Etait-il vraiment possible de faire autrement, quand nous n’avions eu que peu de 
semaines pour prendre de nouvelles options sur la sécurité, pour faire nos choix sur 
les institutions, pour redéfinir une politique internationale et européenne, pour 
imaginer une nouvelle perspective économique et sociale? Il fallait, en même 
temps, réfléchir, écrire, arbitrer, inventer, trancher entre les positions fortement 
antagoniques.92 
The PS campaign therefore struggled because it lacked a sense of vision, which could 
challenge Chirac’s and the FN’s excessive focus on insecurity. This lack of imagination was 
further demonstrated, and consolidated, by the socialists’ presidential campaign slogan 
‘Présider autrement’. It was designed to ‘presidentialize’ the incumbent Prime Minister 
Jospin, but it increasingly translated into an excessive focus on Chirac’s lack of credibility 
and on his ‘failure’ to keep the promises he made in the 1995 presidential elections.93 The 
focus on Chirac was partly due to an understandable, if tactically risky, focus on the second 
round, as well as a need, after cohabitation, to draw attention to the differences between the 
two candidates. On a deeper level, however, it signified that, lacking ideas, the socialists had 
subordinated imagination and debate to personalities and, in the process, had become 
increasingly detached from the electorate.  
The disconnection between the socialist campaign and the wider voting public is particularly 
demonstrated by one of the great gaffes of the socialist campaign. On 10 March on a plane 
journey back from La Réunion, Jospin commented, in earshot of several journalists, that 
Chirac was ‘vieilli, ‘fatigué’ and ‘usé’.94 When Jospin’s remarks were reported in the press, 
they provoked a storm of criticism and Jospin dropped four points in the polls, demonstrating 
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a public distaste for such personal attacks.95 The comment undermined Jospin’s decency, 
which, up to this point, had been one of his key strengths.96 Prochasson, for example, has 
argued that personal behaviour is crucial on the left as it goes to the heart of socialist values: 
‘Rien ne mine plus sérieusement l’homme de gauche que de ne pas savoir mettre en accord 
ses mœurs avec l’éthique exigeante que lui imposent les valeurs de générosité et d’honnêteté 
dont le socialisme est fait.’97 Jospin’s comment was unfortunate and was not intended to be a 
public statement. However, it became an issue because Jospin had already made the 
campaign about personalities. Jospin’s insults undermined his promise to ‘Présider 
autrement’, while further giving the impression that the socialist campaign was, above all, a 
personal battle with Chirac.98 Chirac was quick to capitalize on the gaffe, stating: ‘J’ai fait 
des propositions que je croyais utiles sur la sécurité, la santé, l’économie, l’emploi, et 
j’attends les propositions des autres candidats et notamment celles de M. Jospin. Et qu’est-ce 
que j’entends ? Des propos sur le physique, le mental, la santé. C’est tout de même un peu 
curieux.’99 
The technical nature of the campaign, brought about by the socialists’ state of intellectual 
vacuity, combined with the interrelated narrow focus on Chirac, isolated Jospin’s campaign 
from much of the electorate. Moscovici, for example, stated: 
« Présider autrement »: c’était suggérer, même si ce n’était évidemment pas notre 
conviction, que l’enjeu central de l’élection n’était pas la lutte contre l’insécurité, la 
bataille contre les inégalités, la maîtrise de la mondialisation, mais bel et bien, 
simplement de changer de Président »… Lionel Jospin, qui avait tant fait, qui en 
était si capable, n’a jamais dit aux Français pendant la campagne présidentielle: 
« J’aime la France, je suis des vôtres, je veux vous servir, je suis attaché à des 
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valeurs qui nous sont communes, je souhaite une France plus juste dans un monde 
plus sûr, voilà où nous irons ensemble si vous m’élisez Président ».100 
The struggle to connect with the electorate was also starkly revealed by another of the great 
gaffes of the campaign. The only time that Jospin truly met with the working-class electorate 
was an unplanned, but highly televised, conversation with delegates from the Lu factory in 
the Essonne on 13 March. Asked what he was going to do to help workers who were being 
laid off by highly profitable international companies, Jospin cited the government’s record on 
reducing unemployment. There was then an embarrassed silence when Jospin was asked: 
‘Monsieur, est-ce que vous pouvez vivre avec 4000 francs par mois?’101 The delegate was an 
activist from the Trotskyite Lutte Ouvrière party, so this episode was, to a certain extent, a 
stitch up. All the same, Jospin should have been trying to reach out to this far-left electorate. 
His statistical response, followed by his complete lack of a response, to what were reasonable 
concerns about the implications of globalization on job security, sharply demonstrated that 
the retreat into political management was rendering the socialists unable to take on board the 
new and complex challenges faced by their traditional working-class electorate. 
Towards the end of March, the polls began to reveal that Jospin’s popularity was declining in 
favour of other candidates, especially Lutte Ouvrière’s Arlette Laguiller.102 The socialists 
finally began to recognize that they were losing the support of the working classes. On 19 
March, at the bureau national du Parti socialiste, Mauroy stated: ‘Quand je feuillette le 
projet… je cherche les travailleurs.’ He insisted a few days later: ‘Il faut utiliser les mots de 
travailleurs, d’ouvriers ou d’employés: ce ne sont pas des gros mots ! La classe ouvrière 
existe toujours.’103 How Jospin and the socialists attempted to reverse this trend, and to win 
the far-left votes, however, further reveals the breakdown of the relationship between 
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intellectual reflection, the socialists and the public. The socialists had great difficulty 
articulating what it meant to be on the left in the contemporary context. 
Duclert has argued that due to the long-term demands of unity, the socialists have lost touch 
with the issues raised by nineteenth and early twentieth-century libertarian socialism, which 
could provide some insight into questions of socialist identity in the present.104 This struggle 
has been demonstrated, he contended, by the socialists’ superficial and mythological 
relationship with history.105 The lack of a critical relationship with their history has been 
preventing the PS from forming a vision of the world, which could engage the public in the 
present. The left, having marginalized intellectual reformist voices, he wrote, have become 
purely political, focusing on parties, elections and government.106 Duclert’s grasp of the 
connections between intellectuals, the socialists and wider society, which is closely related to 
Prochasson’s, is supported by Jospin’s confused and contradictory attempt to position himself 
ideologically during the campaign. When he announced his candidacy, probably in an attempt 
to open up to the centre, Jospin declared that ‘The programme I represent is not 
socialist.’107At the end of March, however, Jospin tried to reclaim a position on the left. He 
stated that he was ‘le candidat de la France qui travaille… [de ceux qui] travaillent dans une 
chaîne d’usine, derrière la caisse d’un supermarché, auprès des malades dans un hôpital ou 
sur un tracteur’ and he cited Victor Hugo: ‘Parce que la misère n’attend pas, les reformes, 
mêmes partielles, doivent être réalisées dès à présent.’108 Rather than attempting to give a 
left-wing vision, which could satisfy the early twenty-first century fears of the working 
classes about globalization and insecurity, Jospin’s definition of what it meant to be on the 
left was sociological, mythological and nostalgic. Studies have demonstrated that this 
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rhetorical shift had no positive impact on the electorate.109 The unsubtle left-turn further 
blurred the socialists’ message and gave the impression that the campaign was about tactics 
rather than convictions.110 
In one sense, the flaws of Jospin’s presidential campaign were about poor campaign 
management; however, on a deeper level they thus also reflected the PS’s state of intellectual 
existential confusion. The socialists struggled to articulate what their values were when it 
came to the questions of globalization that were beginning to dominate twenty-first century 
politics. This difficulty was then isolating the socialists from much of their electorate, by 
preventing them from recognizing, analysing, and responding convincingly and holistically 
to, their contemporary concerns. 
Intellectuals and the Socialist Campaign  
It has already been demonstrated that those intellectuals who were directly involved with the 
campaign, working within or alongside the PS, had to sacrifice their intellectual identity for 
more technocratic work. There is also, however, very little evidence of intellectuals 
sympathetic to the socialist cause attempting to connect with the public, to influence public 
political discussions, and thus the intellectual climate of the campaign, in order to combat the 
appeal of the largely non-intellectual populist discourses of the far left and far right. Taking 
Le Monde as a case study, there was a flurry of intellectual engagement trying to rally an anti-
Le Pen vote between rounds. To give just two examples, and there are many more, the 
filmmaker Laurent Heynemann called for artists to ‘relevez la tête’ and the historian and 
specialist of Republican institutions, Maurice Agulhon, wrote an article explaining the 
meaning of the Republic for the present; he criticized Chevènement’s use of the term and 
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explained how security, one of the rights of man, had historically been a fundamental left-
wing value.111 The high level of intellectual engagement between rounds, however, 
contrasted with the dearth of intellectual commentary during the campaign itself. The notable 
exception to a general intellectual passivity was the mathematician Michel Broué’s prophetic 
and passionate article published on 19 April, which warned of the rise of the FN in the polls 
and called for the public to vote for Jospin despite the limitations of his campaign: 
Etes-vous devenus fous ? Le Pen talonne Jospin dans certains sondages!...Vous 
avez voulu lui donner une leçon. Marre des slogans creux, marre des ambiguïtés, 
des paillettes, du « projet socialiste », de la campagne de second tour un mois avant 
le premier tour, de l’électorisme remplaçant les utopies. Bon, d’accord. Mais ne 
savez-vous donc plus ce qui nous attend, nous, notre France, nos services publics, 
nos hôpitaux, notre école laïque, nos protections sociales, nos chemins de fer, si la 
droite revient au pouvoir… ? .... Chirac-Jospin, c’est pareil ? Comme Clinton et 
Bush sans doute !... Si la liasse génération revient aux affaires le 6 mai, il sera trop 
tard. Vous l’aurez pour longtemps, la gueule de bois, et nous avec vous, et nos 
enfants avec nous tous. Réveillez-vous, avant le 21 avril, vite!112 
It is difficult to determine whether the lack of engagement was due to the general vacuity of 
the PS campaign, which meant that there was little for intellectuals to engage with, or the 
continued struggle to get their voices heard in the media. Drawing on the evidence from the 
lead up to the campaign, it was probably a combination of the two. Moscovici, for example, 
argued: ‘L’éloignement des intellectuels, leur désintérêt par rapport à notre projet, ont sans 
doute été un des signes avant-coureurs de notre défaite de 2002.’113 Duclert then cited the 
nature of the media sphere as a central reason for the lack of intellectual involvement during 
the campaign.114 
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The PS had therefore largely abandoned reflection for a form of non-intellectual political 
management and their campaign was thus unable to seduce the contemporary electorate. The 
separation between reflection, the socialists and the public was then further compounded by 
the unprecedented lack of intellectual engagement during the campaign.  
Part III: The Ramifications of 2002 
2002 had longer-term ramifications for the relationship between intellectuals, the socialists 
and wider society. By analysing developments in socialist politics between April 2002 and 
the party’s Dijon Congress (16-18 May 2003), we understand better how the PS’s obsessions 
with purely contingent factors, combined with the rise of a refortified far-left flank, prevented 
any coherent doctrinal reform. 2002 also made an immediate impact in the intellectual 
sphere, where the project Il s’est passé quelque chose provides an illuminating case study for 
intellectuals’ reaction to the shock of the first round defeat of Jospin. Expanding on the 
impassioned debates that unfolded between the two presidential rounds, some intellectuals 
sympathetic to the socialist cause did seek to make an impact on PS politics in light of the 
2002 defeat. The collection attempted to modernize and rebuild the connections between 
intellectuals, the socialists and society, by reconceptualizing the intellectual’s role and by 
making academic work more politically relevant. The project, however, had little impact on 
the PS due to a combination of the problems of party culture and the specialized and disparate 
nature of the project itself. The 2005 referendum on the Treaty Establishing a Constitution for 
Europe then demonstrated how little progress had been made since 2002. The victory of the 
‘no’ campaign in 2005 represented a repeat of the problems revealed by the 2002 defeat and 
illustrated the continued, and perhaps even exacerbated, breakdown of the connections 
between intellectuals, the PS and wider society.   
 
43 
 
The Politicians  
In the wake of the first round result, socialist politicians often failed to recognize and analyse 
the wider significance of the defeat. The first lengthy and highly publicized analyses of the 
event, for example, largely dismissed it as an ‘accident’ or blamed it on Jospin’s personality 
and campaign blunders, or on the behaviour of the other left candidates. The first response, 
published in August 2002, was Jospin’s secretary of state for housing Marie-Noëlle 
Lienemann’s testimony Ma part d’inventaire.115 The work included some thoughtful analysis 
on the changing nature of the working classes, the need to engage with reality and to 
recognize issues such as insecurity and the dangers of Euroscepticism as a response to 
globalization on the left.116 Her overriding diagnosis, however, was that 2002 represented ‘la 
vengeance du peuple de gauche contre Jospin’ and she virulently attacked him, stating that he 
was ‘un peu court pour être Président’ and had an ‘ego hypertrophié’.117 The second, more 
official and less personal, response was a note for the Fondation Jean-Jaurès written by Jean-
Christophe Cambadélis, who was close to Dominique Strauss-Kahn.118 His analysis is much 
more nuanced than Lienemann’s and he claimed to be actively trying to ‘approprier 
intellectuellement [cet échec] pour mieux le dépasser politiquement’.119 While he did attempt 
to look at the bigger picture, suggesting that French society suffered from an ‘ambivalence’ 
brought about by globalization, the dominance of neo-liberalism, increasing individualism 
and a lack of confidence in progress, he could have gone much deeper. Like Lienemann, he 
also focused largely on contingent factors: ‘tout d’abord le séisme politique intervenu le 21 
avril dernier et qui a scellé la défaite de la gauche est pour une part essentielle d’ordre 
conjoncturel et même accidentel. Il n’était donc pas fatal… Sans [les] attaques de nos 
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partenaires contre le gouvernement auquels ils participaient, Jospin aurait été présent au 
second tour.’120 Both Lienemann’s and Cambadélis’s assessments were not unfounded, yet 
they failed to recognize the extent to which the 2002 result also reflected, as discussed above, 
long-term and profound problems on the left. Such analyses thus rendered the PS unable to 
address the problems raised by the event and to begin a process of reform, which could have 
helped to put their politics back in line with the nature, concerns and demands of 
contemporary society. Rather than truly taking on board 2002, and reflecting upon, reaching 
out to, and incorporating society, such interpretations gave the impression that the PS was 
more divided than ever, remained inward-looking and defensive and was descending into a 
battle of egos. These problems of party culture risked further isolating socialist politics from 
intellectuals and from society. A review of Cambadélis’s essay in the far-left-leaning 
newspaper l’Humanité, for example, noted with exasperation that Cambadélis continued to 
‘sous-estimer des attentes des électeurs de gauche… qui… étaient… bien réelle’.121 
Some of the less detailed analyses, however, did move beyond contingent explanations and 
did constitute attempts to rethink and rebuild the connections between intellectual reflection, 
the PS and the electorate. Vincent Peillon, François Rebsamen and Manuel Valls, for 
example, co-authored an article published in Le Monde at the end of August 2002 in which 
they argued that 21 April represented ‘une crise politique profonde’, which required the 
socialists to transcend their internal difficulties, to embark on genuine and novel debates and 
to start a new cycle in socialist history:  
L’histoire frappe à notre porte. Il faut entendre et répondre… Le 21 avril ne peut ni 
ne doit être un simple anneau dans la chaîne du temps. Il doit être une fin et un 
commencement. La fin d’un cycle politique qui a vu la gauche accéder aux 
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responsabilités et par trois fois être battue, n’arrivant pas à répondre dans la durée 
et en même temps aux exigences des siens et à l’intérêt du pays. Le début d’un 
cycle nouveau capable de résoudre cette équation et de mettre en œuvre un 
réformisme radical, populaire sans être populiste, attentif aux contraintes du réel, 
mais ne cédant ni au conformisme ni au renoncement.122 
Furthermore, the suggestions of individuals linked to the jospino-rocardian ‘socialisme et 
démocratie’ courant represented explicit attempts to reinvigorate PS ideas and to incorporate 
civil society. Bergounioux, for example, called for ‘une reconstruction idéologique’ and 
insisted on the need to reconnect with the public by being more representative and open to 
society.123 Strauss-Kahn called for a ‘réformisme réfléchi’ and encouraged research into 
forms of ‘association citoyenne… sous la forme de forums avec des associations, des 
intellectuels et des acteurs sociaux.’ Close to the Policy Network think tank chaired by Peter 
Mandelson, Strauss-Kahn was also keen that socialist reflection transcend national 
boundaries.124 
The Dijon congress (16-18 May 2003), the first congress after the 2002 defeat, however, 
demonstrated that these various attempts at reform were constrained by the continued moral 
hegemony of discourses from the far left of the PS. While Hollande’s ‘réformisme de gauche’ 
prevailed, the three minority far-left motions polled a strong 38 %.125 This resurgence of the 
far left influenced the atmosphere of the congress and meant that there was no genuine 
ideological renewal, or attempt to theorize the ‘réformisme de gauche’. Only Strauss-Kahn, 
for example, seemed to think, or be willing to admit, that the congress truly represented ‘le 
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choix de réformisme’.126 Looking back on the aftermath of 2002, Hollande, then party 
secretary, stated: 
J’ai beaucoup sacrifié à l’unité, peut-être trop… On a souffert d’un manque de 
lisibilité… la ligne réformiste a été largement validée [après 2002] mais 
constamment contredite par la mauvaise conscience, la suspicion de ceux qui 
pensent que nous ne sommes pas suffisamment à gauche. C’est un contresens. Ce 
que demandent les catégories populaires, ce n’est pas de la surenchère; c’est la 
lisibilité et du concret.127  
In line with Bergounioux and Grunberg’s thesis, the ramifications of 2002 thus included a 
strong revival of far-left voices within the PS, arguing that the socialists had been defeated 
because they not been left-wing enough and had therefore ‘betrayed’ and lost the support of 
the electorate.128 Such a stance was epitomized by Henri Emmanuelli and Jean-Luc 
Mélenchon and their courant Nouveau Monde, founded in September 2002. They accused the 
Jospin government of ‘social liberalism’ and argued that their courant would oppose it with 
‘une contestation sans equivoque de la mondialisation libérale’.129 They openly sought to 
‘move the [PS’s] centre of gravity leftward’ and to bring in the Greens, the Communist Party 
and the anti-globalization movements.130 In a polemical article in the Nouvel Observateur, 
Julliard highlighted how paradoxical and defective this far-left understanding of the 
relationship between the socialists and the public was:  
Si j’ai bien compris Henri Emmanuelli, les ouvriers ont voté Le Pen parce que 
Jospin n’était pas assez à gauche… Voilà qui est intéressant. Original. Décoiffant. 
Si dans une usine de sodas que les consommateurs n’achètent plus parce qu’ils les 
trouvent trop sucrés l’ingénieur conseille de rajouter du glucose, il se fait 
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proprement virer… si l’électorat du PS a tendance à glisser à droite, ses militants, 
eux, ont tendance à glisser à gauche.131  
Julliard’s comment was a slightly glib assessment; the electorate had not really moved right 
but, rather, had turned to populist discourses on the left and right, or to abstention. Julliard 
identified, however, how debilitating this historic reflex response was for the PS. A return to, 
or even an intensification of, the stigmatization of reformism and the call for a leftward shift 
distracted attention from any reflection on what it really meant to be on the left in the 
contemporary context. It made it very difficult to rethink social democracy and to come up 
with new and imaginative responses to contemporary issues. Making ‘social liberalism’ into 
an insult, for example, continued to obscure the importance of liberty in socialist political 
culture and tainted any discussions about how to reconcile individualism with solidarity.132  
In the aftermath of 2002, those few attempts to rethink social democracy for contemporary 
times within the political sphere were thus undermined by, and they are highly interlinked, a 
dismissal of the significance of the event and the renewed authority of the historic obsessions 
of the French left. At a time which required contemplation, debate and reform, in order to put 
socialist ideology back in step with the times, and with society, the PS instead descended into 
archaic and immobilizing arguments. While, uncharacteristically, the defeat did not lead to a 
marked leftward shift in the official line, a resurgence of the far left bubbled under the 
surface and the demands of unity thus led to a continued state of ideological confusion. None 
of the questions raised by 2002 were convincingly tackled and the PS’s continued ideological 
vagueness risked further marginalizing both intellectuals and the public. 
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The Intellectuals: Il s’est passé quelque chose… le 21 avril 2002 
In the intellectual sphere, the project Il s’est passé quelque chose… le 21 avril 2002, 
published a year after the 2002 result, constituted a direct attempt by intellectuals to reflect 
upon, and respond to, the socialists’ defeat. The premise of the collection was that 2002 was 
both a political and an intellectual crisis, which had been overlooked and quickly forgotten.133 
The left-leaning historians who directed the project hoped that the collection of essays would 
constitute a first step in overcoming the state of mutual distrust between the intellectual and 
the political spheres. They wanted to demonstrate that intellectuals, particularly those whose 
academic work was in the social sciences, had a crucial role to play in the future and survival 
of French democracy.134 The collection as a whole, as well as each individual contribution, 
was therefore all about rethinking the connections between intellectual work and French 
socialist politics and society. The historian Marion Fontaine, for example, analysed the 
historic left-wing mining region Lens, which had turned to the FN in both rounds of the 
presidential elections.135 She suggested that a use of history could renovate the PS’s political 
culture and help the socialists to reengage with the working classes.136 Rather than viewing 
the Lens region’s mining heritage nostalgically, she thus advocated a complex historical 
understanding of its contemporary relevance.137 Such an approach, she contended, would 
shed light on the disconnection between the local and the national and the working classes 
and the political elites. She concluded: ‘la redéfinition d’une identité et d’une culture de 
gauche semble… être en partie liée à une nouvelle articulation des rapports entre classes 
populaires, partis politiques et intellectuels.’138 The historian Yves Cohen, whose work on 
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l’histoire de l’action has often taken on a transnational dimension, argued that the 2002 
presidential election campaign demonstrated that the only issue able to form a consensus in 
France was that of police and immigration, which, he contended, showed how inward-
looking French politics had become.139 The role of the social sciences, he proposed, should 
be about bringing global issues into political and public debates, in order to form a consensus 
around universal issues. Intellectuals, he suggested, should thus ‘intervenir dans la cité-
monde’.140 The sociologist Eric Fassin then posited that the 2002 defeat was all about 
confused understandings of ‘le peuple’ and their relationship to the elites and to 
‘representation’.141 The socialists’ state of stasis, he argued, could be explained by the fact 
that they were stuck between an Enlightenment understanding and a Marxist understanding, 
both of which view representation as either coming from above or from below, rather than 
being in any way reciprocal.142 He argued that the social sciences could help the socialists to 
overcome this historic difficulty, as they understand that representation is not about 
reflection, for example politicians following public opinion, but the construction of a social 
world.143 
Il s’est passé quelque chose thus demonstrates that 2002 served as a catalyst for increased 
intellectual engagement. There was a sizeable young generation of intellectuals (twenty-six 
individuals contributed to the collection) who, at least in the short term, were keen to make 
their research relevant, to shed light on contemporary democracy and to try to influence 
socialist politics. However, the project struggled to make an impact and in 2005 Duclert and 
Perrine Simon-Nahum, two of the historians who directed the project, lamented that neither 
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socialist politicians nor intellectuals had taken up the themes of the collection.144 On the one 
hand, the project’s failure can be put down to the fact that, as discussed, the 2002 political 
moment had paradoxically further reduced the room for reflection within the PS On the other 
hand, the project also sheds light on some of the wider problems with contemporary 
intellectual engagement, notably the often very specialized and disparate nature of the 
twenty-first century research environment. What is striking about the collection, when 
compared to twentieth-century intellectual engagement, which centred on certain key figures 
and grand theories, for example, is both the number of intellectuals involved and the diversity 
of their comments. As demonstrated, they range from close historical work on a region, to 
philosophical and sociological understandings of representation. Far from providing an easily 
accessible, or succinct, analysis of 2002, with concrete suggestions on how to move forward, 
the collection is a patchwork of specialized and complex responses whose politically utility, 
when taken individually or together, is far from immediately obvious.  
In the aftermath of 2002, the obsessions of the socialist politicians and the problems of party 
culture meant that there was even less room for intellectual reflection within the PS, while the 
nature of the intellectual response was ill adapted to respond to such challenges. These 
problems risked intensifying the state of distrust between the intellectual and the political 
spheres. Socialist politics and left-wing intellectuals continued to move in different 
directions, both largely failing to address the demands of the electorate and the issues of 
society that had been revealed by 2002. 
The Referendum on the Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe (2005) 
The referendum on the Treaty Establishing a Constitution for Europe in May 2005 
demonstrated that little progress had been made by the PS since 2002; it illustrated the 
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continued and accentuated breakdown of the connections between intellectuals, socialist 
politics and wider society. In many respects, it represented a repeat and an intensification of 
the problems of 2002.  
Europe has historically been a particularly divisive issue for the socialists because it 
constitutes a microcosm of historic socialist debates; it necessarily pits Jaurès’s 
internationalist and reformist understanding of socialism against Guesde’s Jacobin, 
nationalist, understanding.145 However, despite continued tensions over Europe, it has been a 
central part of the socialists’ programme, at least since the Mitterrand era. In the 2005 
referendum, however, the PS split over Europe and fought two campaigns: the official 
campaign in favour of the treaty and another, of more or less equal strength, which, merging 
with dissident Greens, Left Radicals and left-wing union elements, opposed the treaty on 
anti-globalization grounds. Given that the European Constitution project largely consolidated 
existing treaties that PS ministers had pioneered in the 1980s and 1990s, this dissident ‘no’ 
campaign represented a rejection of the reformist line pursued in practice, if not in theory, 
since the 1983 reformist turn under Laurent Fabius. The referendum on the European 
Constitution therefore demonstrated that the PS had failed to evaluate and renew their 
doctrine since 2002. The PS’s existential programmatic debates remained unresolved and, 
specifically, the socialists had been unable to reflect upon, and articulate a coherent attitude 
and response to, globalization. The 2002 defeat had actually resulted in the renewed strength 
of increasingly nationalist, inward-looking, far-left responses. 
Faced with the ongoing question of the 2007 presidential candidacy, after Jospin’s 
withdrawal from the political scene, the referendum also demonstrated that personal rivalries 
were taking over from ideas and convictions. The Dijon consensus had broken down and the 
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two PS campaigns were highly personalized. Hollande headed the ‘yes’ campaign and Fabius 
the ‘no’ campaign, giving the impression of an early presidential primary. Fabius’s 
opposition to the party’s official policy, for example, seems to have been particularly 
motivated by personal ambition; it was highly hypocritical because, as Mitterrand’s prodigy, 
he had been one of the primary advocates of the steps towards further European integration in 
the 1980s.  
The result of the 2005 referendum also confirmed that the gap between the PS and the public 
had not been bridged since 2002. The French public rejected the treaty, and thus a big 
component of the PS programme, by 54%. Furthermore, a breakdown of the results estimated 
that 59% of the socialist electorate voted ‘no’.146 This can partly be explained by a desire to 
sanction Chirac and to avoid reinforcing his reputation after 2002, as well as the general 
unpopularity of the Jean-Pierre Raffarin government. It also, however, demonstrated the 
continued triumph of populism, the public’s growing nationalism and conservatism and their 
tendency to blame Europe for all the challenges and downsides of globalization. Michel 
Rocard thus noted that the left-wing electorate had chosen to ‘voter Guesde’.147 Similarly, 
Julliard identified that 2005 illustrated that many people were continuing to move away from 
the idea of progress at the heart of the historic relationship between the proletariat, 
intellectuals and the socialists: ‘Historiquement, qu’est-ce que donc la gauche? L’alliance des 
savants et des prolétaires… Désormais [dès 2005], il manquait à ce véritable front du progrès 
un catalyseur essentiel: la confiance dans l’avenir ! Désormais, l’éternal debat entre la 
Révolution et la Reforme était tranché au profit d’un tiers parti inattendu: celui de la 
conservation.’148 
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The 2005 referendum also confirmed the continued, or perhaps even increased, absence of 
intellectual intervention in French politics and society. With a few notable exceptions (B-HL, 
Agacinski, Bronislaw Geremek, Philippe Sollers, Rosanvallon and Alfred Grosser together 
launched a ‘comité de soutien à la campagne du PS’ in Le Monde) intellectuals largely did 
not get involved publicly in the campaign and, when they did, their intervention was 
somewhat lacklustre.149 Intellectuals continued to be squeezed out of public political 
discussions and the 2005 referendum demonstrated that it was now not only due to the lack of 
space in the PS, the hostility of the media sphere and intellectuals’ own actions. The situation 
was being exacerbated by the growing strength of the horizontal era of internet 
communication. There was an unprecedented level of citizen participation in the 2005 
referendum campaign. The ‘no’ campaign, for example, was dominated by the interventions 
of the economics and management schoolteacher and blogger Etienne Chouard. Hazareesingh 
thus lamented: ‘the European project, the brainchild of Jean Monnet and one of the most 
distinguished creations of Gallic thought, was… effectively pushed to one side by a blogger 
from Marseille.’150 
The aftermath of 2002 therefore revealed the continuation, and even intensification, of the 
dangerous state of mutual distrust between socialist politics, left-wing intellectuals and the 
electorate. The attempts of both intellectuals and politicians to reconstruct and modernize 
these connections after the catastrophic first round result were unsuccessful due to a 
resurgence of the PS’s historic difficulties, the continued challenges of getting heard in the 
media sphere (to which could increasingly be added the rise of the internet and the 
blogosphere) and intellectuals’ own actions - their inability (and/or unwillingness) to respond 
to these obstacles. Faced with the insularity of both socialist politics and left-wing 
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intellectuals, anti-globalization and populist discourses effectively went unchallenged and 
continued to seduce the public. 
Conclusion 
This chapter has used the 2002 political moment to reflect, explore and set up the problem of 
the breakdown of the connections between left-wing intellectuals, the PS and wider society in 
the contemporary context. Looking at the before, during and after of this historic event has 
demonstrated that intellectual socialist sympathizers were struggling to make an impact 
within or outside political structures, or were even actively reasserting the benefits of non-
engaged research. These developments were due to a combination of the problems of socialist 
party culture, the nature of twenty-first century research and the demands of the media 
sphere. The absence of thought-out responses to society’s contemporary problems was, in 
turn, stimulating populist and reactionary voices and contributing to a growing separation 
between the PS and their traditional electorate. Since 2005, the socialists have continued to 
struggle to rethink the relationship between intellectuals, the socialists and wider society. The 
socialist defeat in 2007, for example, demonstrated the lack of progress made between 
presidential elections. Ségolène Royal, the socialist candidate in 2007, for example, tried to 
rekindle a connection between the PS and wider society through ‘participatory democracy’. 
However, while she correctly identified the need to integrate public opinion into socialist 
politics, she largely overlooked the intellectual element and failed to clarify and renew PS 
doctrine.151 Her attempt to rebuild the connections between intellectuals, the socialists and the 
public was highly superficial, as demonstrated by her close, and highly publicized, 
association with the media intellectual B-HL. 
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Chapter Two: Vincent Peillon (1960- ) 
In 2009, Pierre Moscovici referred to Vincent Peillon as ‘Docteur Vincent et Monsieur 
Peillon’.152 The slur has been ubiquitous ever since and it effectively highlights Peillon’s 
unusual hybridity. Since the early 1990s, he has been at once an academic and a socialist 
party apparatchik; he has been so dedicated to this double life that he once claimed to get up 
at four each morning in order to read, research and write before commencing his political 
work.153 Having laid out the problem of the disintegration of the connections between 
intellectuals, socialist politics and wider society from the political perspective, this chapter 
moves on to look at an example of an intellectual and political figure. It assesses Vincent 
Peillon’s attempt to rethink and to reconstruct these connections after the socialist defeats in 
the 2002 and 2007 presidential elections through his own personal form of intellectual 
engagement. It argues that his efforts have so far been largely unsuccessful and that he has 
actually been incarnating the contemporary breakdown of the relationship between 
intellectual reflection, socialist politics and wider society.  
Peillon’s mixed identity poses an interesting question about the definition of an ‘intellectual’ 
in the French sense. In the Dictionnaire des intellectuels français, Julliard and Winock, in 
collaboration with other historians, discussed whether politicians like Charles de Gaulle and 
Georges Clemenceau, both of whom had a very significant intellectual culture behind them, 
could be classed as ‘intellectuals’. They decided to exclude them, arguing that to be an 
intellectual one must reflect on politics by using expertise gained in another domain. De 
Gaulle and Clemenceau were always firmly planted in the professional, political sphere. They 
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did, however, class figures like Léon Blum and Jean Jaurès as intellectuals, as both of them 
had been intellectuals before they became politicians.154 
Peillon falls into this latter category. He comes from a middle-class Jewish, communist, 
family and was immersed in history and academia from an early age. His mother was a 
researcher and his father a communist banker. He thus frequently encountered left-wing 
intellectuals and he noted that he was particularly inspired by the eminent historian, 
philosopher and engaged intellectual Jean-Pierre Vernant, who was a close family friend.155 
Peillon had an impressive trajectory as a student, gaining his baccalauréat at sixteen and his 
licence from the Sorbonne aged twenty. He taught from 1984 to 1997, obtaining the 
agrégation in philosophy, and completed his doctoral thesis on the left-wing philosopher 
Maurice Merleau-Ponty (1992). Throughout his political career, Peillon has continued 
varying levels of academic work. He was a senior research fellow at the Centre nationale de 
la recherche scientifique (CNRS) between 2002 and 2004, has published several 
philosophical essays and set up, and has been leading, the Bibliothèque républicaine with the 
éditions Bord de l’eau, which has been republishing primary documents by nineteenth and 
early-twentieth-century left-wing thinkers.156 
Peillon has a very specific and detailed understanding of the ideal of intellectual engagement, 
outlined in his essay Eloge du politique.  Here, he subsumed the relationship between 
intellectual reflection, politics and wider society into his historical concept of ‘le politique’, 
which he defined as ‘la recherche du bien commun et la participation de tous à cette 
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recherche’. 157 He argued that politics in its true sense is all about a relationship with 
philosophy which has its origins in Greek antiquity. He contended that the central problem of 
the modern era has been the disintegration of this connection. Philosophy has become 
increasingly narcissistic and elitist and has retreated from its practical responsibilities, 
forgetting that ‘nous sommes des créatures finies, des créatures mortelles, et nous devons 
savoir que nous ne pouvons accéder à l’universel qu’à partir d’un coin du temps et de 
l’espace’.158 Politics, in turn, has abandoned reflection; ‘le politique’ has descended into ‘la 
politique’, which he defined as the base search for power.159 Updating Merleau-Ponty’s 
analyses, Peillon argued that contemporary ‘ultraliberal’ society is dominated by two 
deplorable figures, the ‘coquin’, ‘[le] technocrate qui réduit la politique à un art des moyens’, 
and the ‘cynique’ who ‘se satisfait, au milieu du malheur du monde, de la bonté de sa volonté 
et la noblesse de ses sentiments’ and abhors the people rather than seeking practical ways to 
improve their lives.160 
Peillon’s theory of intellectual engagement thus differs from traditional models. It is not 
about mass popular interventions as in May ‘68, a blind commitment to a political ideology 
as demonstrated by Sartre, or a retreat into lofty ideals as was the case with Julien Benda, nor 
was it close to Raymond Aron’s uncompromising reason. Peillon understood the intellectual 
to be someone whose thought was inherently engaged by virtue of always keeping in mind ‘la 
recherche du bien commun’, which he viewed as the fundamental goal of both politics and 
society.161 What he meant by this in the modern age was reformist socialism, which he 
interpreted as a thought-driven movement which engages with the fundamental concerns of 
society in the present.162 This is evidenced by Peillon’s desire to redeem Merleau-Ponty’s 
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political thought, notably the liberal socialism he laid out in the essay ‘l’avenir du socialisme’ 
(1959) which, Peillon contended, converged with Mendès-France’s approach.163 Peillon 
concluded that the way forward for the left was to re-establish the age-old link between 
politics and philosophy, allowing it to revisit fundamental questions like ‘Qu’est-ce que la 
jouissance? Qu’est-ce que le désir? Qu’est-ce qu’une vie bonne?’ and thus to re-engage with 
the day-to-day concerns of the electorate.164  
This chapter analyses Peillon’s attempt to put his personal conceptualization of the 
connections between intellectual reflection, politics and wider society - ‘le politique’- into 
practice in the twenty-first century. What is most fascinating and exceptional about Peillon is 
the extent to which he has intertwined his academic work with a political career that has 
placed him so close to the party mainstream. An analysis of Peillon, an intellectual who has 
been so much in the thick of socialist politics, thus provides a unique window into the 
relationship between intellectuals and the socialist political movement more broadly.   
Peillon steered clear of any direct self-analysis in Eloge du politique, yet the date of 
publication (2011) suggests that it should, at least partially, be read as an oblique meditation 
on his own two decades’ experience as an intellectual in politics. The fact that he felt 
compelled to write the essay, as well as the virulence of the critique which, in a necessarily 
indirect way, railed against his colleagues in both the academic and the political spheres is a 
testament to his own personal sense of frustration. Peillon clearly encountered serious 
obstacles, some of which he has briefly identified: the tendency towards political 
management, the retreat of many intellectuals into their own specialisms and the challenges 
of the modern media age. Peillon’s attempt to bridge the gap between intellectuals, politics 
and society has so far proved largely unsuccessful due to a combination of Peillon’s own 
                                                             
163 Ibid., pp. 154-156.  
164 Ibid., pp. 191-192, 195.  
59 
 
limitations, the PS’s state of ideological confusion and the nature of contemporary 
democracy. 
Part one of this chapter looks at Peillon’s more distinctly academic work, his published 
philosophical essays and the Bibliothèque républicaine. It argues that Peillon’s effort to 
articulate, in collaboration with other intellectuals, a progressive republican socialism which 
could reconcile individualism with solidarity, has so far largely remained in specialist 
academic circles and has failed to find its way into party ideology. His lack of success can be 
explained partly by understanding the socialists’ troubled relationship with intellectual 
reformism, partly by the mediatization of contemporary politics and partly by grasping the 
limitations of Peillon’s form of intellectual engagement which, by tending towards historical 
specialization, has so far failed to respond to these challenges.  
Part two moves on to Peillon’s political action and media presence in the period when he 
began to pave his way to high office in the build up to the 2012 presidential elections. In an 
interview in 2009, Peillon insisted that his political generation ‘doit maintenant prendre ses 
responsabilités.’165 Peillon’s political ambition has gained him a reputation for treachery in 
the PS. Hollande, for example, pointedly remarked in 2009 that ‘Peillon est un serpent. Avec 
lui, c’est tout pour sa gueule. Vous verrez, il trahira Royal. Il trahit toujours.’166 This section 
looks closely at three moments when Peillon’s political action and media presence coincided: 
his essay La Révolution française n’est pas terminée, his public falling out with Royal in 
2009 and his decision to boycott a debate on ‘national identity’ on France 2 in 2010.167 
Despite his continued academic work, Peillon’s personal ambition meant that he increasingly 
played the political media game. His academic work has tended towards historical 
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specialization while his political action has, at times, descended into a search for power. Far 
from being at once a thinker and an actor in the mode of Jaurès, Peillon has pursued the two 
simultaneously, but separately. In this period, Peillon paradoxically incarnated the very 
divorce between philosophy and politics which he had hoped to overcome.  
Part three turns to Peillon’s time as Education Minister (May 2012-March 2014), which was 
his opportunity to put ‘le politique’ to the test in the context of education. It argues that, once 
in office, Peillon played the political media game less and tried to follow his intellectual 
vision. In a world dominated by professional politicians, however, Peillon increasingly 
looked like a ‘philosopher lost in politics’.168 It takes the controversy over the school week as 
a case study to demonstrate that Peillon lacked the political skill to build the consensus 
promised by his summer concertation and central to ‘le politique’. Peillon’s intellectualism 
got in the way of his attempt to communicate what were, for the most part, very sensible and 
necessary reforms. Furthermore, the strength of his intellectual convictions translated into an 
inflexible style. Far from bringing together politics, intellectuals and society, Peillon acted 
alone both in relation to the rest of government, a trend that was exacerbated by the vacuity 
of ‘Hollandisme’, and to civil society.  
Part I: Peillon’s Philosophical Essays and La Bibliothèque Républicaine  
Inherent to ‘le politique’ is the idea that one’s intellectual work should always be inspired by 
and striving for the political. Peillon’s academic work has sought to influence the nature and 
direction of present-day French left-wing politics. Through the Bibliothèque républicaine, 
Peillon has been trying to construct a new discourse for the PS by redeeming the reformist 
thought of nineteenth-century and early-twentiety-century left-wing thinkers. Contrasting 
Peillon’s essay Jean Jaurès et la religion du socialisme with political uses of Jaurès, a 
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towering figure in the political culture of the French left, however, demonstrates that there 
has been a marked discrepancy between Peillon’s academic work on historical figures and 
how these same figures and their thought have been utilized, if indeed they have been made 
use of at all, by the PS’s political elite.169 So far, Peillon’s more distinctly academic work has 
had minimal impact in the political sphere and has remained very much on the margins of the 
PS. This has been due to the PS’s state of existential confusion and a clash between the nature 
of Peillon’s intellectual engagement and the demands of contemporary democracy. 
Peillon’s academic work is engaged because it is all about furnishing the PS with the 
intellectual foundation to take on the challenges of the twenty-first century. His method has 
been to take a fresh look at the left’s political culture and to explore the reformist thought of 
historic thinkers, which he believes could usefully be taken up once more. His essays, for 
example, have focused on Jean Jaurès (1859-1914), Pierre Leroux (1797-1871) and 
Ferdinand Buisson (1841-1932).170  Peillon’s attempt to put ‘le politique’ into practice in the 
context of his academic work has therefore been about constructing a new progressivism for 
the French left, which is particularly demonstrated by the work of the Bibliothèque 
républicaine. On the project’s homepage, Peillon contends that reformism is much more than 
pragmatism. Rather than being dismissed, he writes, this school of thought deserves to be 
looked into in depth. The project seeks to promote, and render accessible, the forgotten 
voices of figures marginalized from the political culture of the French left. Peillon asserts that 
a false opposition between communism and liberalism has prevented important discussions 
about how to reconcile individualism and solidarity. The project thus aims to redeem a 
republicanism which is more flexible and inclusive, which is ‘plus religieuse, à tout le moins 
plus métaphysique, plus spirituelle et plus morale’. The political agenda of this historical 
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work is explicit: the hope is that this alternative French socialist tradition will permit a 
renovation of the PS and provide it with the historical and intellectual foundation to tackle 
contemporary questions, notably those ‘sur la laïcité, la place des religions dans les 
démocraties ou l’esprit public, mais aussi sur les solidarités, le droit au travail, les droits de 
l’homme, les services publics ou la propriété sociale’.171 Books published by the Bibliothèque 
républicaine include Jaurès’s Pour la laïque and Ferdinand Buisson’s La foi laïque, both of 
which explore secularism; Paul Brousse’s La propriété collective et les services publics, Léon 
Bourgeois’s Solidarité and works by Louis Blanc, which tackle the role of the state and how 
to reconcile individualism and solidarity; and Benoît Malon’s La morale sociale, Charles 
Andler’s La civilisation socialiste and Frédéric Rauh’s L’expérience morale, all of which 
deal with questions of morality and the left.172  
Peillon’s attempt to put his idea of intellectual engagement into practice has therefore 
intersected with the increasing interest in Republicanism since the 1980s, which has been 
posing particular problems for the left. The relaxation of anti-totalitarianism sparked a return 
to the Jacobin republican tradition, epitomized by intellectuals like Régis Debray and Marcel 
Gauchet, as a means to respond to the problems of globalization, immigration and identity 
that have been progressively dominating political debates.173 Hazareesingh has contended 
that republicanism is particularly appealing to intellectuals because it revives the 
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universalism which has always been so inherent to French thought, but which has floundered 
since the decline of communism. Hazareesingh has also observed that contemporary 
understandings of republicanism have increasingly manifested themselves in a nationalist 
retreat on the left, providing the philosophical foundation for those hostile to identity-based 
diversity.174 The ideas of those intellectuals who supported Jean-Pierre Chevènement in the 
2002 presidential elections, as demonstrated in the previous chapter, support this observation. 
Peillon’s attempt to practise ‘le politique’ in his academic work has therefore been part of a 
counter-intellectual movement, which has been attempting to highlight the flexibility of 
republicanism and thus make it ‘work’ for socialist politics in contemporary France.175  
It is difficult to come to any firm conclusions about the impact of this work in the political 
sphere and thus the success, or otherwise, of this more distinctly academic side of ‘le 
politique’. Ideological evolutions are influenced by a wide range of factors; Peillon has not 
been the only person trying to redeem forgotten elements of the left’s political culture and, 
perhaps most significantly, these things take time. There is often a substantial delay between 
ideas and their practical applications as, by its very nature, intellectual work seeks to be 
ahead of, and therefore to influence the direction of, the times. Comparing Peillon’s work on 
Jean Jaurès with the socialists’ use of Jaurès in the political sphere, however, sheds some 
light on the question, especially because Jaurès was both one of the first and best known of 
the figures Peillon researched. Peillon’s essay Jean Jaurès et la religion du socialisme (2000) 
was at the forefront of an academic revival of interest in Jaurès’s philosophy, which 
coincided with an increasing fascination with Jaurès in the political sphere, especially during 
the 2007 and 2012 election campaigns.176 In contrast to Peillon’s work, which sought to 
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understand Jaurès’s philosophy and political thought in all its depth and complexity and to 
underscore its contemporary relevance, political uses of Jaurès have been increasingly 
superficial. Peillon’s academic work has so far failed to resonate with the PS. The nature of 
party culture and the PS’s state of ideological confusion has taken the socialists a long way 
from Jaurès’s ideas and values.  
In Jean Jaurès et la religion du socialisme, Peillon noted that the study of Jaurès tends to be 
defined either by a superficial political engagement with his memory, or by a restrictive 
academic debate between historians.177 He aimed to address this gap by looking behind 
Jaurès the individual to his philosophy, arguing that Jaurès the philosopher and Jaurès the 
politician were inseparable.178 Peillon’s central aim was to demonstrate this coherence and 
bring to the fore the religious, metaphysical Jaurès whose thought, marginalized by the 
dominance of the Jules Guesde tradition which dominated socialist politics after 1918, had 
the potential to ‘réveiller l’espérance du socialisme’ in the twenty-first century.179 Peillon 
began by revisiting Jaurès’s early work on metaphysics, as laid out in his first doctoral thesis 
De la réalité du monde sensible in which, Peillon contended, Jaurès overcame the antinomy 
between the denial of the ‘monde sensible’ on the one hand and the denial of ‘l’esprit’ on the 
other: ‘Il y a bien, chez Jaurès, un monisme métaphysique, qui le conduit à dépasser les 
antithèses traditionnelles entre la matière et l’esprit, le corps et l’âme, le fini et l’infini.’180 
Peillon maintained that this belief in harmony, which is what philosophically distanced 
Jaurès’s socialism from Marx’s, could usefully be taken up once more:  
Parce qu’il [Jaurès] réfute toute forme du dualisme, entre la matière et l’esprit, 
entre la nature et l’idée, entre le collectivisme et l’individualisme, entre la tradition 
et la nouveauté, entre la nation et l’internationalisme, entre la classe bourgeoise et 
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le prolétariat, entre la sensibilité et la raison, Jean Jaurès met en œuvre un effort qui 
désarme toutes les simplifications dont notre siècle s’est repu jusqu’à 
l’écœurement.181 
 Furthermore, given the current professionalization of the political sphere, Peillon contended 
that the socialists could benefit from Jaurès’s understanding of politics; Jaurès refused to 
separate thought and action: ‘à aucun moment il [Jaurès] n’accepte de séparer la politique 
comme engagement, choix, action, combat, d’une réflexion sur l’homme, la nature, l’histoire, 
la science, la justice, la raison ou la liberté’.182 Finally, Peillon highlighted that, first and 
foremost, Jaurès’s republican socialism, and his interpretation of the Revolution, was 
religious and moral. Peillon argued that, by reengaging with the battle for the ideal of justice, 
the political left could regain a sense of direction and, thus, the optimism that is so 
fundamental to its political culture.183  
Peillon could perhaps have gone slightly further in his understanding of Jaurès’s philosophy. 
The American political scientist Geoffrey Kurtz, like Peillon, sought to decipher Jaurès’s 
philosophy in order to draw out what it had to say to the floundering social democratic 
tradition today.184 He also embarked on a close reading of Jaurès’s doctoral theses, but he 
painted a slightly more nuanced picture.185 Notably, he emphasized the necessary 
‘awkwardness’, paradoxes and occasional contradictions at the heart of Jaurès’s thought.186 In 
particular, Kurtz maintained that while Jaurès did seek to reconcile principles, he also 
recognized the extent to which they remained distinct.187 The idea that reconciliation is never 
total, Kurtz insisted, is crucial to understanding the place of the ideal, reality and hope in 
Jaurès’s conceptualization of social democracy. Jaurès’s reformism, Kurtz argued, is about 
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the hopeful day-to-day work to reconcile a commonly shared ideal with a political reality that 
can never quite live up to it.188   
Jean Jaurès et la religion du socialisme was at the forefront of serious attempts to delve into 
Jaurès’s philosophy. It was well received in the academic sphere and, alongside other works, 
sparked an academic revival of interest in debates about morality and the left.189 Since the 
publication of Peillon’s essay, the slightly mysterious fascination with Jaurès in the political 
sphere has intensified. The interplay between scholarship and politics is therefore particularly 
intriguing in the case of Jaurès and sheds some light on the relationship between intellectual 
work and the socialists more broadly. Far from drawing on his thought and values, as Peillon 
encouraged, Marion Fontaine observed that Jaurès has been quoted in an excessive and 
clichéd manner, which has been more a case of dutiful reverence than a genuine attempt to 
make use of his thought.190  
Firstly, Gilles Candar noted that discussions of Jaurès in the political sphere have particularly 
focused on who has a legitimate right to quote him rather than on what was actually said.191 
The then presidential candidate Nicolas Sarkozy, for example, provoked outrage on the left 
when in one speech during the 2007 election campaign he claimed to be a closer heir to 
Jaurès than either Hollande or Royal and mentioned him some thirty-two times.192 As Candar 
highlighted, there is no reason why the right should not also be drawing on Jaurès who sought 
to engage with those across the political spectrum and whose thought centred on an holistic 
understanding of humanity.193 The reduction of Jaurès’s thought to petty electoral squabbles, 
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to the simple denunciation of the opponent, demonstrates just how far the socialists have 
drifted from Jaurès’s values. 
Secondly, Jaurès has been held up as a moral exemplar by the socialists. Specifically, he has 
been cast as an ‘apolitical saint’, remembered for not having held ministerial office.194 
Peillon’s essay encouraged the left to re-engage with the moral Jaurès, yet this weary 
nostalgia was certainly not what he had in mind. Peillon highlighted that political action was 
inseparable from Jaurès’s philosophy and central to his understanding of morality and justice 
and to his conceptualization of socialism as a religion. Peillon can perhaps be criticized for 
excessively focusing on Jaurès’s philosophy at the expense of the individual when, in fact, 
Jaurès’s personal political ambition remains little understood. Certainly, however, Jaurès was 
a politician through and through and the vague moral references to him in the political sphere 
have been a sign of the socialists’ confused relationship with the morality and optimism so 
central to Jaurès’s understanding of social democracy.195  
Peillon had been hoping to trigger a productive reengagement with Jaurès’s republican 
socialism, which would encourage the socialists to think, to regain a sense of what they were 
aiming for and to fight for it passionately. The socialists’ superficial and uncomfortable 
relationship with Jaurès’s legacy has sharply contrasted with this attempt, which more 
broadly demonstrates that Peillon’s effort to put ‘le politique’ into practice has so far seen 
little by way of concrete results. While the PS may have finally accepted reformism in 
practice, it has been closer to pragmatism and political management than to the thought-
driven spiritual republican socialism Peillon has been advocating. There has thus not been 
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space in the PS for the level and coherence of thought inherent to Peillon’s intellectual 
understanding of reformism.  
Peillon’s academic work has also been struggling to make an impact due to the fact that his 
form of intellectual engagement has been ill suited to the nature of contemporary democracy. 
An historical examination of the socialist movement’s political culture could help renovate a 
PS in need of different ideas. Whether Peillon’s method, which has been to write such 
specialized essays and to republish primary documents, is a viable means of getting these 
ideas into the public political sphere, however, is questionable. It is difficult to find evidence 
to determine the extent to which Peillon’s academic work has been looked at in the political 
sphere. L’Hebdo des socialistes, the PS’s official newspaper, included an interview with 
Peillon which allowed him to promote and explain his book on Jean Jaurès, suggesting that 
the party was aware of, and at least wanted to be seen to be engaging with, Peillon’s 
academic work. The interview, however, is brief and only scratches the surface of Peillon’s 
book.196 Another example that sheds some light on the impact of Peillon’s work is a blog that 
included a book review of Jean Jaurès et la religion du socialisme by ‘Daniel’, a member of 
the PS seemingly close to Peillon. While only the thoughts of one individual, it provides a 
useful insight into how party members may have been engaging with Peillon’s work. Overall 
the author was positive; he claimed to have been able to follow the thrust of Peillon’s essay 
and ended with ‘Merci Vincent de m’avoir fait mieux comprendre Jaurès.’ That said, it 
required some gentle persuasion on Peillon’s part to get him to read past the first few pages. 
He also admitted that ‘quelques pages m’ont paru assez rébarbatives’ and that he found some 
sections hard to follow. Furthermore, it was only because Jaurès remains such an important 
figure in the memory of the French left that Daniel elected to read the essay. He confessed 
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that he did not believe that Peillon’s other essay on Merleau-Ponty was worth the effort: 
‘Merleau Ponty: connais pas… ça ne me semblait pas être d’actualité et ce n’était donc pas la 
peine que je m’impose un mal de tête.’197 It seems even less likely that the PS’s busy political 
elites would have taken the time to read and reflect on Peillon’s work. Dominique Reynié, 
member of the think tank Fondapol, for example, reflected: ‘Les acteurs politiques se sont 
mis en situation de préférer toute réunion à tout moment de lecture. Quand ils veulent des 
notes, c’est deux pages maximum. Quand on commence à leur expliquer quelque chose, au 
bout de trois minutes ils sont sur leur portable à regarder leurs messages. Ils enchaînent les 
rendez-vous, galopent en permanence.’198 In Eloge du politique, Peillon deplored the distance 
between philosophy and the public.199 However, Peillon’s own academic work, despite being 
engaged, has often been highly specialized and thus not easily accessible. In particular, his 
conscious focus on poorly known figures has been working against him. Peillon has been 
struggling because the relevance of his work is far from immediately apparent. 
In an interview in Le Monde in 2008, Peillon was asked about the lack of intellectual 
involvement with the PS and the so-called ‘silence of the intellectuals’. He responded that the 
real issue was not a deficit of intellectuals with things to say to the left, but an absence of 
politicians who were willing to listen.200 In a sense, Peillon’s work makes this point; the 
academics involved with the Bibliothèque républicaine, for example, are all relatively young 
and the majority are either philosophers, historians or sociologists. This has, of course, been a 
deliberate choice on Peillon’s part, but it also highlights that there has been a sizeable 
generation of intellectuals who have been wanting to rethink social democracy. So far, 
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however, there has not been room for this academic work to find its way into socialist 
politics. Peillon’s attempt to practise ‘le politique’ in the context of his academic work has, 
thus far, floundered in the face of a combination of the PS’s state of ideological disarray and 
the demands of the mediatized public and political spheres.  
Part II: Peillon’s Interlinked Political Action and Media Presence (2008-2010) 
Central to ‘le politique’ is the idea that thought and political action should come together in 
‘la recherche du bien commun’ in order to guard against politics becoming a simple search 
for power, or intellectual work retreating to its ivory tower. Peillon summed this up sharply 
elsewhere: ‘Le politique ne peut se débarasser du savant, lequel ne peut se débarrasser du 
politique. Penser faux est une faute politique. Agir mal est une faute intellectuelle.’201 
Peillon’s first published philosophical essay appeared in 1994, the same year that he joined 
the PS’s national bureau, illustrating the extent to which Peillon’s academic and political 
careers developed in tandem.202  While Peillon’s academic work has tended towards 
historical specialization, his political action has, at times, been closer to ‘la politique’ than ‘le 
politique’. Ironically, while Peillon had hoped to combine philosophy and political action, he 
merely succeeded in incarnating the separation between the two. This is demonstrated by 
taking three case studies from 2008 to 2010: firstly, his essay La Révolution française n’est 
pas terminée (2008), which has received much more media attention than his previous 
academic work but, in some respects, to the detriment of more rigorous academic practices; 
secondly, his public falling out with Royal in 2009 and, thirdly, his decision to boycott a 
debate on ‘national identity’ on France 2 in 2010.203 Peillon’s personal ambition, combined 
with how politicians often feel they need to act and to present themselves in order to achieve 
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political success, meant that he often failed to incarnate ‘le politique’. Peillon increasingly 
played the political media game and often behaved like a ‘coquin’ in the public and political 
spheres. 
La Révolution française n’est pas terminée (2008) 
La Révolution française n’est pas terminée differed from Peillon’s other essays and is a 
fascinating example of what happened to Peillon’s intellectual work when it met his political 
ambition. The immediately striking difference is the front cover, which is dominated by an 
American-style black and white portrait of the author, suggesting that the essay was partially 
a self-promotion exercise.204  That Peillon adopted this tactic is telling: he clearly believed 
that a status as a man of ideas would help sell his political position on the left. That said, in 
direct contrast to his other works, La Révolution française n’est pas terminée provoked a 
much more positive and expansive response in the mainstream media and a storm of criticism 
from historians, demonstrating the very different demands of the academic sphere and the 
media sphere.205 Peillon struggled to reconcile his political ambition with intellectual depth 
and integrity.  
La Révolution française n’est pas terminée was the culmination of Peillon’s attempt to get 
contemporary progressive intellectual voices heard in the public political sphere and to 
redeem the moral and spiritual elements of the French socialist tradition. Peillon argued that 
the current sense of lassitude in French politics and society was due to an inability to 
transcend artificial and restrictive oppositions: ‘l’individu contre l’Etat, la République contre 
la démocratie, la liberté contre l’égalité, le libéralisme contre le socialisme, la politique contre 
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la morale, la laïcité contre la religion, la Troisième République contre la Deuxième’.206 He 
contended that, in opposition to the historian François Furet’s assertion that ‘the Revolution is 
over’, there had been a revival of interest in an alternative republicanism in recent years, 
which represented a serious attempt by a new generation of intellectuals to write their own 
history in order to move forward in the present.207 Peillon drew on these secondary analyses 
(notably Jean-Fabien Spitz, Serge Audier and Marie-Claude Blais) and attempted to 
rehabilitate the thought of nineteenth century and Third-Republican figures. He asserted that 
the dominance of positivism, Marxism and, most recently, Furet’s militant historical 
liberalism had marginalized a republican socialist tradition which was ‘liberal’, ‘social’, 
‘fraternal’, ‘spiritual’ and ‘secular’ and could provide the left with the intellectual foundation 
to overcome the current national sense of pessimism in France.208 
The work was a serious and original reflexion on republicanism and socialist ideology, which 
built on, and brought together, Peillon’s longstanding efforts to redeem a liberal, social and 
spiritualist republican tradition. The unprecedented attention that this particular essay 
received was due to his attempt to take on François Furet, one of the most controversial and 
best known of French historians. In Interpreting the French Revolution, Furet criticized the 
approach of ‘Jacobin’ historians for ‘commemorating’ rather than truly analysing the 
Revolution. Furet reemphasized instead the analyses of nineteenth-century authors like 
Tocqueville and Cochin and asserted that the ideology of 1789 led directly to the 1793 terror, 
much as Marxism had led to the Soviet oppression. What was positive about the Revolution, 
he contended, was thus not the promise of a future socialist revolution, but rather the birth of 
a modern democratic political culture. His central claim was that the Revolution was now 
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‘over’, the passionate left-right revolutionary battles had ended with the acceptance of the 
institutions of the Fifth Republic.209  
Critiques of the essay, however, all highlighted that Peillon’s provocative title did not 
correspond with the content of the essay. They suggested that Peillon had created a false 
controversy with Furet that undermined what was otherwise an important contribution to 
historical understanding. Prochasson, the author of a biography on Furet, asserted that Furet, 
like Peillon, was on the left and was trying to rethink its political culture, thus ‘Vincent 
Peillon se prive même d’un allié qui eût pu être très éclairant s’il avait été lu avec plus de 
soin et moins de préjugés.’210 Similarly, the historian Mona Ozouf, who was close to Furet, 
and the philosopher Philippe Raynaud accused Peillon of not having read Furet’s works. 
Raynaud stressed that Furet had argued that there was no longer a counterrevolutionary force 
in contemporary France and that he was referring to the republican regime and its institutions, 
not to its ideology.211 In a particularly stinging article in Le Nouvel Observateur, Ozouf 
denounced Peillon’s ‘witchcraft trial’ and claimed that some of the key quotations Peillon 
used were from her and not from Furet. Furthermore, she maintained that, far from ignoring 
the religious dimensions of the Revolution, as Peillon contended, Furet was highly 
preoccupied with the spiritual deficit that resulted from the revolutionary clash with the 
Catholic Church.212  
Given the portrait on the front cover, it seems reasonable to suggest that the unnecessarily 
provocative nature of the essay was part and parcel of Peillon’s self-promotion. La 
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Révolution française n’est pas terminée did find its way into the mainstream media in a way 
that his other essays and his Bibliothèque républicaine project did not. That it was Peillon’s 
most controversial and, at times, most academically questionable work that received the most 
media attention, and which remains by far the best known of his essays, says something about 
contemporary media culture, illustrating its penchant for controversy above and beyond deep 
and serious reflection. Peillon clearly believed that his identity as an intellectual and being 
known for having written an ideological book would help advance his political career within 
the PS, which further demonstrates that intellectuals remain a collective ‘site of memory’ on 
the left, of real importance to political culture. Paradoxically, however, Peillon’s intellectual 
rigour was partially undermined in the process. A lot of academic criticism, for example, 
centred on the extent to which Peillon-the-politician broke through in the essay, undermining 
the value of his scholarship. Notably, Prochasson labelled the work ‘Un livre politique et 
savant’ and wrote that the politician came through in Peillon’s often dogmatic tone, which 
denounced alternative understandings of republicanism as ‘incorrect’ and ‘ignorant’.213 
Furthermore, the political commentator Laurent Bouvet identified that the ambiguity between 
being a ‘vrai savant’ and a ‘bon politique’ was the essay’s central flaw.214  
Peillon’s desire to bring together thought and politics in order to prevent ‘le politique’ 
descending into ‘la politique’ was thus undermined by his inability to synthesize his 
intellectual work and his political ambition. Moscovici’s label ‘Docteur Vincent et Monsieur 
Peillon’ was apt; in this period, Peillon was very much an intellectual and a politician rather 
than an intellectual in politics. These arguments are further evidenced by two moments when 
Peillon’s political action and media presence coincided: the Dijon Meeting (2009) and the 
France 2 Debate on ‘National Identity’ (2010). Peillon manipulated his way into the media 
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and failed to transcend the battle of egos which has been an increasing part of socialist party 
culture. Peillon’s intellectual identity did little to set his behaviour apart and his political 
action in this period thus strayed significantly from the sincere, moral and thought-driven 
nature of this ideal of ‘le politique’.  
The Dijon Meeting (2009) and the France 2 Debate on ‘National Identity’ (2010)  
Peillon played a central role in organizing a meeting at Dijon to discuss education led by the 
courant Espoir à gauche, set up by Royal for the Reims congress (2008). The meeting 
included leaders from Europe Ecologie Les Verts, Le Mouvement Democrate and ex-
communists and was part of a drive to promote collaboration across the political spectrum. 
Peillon decided not to invite Royal, arguing that he did not want presidential ambitions to get 
in the way of proper debate.215 Royal turned up unannounced, an act which Peillon 
denounced venomously in the media. Notably, he underlined her ‘isolation’, accused her of 
putting her personal ambitions above all else and insisted that she had disqualified herself as 
a candidate for the 2012 presidential elections.216 Any ideas that came out of the meeting 
were thus quickly eclipsed by a very public and personal falling out between Peillon and 
Royal, which marked the beginning of the end of their political alliance.  
Royal was adamant that she did not need to be invited to a meeting held by her own 
courant.217 That she gave no advance warning, combined with her track record as a 
particularly astute manipulator of the media, however, suggests that Peillon’s comment that 
her action was a deliberate ‘media coup’ was reasonable.218 Royal consciously turned what 
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could have been a private disagreement into an ‘event’. It seems fair to conjecture that she 
was attempting to get herself back into the public eye and at the forefront of her courant after 
a period of withdrawal in the wake of her failed attempt to become Party Secretary (2008). 
When denouncing Royal, Peillon insisted: ‘Je ne voulais pas… que des gens, que l’ambition 
individuelle affichée prennent le pas sur les idées du rassemblement.’219 He was right to 
identify the extent to which socialist politics had been deteriorating into a fight between 
individuals. Furthermore, he correctly identified the media’s taste for this soap opera-style 
politics, noting that the media focused on Royal’s surprise arrival at the expense of the 
content of the meeting.220 Peillon’s response, however, which he claimed was a matter of 
principle, only served to intensify such a shift in focus.221 Had he simply invited her in the 
first place, or played down the significance of her arrival, he could probably have salvaged 
the meeting’s legacy. It seems reasonable to suggest that Peillon was playing Royal at her 
own game, had ambitions to control the courant himself and, like Royal, used the controversy 
for his own publicity. With hindsight, this interpretation is supported by the fact that Peillon 
has switched allegiances and changed courants more than most, moving from the far-left 
Nouveau Parti Socialiste courant to support firstly Royal, then Dominique Strauss-Kahn and 
then Hollande.  Peillon has continuously highlighted that disreputable personal battles have 
been the primary obstacle to the ideological and moral overhaul of the PS.222 This episode, 
however, suggests that Peillon often failed to rise above such petty manoeuvring. The result 
was that, yet again, infighting presented a confused and divided PS to the public and played 
into the hands of the right.223  
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Just two months later, in January 2010, Peillon was due to appear on a programme of ‘A vous 
de juger’ for a live primetime debate on ‘national identity’ which was to feature Eric Besson, 
the Union pour un mouvement populaire (UMP) Minister for Immigration, Integration and 
National Identity, and Marine Le Pen, Vice-President of the Front National. Peillon boycotted 
the programme, leaving his chair empty and, during the course of the programme, issued a 
communiqué explaining his actions: ‘Parce que tout mon engagement politique et citoyen est 
fondé d’abord sur les valeurs de la République, de la raison et de l’antifascisme, j’ai décidé 
de ne pas participer au débat d’indignité nationale’. He criticized the nature and implications 
of the ‘national identity’ debate launched by the Sarkozy administration more generally, 
arguing: ‘Ce débat a provoqué et provoque encore des dérapages xénophobes, racistes, 
islamophobes qui font honte à la France, dressent les français les uns contre les autres et 
remettent le Front National et ses thèses de haine au cœur de notre vie politique’. He objected 
to the format of the debate, which had relegated him to the second half, thus allowing the 
extreme views of Besson and Le Pen to dominate. He ended by deploring the media’s lack of 
independence and even called for the resignation of Arlette Chabot, the head of France 2’s 
editorial team.224 
Peillon portrayed his actions as those of an intellectual in politics. In an interview about the 
event in Le Monde he stated: ‘On aime les philosophes lorsqu’ils n’agissent pas et restent à 
leur place dans leur bibliothèque. Je m’y refuse. Leur place est dans la cité.’225 As 
demonstrated, Peillon’s intellectual work had been highlighting the importance of 
individualism to republicanism. On the contrary, the debate pioneered by Besson directly 
linked the nation’s identity crisis to immigration and was thus hostile to identity-based 
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diversity. It is unsurprising that Peillon objected, on an intellectual level, to a programme 
which, by inviting Besson and Le Pen, publicized such a means of framing the debate. The 
manner in which Peillon went about translating this admirable intellectual stance into action, 
however, demonstrates that he often failed to incarnate his attempt to promote an ideological 
and moral renovation of PS politics. 
Several commentators accused Peillon of hypocrisy and made a link between his 
denunciation of Royal’s ‘media coup’ at Dijon and his behaviour with France 2.226 The 
psychoanalyst Jean-Pierre Winter even suggested that Peillon had made a connection 
between ‘not invited - present’ and ‘invited - not present’; he contended that Peillon hoped to 
provoke the sort of media storm Royal had conjured up.227 This link is tenuous as the empty-
chair tactic is an age-old technique, yet his motivations were undoubtedly questionable. 
Despite advocating the importance of sincerity in politics, Peillon’s boycott was 
premeditated. He confirmed his attendance on the morning of the programme, yet later 
admitted: ‘J’avais pris ma décision depuis plusieurs jours… Je voulais qu’il y ait un incident. 
Il fallait que ça fasse un peu scandale.’228 He legitimized his actions by arguing that, had he 
tried to act collectively with the PS someone else would have taken his place on the show, 
which would have undermined his intention to ‘casser le spectacle’: ‘Il y a une concurrence 
pour passer à la télévision… qui va au-delà des solidarités de parti.’229 Winter noted that 
appearing on France Inter to denounce ‘la société de spectacle’ was simply creating his own 
‘spectacle’ and suggested that the affair was more about getting himself known than about 
transmitting a message.230 Similarly, the political commentator Stéphane Rozès reflected that, 
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in his political career to date, Peillon had played second fiddle to two flamboyant media types 
- Montebourg and Royal. He suggested that Peillon was attracted to this sort of political 
figure and now increasingly wanted to be in the media himself.231 Except for the (largely 
negative) publicity, Peillon’s actions backfired. Marine Le Pen ironically suggested that 
Besson, who had defected from the PS, could play the role ‘du socialiste et du responsable de 
l’UMP’. Peillon’s call for the resignation of Arlette Chabot and others, a move that Aubry 
refused to support, then led to accusations of totalitarianism.232 In an interview in March, 
Peillon admitted that he did not have the moral or political authority to pull off the boycott.233 
Such a tendency to admit one’s mistakes is rare in politics and Peillon certainly dedicated less 
time to the media than either Montebourg or Royal.234 All the same, Peillon increasingly, and 
hypocritically, sought to manoeuvre his way into the media, often at the expense of his 
political integrity. 
In 2009, an article in Le Journal Du Dimanche hit on the implications of Peillon’s hybrid 
identity: ‘Ses [Peillon’s] laudateurs disent: “Il est mieux que les autres” (un foreur de 
concepts); ses contempteurs disent “il fait comme les autres” (un danseur de tango). On dira 
donc: il est (sans doute) mieux que les autres mais il fait (au final) comme les autres.’235 
Peillon’s understanding of ‘le politique’, of intellectual reformism, centred on its ability, 
through the reunion of thought and action, to transcend power politics in the name of the 
common good. Despite continuing his academic work, in this period between presidential 
elections when Peillon was particularly focused on forging his political career, his political 
action succumbed to the demands of the media sphere and to the personality-dominated 
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nature of contemporary politics. Vincent Duclert thus marginalized Peillon, arguing that there 
have been no intellectual reformists in the PS since Michel Rocard:  
L’histoire et le savoir sont inaudibles pour les dirigeants du parti et les courants qui 
le composent… Vincent Peillon continue… d’œuvrer pour la redécouverte des 
grands textes du socialisme, ou encore d’interroger le rapport des socialistes avec 
l’histoire du XIXe siècle. Mais il se montre aussi… un parfait manœuvrier des 
courants et des réseaux.236 
Peillon was unable to find a path between his identity as an intellectual and his identity as a 
politician. Rather than embodying ‘le politique’, by synthesizing his intellectual work and his 
political action, Peillon embarked on a schizophrenic pursuit of the two.  
Part III: Peillon’s Education Ministry (May 2012-March 2014) 
‘Le politique’ is a theory of action in the here and now. Peillon, like all reformists, therefore 
sought a governmental position. He viewed the Education Ministry as his calling and stated 
shortly after gaining the post: ‘Je suis aujourd’hui confronté à ce que j’ai le plus désiré… 
cette fonction incarnait une sorte d’accomplissement de tout ce que j’ai vécu depuis que je 
suis enfant. Me voilà là pour reformer l’école.’237 It has been demonstrated that Peillon 
achieved the ministerial position, in part, at the cost of his attempt to practise a new, more 
honest, form of politics. Once appointed to government, Peillon’s attempt to intellectualize 
the contemporary question of republicanism and to construct a new progressivism was 
focused on the centrality of schooling to the Republic. He believes that schooling has the 
potential to change society and vice versa and he constantly emphasized this in interviews in 
the lead up to the 2012 presidential elections. As early as 2009, for example, in an extended 
interview entitled ‘Peut-on améliorer l’école sans dépenser plus?’, which contrasted Peillon’s 
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vision for education with that of the UMP ex-Education, Minister Xavier Darcos, Peillon 
insisted: ‘La France républicaine n’est pas née dans un chou. Elle est le produit de son école, 
façonnée par elle… En France, l’école est beaucoup plus que l’école. Elle est l’âme de la 
France… La France a besoin d’une refondation républicaine. Cela suppose le courage d’une 
grande réforme de l’école.’238 He had a unique opportunity to put his vision into effect as the 
president had pledged to prioritize education; it would be the ‘quinquennat pour la jeunesse’. 
The government promised not just educational reform but a complete ‘refondation de l’Ecole 
de la République’. 239 
There is a broad consensus in France that the education system is in need of a serious 
overhaul and Peillon succeeded in passing, although with significant delays, a ‘loi 
d’orientation et de programmation’ which was published in July 2013 and aimed to create 
‘une école exigeante et égalitaire’.240 This legislation continues to be gradually translated into 
concrete changes on the ground. It is perhaps too early to assess the impact of Peillon’s 
measures on the French school system and it is certainly too soon to come to any sort of 
judgement about their effect on French society more widely; it is commonly estimated that it 
takes ten years to see the results of educational reform.241 This section thus focuses instead on 
Peillon’s method and approach. Once in office, Peillon tried to follow his intellectual vision 
but he quickly lost popularity with the media, the public and the rest of government, which 
took the energy out of his ministry and led to his replacement by Benoît Hamon in the 2014 
cabinet reshuffle. These arguments are illustrated by looking at Peillon’s summer 
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concertation on schooling (June-October 2012) which, by bringing together society, 
intellectuals and politicians, was the epitome of ‘le politique’. Despite a promising start, 
however, the concertation method was progressively undermined by Peillon’s style and 
approach, which failed to resonate with the nature of contemporary democracy. The rythmes 
scolaires controversy, which dominated the first year of Peillon’s ministry, demonstrates that, 
while Peillon had a real vision for schooling, he failed to distinguish between an intellectual 
discourse and a political discourse, which got in the way of what were, for the most part, 
necessary, progressive and down-to-earth proposals. Furthermore, the strength of his own 
intellectual conviction, combined with his limited communication skills, translated into a 
slightly blinkered style which bordered on arrogance and undermined the art of dialogue 
central to ‘le politique’. Peillon acted unilaterally rather than in concert with the rest of 
government or with civil society, a problem that was then exacerbated by the confused nature 
of ‘Hollandisme’. 
As discussed, Peillon defined ‘le politique’ as ‘la recherche du bien commun et la 
participation de tous à cette recherche’.242 In the context of education in France, this meant 
overcoming longstanding sectarian interests, divisions and a deep-seated sense of distrust. 
Furthermore, it meant reconciling historic tensions, including those between the democratic 
aims of the école républicaine and the elitist demands of ‘meritocracy’ and whether 
education should be teacher or student led.243 Peillon’s academic work has been seeking to 
redeem a philosophical strand of republicanism which is able to reconcile the seemingly 
irreconcilable and he sought to apply this republican synthesis to education: ‘On a laissé se 
durcir des positions antagonistes. Et chacun s’est laissé aller à des caricatures néfastes.’244  
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Ayrault’s and Peillon’s method was to start the ministry with a large-scale ‘concertation pour 
la refondation de l’École de la République’. There were meetings in Paris and in the regions, 
which brought together all those concerned; there was even space on a dedicated website 
where the public could post their own comments.245 The concertation then led to the 
production of a report which would form the basis of the ‘loi d’orientation et de 
programmation’. The government chose a ‘concertation’, as opposed to the more common 
‘consultation’. In an analysis of the differences between the two, the social psychologist 
Hubert Touzard argued that a ‘consultation’ collected the opinions of various actors on a 
provisional project while a ‘concertation’ was about ‘l’action collective en vue d’un accord, 
d’un but commun’, noting: ‘l’objectif de la concertation est pour des acteurs, individuels ou 
collectifs, de trouver un accord, de résoudre ensemble un problème qui se pose à eux, de 
prendre ensemble une décision collective, ou (the case here) de préparer une décision prise en 
final à un autre niveau.’246  
The concertation was thus Peillon’s attempt to put his ideal of le polique into action by 
bringing together politics, intellectuals and civil society to debate education and to reach a 
consensus, in the name of the common good, which could then be translated into political 
action. These aims were made explicit in the final report, which stated:  
La concertation s’est appuyée sur une démarche novatrice de démocratie 
participative. Pour dégager les principes fondateurs qui serviront de base à 
l’édifice, elle a réuni le plus largement possible, sur des thématiques prédéfinies, 
toutes les forces vives de l’éducation : des enseignants, des élèves, des parents, des 
directeurs d’école et des chefs d’établissement, des administrateurs, des élus, les 
organisations représentatives, des personnalités qualifiées, des représentants des 
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mondes économique, associatif, culturel, sportif, scientifique. Les ministères 
concernés ont également été associés.247  
The concertation approach was seen as successful at the time and there was some sense that, 
above and beyond previous attempts, a consensus had been achieved. The final report noted 
that there had been a constructive discussion and that, despite a wide range of opinions, those 
involved had managed to agree on a common approach. 248 Such a sentiment is supported by 
the almost exclusively positive reports in the mainstream media and the comments made by 
the representatives of some of the key groups involved. The educational historian Claude 
Lelièvre, for example, despite his initial scepticism, stated early on in the concertation 
process: ‘J’ai le sentiment… que l’envie de dépasser les points de blocage est aujourd’hui 
partagée… On sent chez chacun d’entre nous le désir de sortir de la situation actuelle, 
délétère et confuse, et de trouver une issue plutôt que de s’affronter.’249  
The remarkable sense of optimism and solidarity, which translated into a fifty-two page 
synthesis report, however, was short-lived. Peillon lacked the political acumen to build on 
and maintain the apparent consensus, and this is evidenced by the controversy over the 
changes to the school week. The reform of the school week was viewed as one of the most 
popular of the concertation’s proposals and Nathalie Mons, who copiloted the concertation, 
noted: ‘La nécessité d’un réaménagement des rythmes scolaires au primaire, au-delà de la 
semaine de quatre jours, fais consensus, même si les conditions restent à définir.’250 As such, 
during the official release of the report, Hollande was quick to announce that the school week 
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would be increased to four and a half days and that this reform should be able to come into 
effect from September 2013.251 The length of the primary school week was a necessary 
structural reform that would put France back in line with the rest of Europe. France had the 
smallest number of school days per year, yet one of the highest number of hours of classes 
and the Académie nationale de médecine was adamant that children’s welfare was not best 
served by the four-day week.252 Despite the logic of the reform, it provoked huge opposition 
from parents and teachers in 2013 and there were a series of large-scale strikes.253 Hollande 
thus felt compelled to announce that communes could opt to wait until September 2014 to 
implement the change. The problems with the reform of the school week overshadowed and 
delayed Peillon’s other proposals, undermined his credibility and was probably one of the 
main reasons for his replacement. 
The disintegration of the consensus achieved during the concertation demonstrates just how 
difficult it is to make changes in education and how sensitive and frustrated those involved 
were after so many failed reforms and the hostility and cuts of the Sarkozy administration. It 
also evidences the limitations of Peillon’s attempt to put ‘le politique’ into practice in 
contemporary politics. Despite his background in teaching, Peillon quickly lost popularity 
with both teachers and parents and one explanation for this was his intellectualism. His 
philosophical vision frequently manifested itself in a retreat into specialist historical 
references, which proved to be an obstacle to the communication of what were sensible and 
necessary reforms. In particular, Peillon’s rhetoric failed to resonate with the media. He was 
especially frustrated, for example, that the media focused on the rythmes scolaires 
controversy at the expense of his other reforms, insisting in an interview in Le Monde that his 
                                                             
251 François Hollande cited in Maryline Baumard, ‘François Hollande dessine l’école du quinquennat’, Le 
Monde at www.lemonde.fr (viewed 14 February 2016). 
252 L’Académie de médecine in ‘l’Académie de médecine défend la semaine de quatre jours et demi’, Le Monde 
(05.03.2013) at www.lemonde.fr (viewed 20 April 2013). 
253 Baumard, L’école: le défi de la gauche. 
86 
 
vision for education ‘n’a de sens que dans un ensemble’.254 In February 2013, at the height of 
difficulties over the school week, Peillon thus sought to bypass the media by publishing a 
short book, which aimed to explain his vision to ‘Refonder l’école de la République et 
refonder la République par l’école’ in its totality and to lay out ‘simplement’ the priorities of 
the ‘loi d’orientation et de programmation’. 255 The book was a real attempt to wear his 
learning lightly; it is written in the first person, in simple language and is clearly laid out, 
with a chapter dedicated to each of his central aims. Peillon kept his historical and 
philosophical references to a minimum, while still outlining the intellectual vision behind his 
practical policies. Despite these efforts, the book was scarcely commented on in the media. 
The educational journalist for Le Monde, Maryline Baumard, for example, unfairly dismissed 
the work as ‘jus de crâne intellectuel’.256 It seems that Peillon’s attempt to adapt his register 
and to adopt a more distinctly political discourse was too little too late. Furthermore, the fact 
that he tried to reconnect with the public in book form is an ironic testament both to Peillon’s 
naivety regarding the nature of contemporary democracy and to his refusal to play the media 
game once in office. Peillon’s republican vision for education was all about giving it a sense 
of direction, yet he was unable to articulate what that meant to the public. Imagining what the 
French school system might be like at the end of Hollande’s presidential term, Baumard thus 
wrote: ‘En 2017, les résultats scolaires de la France étaient encore bien mauvais. On ne 
voyait toujours pas vraiment ce qu’une refondation allait donner une fois à maturité. Et pas 
peine de compter sur Vincent Peillon pour expliquer la chose. Trop « intello », on ne voyait 
pas assez où il voulait en venir.’257  
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As Education Minister, Peillon’s intellectual identity and rhetoric did not chime with the 
mediatization of contemporary politics, and this undermined his attempt to bring together 
philosophy, politics and civil society. These problems are further demonstrated not just by his 
increasing unpopularity with the media but also, and it is closely related, with the general 
public. Brice Teinturier, political scientist and managing director of the polling company 
Ipsos, suggested that it was, in part, Peillon’s intellectualism which caused his popularity to 
stagnate in the polls. Polls undertaken for Le Point, for example, showed that his satisfaction 
rating did not get beyond around 30%.258 In terms of the rythmes scolaires debate, Peillon 
proved unable to retain the support of parents. He failed to communicate the positives of the 
reform and, in particular, the ideology behind it. The restructuring of the school week aimed 
to reduce inequalities by expanding the availability of free extracurricular activities, yet 
parents increasingly viewed the reform as nothing more than an organizational problem.259  
The strength of his intellectual convictions, combined with his inability to articulate his 
vision in a way that would allow it to be heard and understood in the public sphere, also 
translated into an inflexible and often arrogant style, which compromised the art of dialogue 
that had been central to the concertation. As such, while Sébastien Sihr, the general secretary 
of the main teachers’ union, complained: ‘On voulait un ministre, on a eu un philosophe’, 
others disagreed, however: ‘On pensait avoir un philosophe, et on a un ministre comme les 
autres.’260 With the exception of the concertation, Peillon did not work sufficiently well with 
the rest of government or with civil society, as evidenced by the series of ‘gaffs’ he made as 
Education Minister; they were so frequent that one trade unionist allegedly dubbed him 
‘Gaston la gaffe’ after the bumbling office junior in the comic strip Gaston.261  
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Again, the rythmes scolaires controversy serves as an illuminating case study. Peillon was so 
sure of his personal intellectual vision for schooling and, inseparably, for French society 
more widely, that he overlooked the strength and depth of the potential opposition. On 17 
May 2012, the day he entered office and well before the concertation, Peillon provoked 
controversy when he stated that ‘Tous les enfants auront cinq jours de classe.’262 The 
statement was a twofold gaff; firstly, Hollande’s election promise had been four and a half 
days not five and, secondly, he made the announcement before his appointment as Education 
Minister had been made official. Furthermore, on 24 February 2013, at the height of the 
debate over the structure of the school week, Peillon stoked the fire by declaring his plan to 
extend the school year and to make changes to the timing of summer holidays. 263   
Peillon’s intellectualism thus often translated into a naïve self-confidence, which got in the 
way of his attempt to build a consensus and to negotiate his reforms. A poll conducted by the 
polling organization BVA in February 2014, for example, demonstrated that 50 % of those 
who had heard of Peillon felt that he ‘joue trop perso’, while only 36% viewed him as an 
‘homme de dialogue’.264 Peillon blamed the media for allowing the rythmes scolaires dispute 
to eclipse his other proposals and to distract from the totality of his vision for schooling, yet it 
is hardly surprising, given that Peillon pushed the reform so dogmatically from his first day in 
office. 
It was not just his comments within the sphere of education which undermined his credibility 
and, in turn, weakened his ministry. He had a strong personal vision for society more broadly 
and was only too ready to make it known.265 In October 2012, for example, during a live 
interview with France Inter, Peillon implied, in contrast to the official government position, 
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that he was in favour of the decriminalization of cannabis.266 The comment was jumped on by 
the right and exasperated Hollande and Ayrault. Notably, Ayrault declared: ‘Les ministres ont 
à se concentrer sur la mission qui est la leur… Lorsqu’ils sont à la radio et la télévision, ils 
doivent défendre à la fois la politique de leur ministère et la politique du gouvernement, et 
rien d’autre.’267   
Peillon’s attempt to put ‘le politique’ into practice in the context of education in the twenty-
first century was thus progressively undermined by the fact that his intellectual vision, and 
the way in which he tried to put it across, did not resonate with the media or the majority of 
the public. Furthermore, due to his own personality, experiences and intellectual identity, 
Peillon was so wrapped up in his own convictions that he often lost sight of the rest of 
government and of the art of dialogue and compromise so crucial in the particularly thorny 
issue of education. Baumard reflected: ‘Vincent Peillon veut faire du Peillon et rien d’autre. 
Parce qu’il a été habitué à décider seul de ses stratégies après toutes ses années dans 
l’opposition, son expérience de chercheur au CNRS et d’écriture. Et puis aussi parce qu’il a 
de lui-même et de ses analyses une très haute idée.’268 
These problems were also exacerbated by the fact that his intellectual vision and ideology 
were not truly shared, and therefore not supported and promoted, by the rest of government 
and, most importantly in the context of the Fifth Republic, by the president. Hollande is the 
epitome of the modern day professional politician and Hazareesingh has underlined the 
technocratic nature of this énarque’s intellectual outlook.269 Hollande is a reformist, like 
Peillon, but his reformism, even more so than Jospin’s, has been managerial not theoretical. 
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In 2012 Julien Dray, a socialist on the left-flank of the PS, thus stated: ‘On a beaucoup trop le 
sentiment d’une stricte continuité avec ce qui se faisait auparavant dans le pays.’270 
Furthermore, the vagueness of Hollandisme has been compounded by the fact that those 
governmental figures (2012-2014) whose political positions did have a more intellectual 
foundation were not from Hollande’s political family and were therefore unable to contribute 
to the definition of ‘Hollandisme’. Montebourg, for example, is on the far left of the party, 
while Valls, Moscovici and Peillon all have very different interpretations of ‘reformism’. 
Valls believes that the very word socialism is obsolete and has been wanting to ‘finir avec les 
tabous du PS’; Moscovici has been advocating a ‘réformisme ambitieux et continu’, while 
Peillon has been championing a ‘republican socialism’ inspired by Merleau-Ponty and 
Mendès-France.271 Peillon’s tendency to go solo and his struggle to articulate his republican 
vision can therefore, in part, be explained by the doctrinal confusion that has been haunting 
the socialists and which lies at the heart of the Hollande presidency; there has been little 
space for a more distinctly intellectual reformism. In the context of education, for example, 
Baumard highlighted that there was a clash between ‘un Peillon agrégé de philosophie et un 
Hollande diplômé d’HEC’. Hollande, in contrast to Peillon, wanted education to be primarily 
a means of achieving a more productive society and of boosting the economy.272 
Peillon’s ministry episode cannot be taken out of the particular context of education, an area 
of society dominated by strong views and powerful interest groups. John Ambler highlighted 
that education has provoked some of the most passionate debates and demonstrations in the 
Fifth Republic and that ‘power on the streets’ has frequently caused proposals to be 
withdrawn and has forced ministers out of office.273 When his ministry fell into difficulties, 
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Peillon thus legitimately highlighted that, on average, education ministers have only lasted 
two years in the Fifth Republic.274 Education is a notoriously controversial subject, not just in 
France but also, for example, in Britain. The Conservative Education Minister Michael Gove 
(May 2010-July 2014), who tackled education from a political, as opposed to an intellectual, 
perspective, was also replaced due to the toxic nature of educational reform. History may 
well subsequently judge many of the reforms of both Gove and Peillon as on target and 
positive in the long-term. That said, the way in which Peillon failed to communicate his 
vision for education and to build a profound and lasting consensus has demonstrated that 
there has, so far, been little room for his ideal of ‘le politique’ in PS politics. Peillon’s 
personal intellectual understanding of reformism hit up against the mediatization of 
contemporary politics and the socialists’ state of doctrinal confusion. Peillon was unable to 
negotiate these obstacles and ‘le politique’ rapidly descended into lofty intellectualizing and a 
thrust-from-the-top approach, both of which undermined his popularity, credibility and any 
chance he may have had to negotiate the notoriously destructive Education Ministry. Peillon 
finally admitted in December 2014: ‘J’étais dans les dossiers, je communiquais peu, c’est 
peut-être une faute politique.’275  
Conclusion 
This chapter has explored the difficulties encountered by an intellectual and political figure 
trying to negotiate and reconstruct, in a very specific and personal way, the connections 
between intellectuals, politics and wider society in the twenty-first century. It has highlighted 
the tension between Peillon’s theory of intellectual engagement and how it unfolded in 
practice in PS politics. Peillon’s attempt to reconnect intellectuals (philosophy), politics and 
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society, by constructing and promoting a flexible reformist republican socialism, has so far 
proved unsuccessful. The reconciliation that is central to ‘le politique’ quickly disintegrated 
in the face of the realities of contemporary democracy. Peillon has been unable to synthesize 
his own complex and hybrid identity as an intellectual and a politician. He has come up 
against a series of interlinked barriers, notably the socialists’ inability to engage with the 
thought-driven nature of his reformism, the professionalization of contemporary politics and 
the demands of the media sphere. Ironically, Peillon has so far exemplified the contemporary 
breakdown of the connections between intellectuals, socialist politics and wider society.  
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Chapter Three: Equality  
In his 2011 work, The society of equals, Rosanvallon reflected: ‘Inequalities have never 
before been so widely discussed while so little has been done to reduce them…  a generalized 
sense that inequalities have grown “too large” or even become “scandalous” coexists with 
tacit acceptance of many specific forms of inequality and with silent resistance to any 
practical steps to correct them.’276 Rosanvallon asserted that this paradox, which he termed 
the Bossuet paradox (after the seventeenth-century theologian Jacques-Bénigne Bossuet who 
said that ‘God laughs at men who complain of the consequences while cherishing the causes’) 
lies at the heart of the current crisis of the political left.277 The left’s identity, he argued, has 
historically centred on ‘the promotion of equality’. The fact that the left has been losing 
ground across Europe is therefore neither coincidental nor transitory, but ‘structural’: ‘The 
left has lost the historic source of its strength and legitimacy’. While left-wing parties can still 
win elections, he concluded, it is only because ‘elections turn as much on the weaknesses of 
one’s enemies as on one’s own strengths.’278 
Having looked at Vincent Peillon’s individual form of engagement, which has been 
straddling the intellectual and political spheres, this third and final chapter moves on to 
evaluate intellectual attempts to rebuild a connection between the PS and society through an 
issue of vital importance within society itself – equality – from outside the PS.  
As Rosanvallon has suggested, the PS has been having great difficulty engaging with the 
issue of equality in contemporary times. The fall of the Berlin wall symbolized, to many, the 
failure of the communist understanding of equality as ‘uniformity’. On the other side, the 
‘uniformity’ implied by the market through management techniques like Taylorism has been 
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undermined by globalization; contemporary capitalism has been increasingly structured 
around ‘initiative’ and ‘singularity’.279 At the same time, the public has become increasingly 
ill-disposed to the idea of equality as redistribution. One 2014 survey, for example, showed 
that 84% of French people believed that money gained through taxation was subsequently 
wasted.280 Levelling, state-planned conceptions of equality have thus been progressively 
challenged by a society that appears to resist uniformity both ‘ideologically’ and 
‘technically’.281 
Inequality, however, has remained a pressing issue both in terms of the actual level of 
inequality and in terms of public concerns. Inequalities have been on the rise within 
developed countries.282 Simply looking at income inequality, for example, in France between 
1998 and 2006, the average income of the top 1% increased by 14%, that of the top 0.01% 
increased nearly 100%, while the income of the bottom 90% increased by a mere 4%.283 
Furthermore, the French seem to be particularly sensitive to inequalities: a 2014 survey 
showed that 60% of the French public felt that the gap between the rich and the poor was a 
‘very big problem’, making France one of the developed countries the most worried about 
inequalities.284 
In the past fifteen or so years, in the face of these far-reaching ideological and social 
transformations, to which can be added the political problems of the 2002 and 2007 defeats 
and the floundering Hollande presidency, equality has become an increasingly central focus 
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in those intellectual circles that have been trying to influence the PS. The Fondation Jean-
Jaurès, for example, made equality their ‘priority’ research topic from 2015.285  
This chapter argues that many intellectuals have been attempting to think differently about 
equality in order to construct a post-Marxist vision of a just world, which could help 
reconnect the socialists with both the nature and concerns of contemporary society through 
the battle for equality. The equality debate is important to the socialists’ political culture and 
could, in turn, help reinvigorate the left-right divide, possibly allowing the PS to redefine its 
position more clearly.286 The Italian philosopher Norberto Bobbio, for example, argued that 
the criterion most often used to distinguish the political right from the political left is the 
attitude taken towards the issue of equality. At the most basic level, he contended, the right 
views inequalities as ‘natural’ in origin and therefore ‘inevitable’, while the left believes they 
are ‘social’ in origin and therefore ‘eliminable’.287 In many commentators’ eyes, socialism 
has, above all, been about fighting inequalities.288 Furthermore, the battle has been 
particularly central to French socialism because equality is a value perceived to be at the 
heart of the French Republic more widely and a fundamental component of French 
‘exceptionalism’.289 
It is beyond the confines of this chapter to provide an exhaustive treatment of intellectual 
discussions on equality over the past fifteen years; but useful conclusions can be drawn from 
a focus on Pierre Rosanvallon, one of the dominant intellectual influences in contemporary 
left-wing thinking.  
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Part one of this chapter looks at Rosanvallon’s ‘atelier intellectuel’- the République des idées 
- founded in 2002, and focuses on the collection of short essays it has been releasing each 
year in partnership with the Editions du Seuil.290 It argues that significant progress has begun 
to be made in terms of developing updated social democratic ideas about equality and in 
terms of formulating and practising a form of intellectual engagement more suited to the 
demands of contemporary democracy. There have, however, still been clear problems. 
Firstly, the group has been struggling to strike a balance between the demands of the media 
and high academic standards. Secondly, despite the intellectuals’ attempt to make an impact 
in politics by influencing public public opinion via the media, they have still been largely 
unable to overcome the obstacles of socialist party culture and the mediatized and 
professionalized nature of contemporary politics more broadly.  
Part two turns to Rosanvallon’s individual work through a critical reading of his essay The 
society of equals. It appraises the work as a form of intellectual engagement and argues that 
Rosanvallon has elucidated the issue of equality in all its historical depth and has thus 
enhanced the République des idées’s attempt to fashion a post-Marxist idea of equality. This 
part then analyses the connection between Rosanvallon’s work and the socialists’ approach to 
equality under Hollande, thus shedding light on the relationship between an intellectual like 
Rosanvallon, who has been working in a largely academic vein, and socialist politics. It 
demonstrates that the PS has struggled to engage with Rosanvallon’s idea for a 
comprehensive political and social theory of equality; the socialists are yet to convince the 
public that there is more to equality than redistribution. Instead, they have gradually stopped 
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talking about the issue and have thus been having great difficulties formulating a vision of 
social progress for contemporary times.291  
Part I: La République des idées (2002-) 
As a group, the République des idées has been attempting to clarify social democracy by 
analysing the social and territorial inequalities of contemporary French society.292 Ivan 
Jablonka, historian and co-director of the project, for example, claimed that inequalities were 
the group’s ‘ligne de force’.293 The intellectuals in the République des idées, responding to 
the problems revealed by the socialist defeats in the 2002 and 2007 presidential elections, 
have been attempting to practise a different form of intellectual engagement. These 
intellectuals, largely in the social sciences, have rejected the historic model of the universal 
intellectual and have instead adopted a more modest scientific approach. Their methodology 
has been allowing them to think about inequalities in a different way and they have begun to 
formulate a convincing post-Marxist vision of a just society. Furthermore, the group has tried 
to overcome the problems of socialist party culture and to adapt to the nature of 
contemporary democracy by first and foremost targeting civil society and the media in order 
to influence the PS from the outside. However, while the project has successfully found its 
way into the media, it has so far struggled to square publicity and accessibility with academic 
rigour. Taking the essay Pour une révolution fiscale. Un impôt sur le revenu pour le XIXe 
siècle as a case study sheds some light on the République des idées’s actual impact on 
socialist politics. It demonstrates that while some of the collection’s ideas have managed to 
capture the imagination of the public and have even found their way into political 
programmes, the group has so far continued to struggle to overcome the obstacles of socialist 
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party culture. 294 Thus far, the socialists have failed to engage in any depth with the group’s 
ideas; the intellectuals have often simply been names to be invoked and the socialists have 
had a largely superficial and instrumental relationship with the project.  
Intellectual ‘penseurs’295 
The République des idées has been attempting to reconnect the PS and society through a 
deeper and more accurate understanding of inequalities: ‘Ce que je [Rosanvallon] cherche 
avec cette collection de livres… c’est d’aider à un supplément d’intelligibilité dans les 
domaines où l’on sent confusément que des choses se passent mais sans bien arriver à les 
identifier.’296  The République des idées thus represents an attempt to transcend Marxism and 
to clarify social democracy by establishing a more rigorous understanding of the issues of 
contemporary society which, as demonstrated in chapter one of this thesis, have been talked 
about so vaguely by both politicians and also by many intellectuals. When asked about the 
nature of the evolution from the Fondation Saint-Simon, a think-tank founded in 1982 which 
Rosanvallon ran with the historian François Furet, to the République des idées, for example, 
Rosanvallon stated that in the 1980s : 
 ‘Le problème-clé était la modernisation d’une gauche qui avait gagné les élections 
avec un programme commun inscrit dans la tradition séculaire du socialisme de la 
fin du XIXe siècle. Aujourd’hui, nous sommes entrés dans le monde de l’après-
communisme et dans celui d’un nouvel univers du capitalisme. Il ne s’agit plus 
d’aggiornamento, mais de refondation intellectuelle, pour reconstruire une analyse 
de la réalité.297  
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The Fondation Saint-Simon therefore aimed to modernize the political left by reconciling it 
with the market economy.298 The République des idées, however, has been trying to help the 
socialists to define their politics more precisely now that they have largely abandoned any 
practical commitment to a break with capitalism. Thierry Pech, the first secretary-general of 
the group, for example, stated: ‘Les socialistes croient qu’il suffit de se dire moins marxistes 
davantage sociaux-démocrates, et qu’ils peuvent repartir ainsi. C’est une grave erreur… [La 
gauche doit fournir] une relecture profonde de la société, de l’individu moderne, de 
reconstruire, à la racine, une compréhension de l’économie.’299 
Given its post-Marxist ideological ambitions, the project has been deliberately trying to 
distance itself from global theories and thus from the historic model of the universal 
intellectual. The authors first and foremost analyse data and statistics which they use to 
question general perceptions, to illustrate the nature of contemporary inequalities and then to 
make informed suggestions about how to tackle them politically. Eric Maurin, whose essay 
opened the collection emphasized: ‘Nos questions sont produites à partir de l’examen des 
faits plutôt que des théories.’300 Reflecting on the République des idées around its tenth 
anniversary, Florent Guénard, the project’s general secretary, thus suggested that the 
researchers involved with the collection have been practising Michel Foucault’s model of the 
‘specific’ intellectual.301 The political analyst Agathe Cagé, however, has observed that while 
Foucault’s model resonates with the République des idées’s methodology, because it rejects 
totalizing thought in favour of expert analyses, the end aim is subtly different. The analyses 
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of the ‘specific’ intellectual are supposed to help citizens to speak for themselves by 
providing information about the power relations that influence their thought processes. The 
République des idées, however, has been aiming to ‘rendre à la société la force et la capacité 
de se changer’.302 The project’s form of intellectual engagement still contains an element of 
protest and a desire for change, albeit a modest one. Michel Winock therefore suggested that 
Rosanvallon’s team of intellectuals should be classed not as ‘specific’ intellectuals but as a 
new type of contemporary intellectual ‘penseur’: ‘Le souci de protester [contre toutes sortes 
d’inégalités] passe après le besoin de comprendre le monde indéchiffrable… Le penseur a 
quitté le registre de “J’accuse” pour celui de “Je veux comprendre”.’303 
Rosanvallon’s group has therefore sought to adopt a more humble and thoughtful form of 
intellectual engagement adapted to the fact that contemporary French politics and society has 
little confidence in grand ideological theories. One of the standard criticisms of more modest 
and scientific forms of intellectual engagement and of the ‘specific’ intellectual model, 
however, is that its focus on expertise eliminates the more comprehensive or human ideas and 
values associated with the Dreyfusard model of the intellectual as moral guardian.304 
Historians like Prochasson and Duclert, for example, have both seemed to be suggesting that 
a return to the intellectual as moralist could help the socialists to get back in touch with their 
political culture.305 Furthermore, Aquilino Morelle, one of Hollande’s political advisors 
lamented the influence of think tanks and foundations on socialist political programmes after 
2002, stating: ‘Ça donne un diagnostic sophistiqué, mais pas de prescription ni de vision 
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globale. La pensée fragmentée, c’est épuisant, ça ne permet pas de vivre. Il faut un sens, 
quelque chose de plus global et de plus humain.’306 
Despite not complying fully with the ‘specific’ intellectual model, the République des idées 
has been reflective of the contemporary trend towards expert analyses. Contrasting the essay 
L’élitisme républicain. L’école française à l’épreuve des comparaisons internationales, 
written by the sociologists Christian Baudelot and Roget Establet, with that of the economist 
Eric Maurin, L’égalité des possibles. La nouvelle société française, however, demonstrates 
that, while in some cases the scientific approach has led to insightful but narrow conclusions 
which, when taken alone, do fail to provide a wider reconceptualization of the issue of 
equality, the statistical approach has also been able to provide the basis for more complex 
attempts to rethink the idea of equality more broadly.307  
Baudelot and Establet examined what they saw as the acute problems with the French 
education system and hoped to promote a ‘nationwide debate’ by rendering accessible the 
studies produced by the Programme for International Student Assessment (PISA).308 They 
argued that, in France, PISA’s results have been oversimplified by the media and unfairly 
distrusted and ignored by politicians and teachers who have tended to believe that PISA’s 
criteria fail to take into account the unique nature of the French republican education 
system.309 Baudelot and Establet advocated the benefits of an international comparative 
approach as a means to transcend the inward-looking and interest-driven nature of debates on 
schooling in France.310 Drawing on PISA, they questioned the French system’s elitist 
viewpoint by demonstrating that the countries with the best school performance have been 
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those that most effectively fight inequalities. The success of the elites and the success of the 
masses, they concluded, are linked; justice and efficiency thus go hand in hand.311 The idea 
behind L’élitisme républicain is very simple as, working from this central observation, they 
then deduced: ‘On voit bien dans quel sens on peut améliorer les résultats: supprimer tout ce 
qui fait obstacle à la constitution d’une véritable école unique.’312 
For Maurin, however, re-reading and redeeming statistical analyses is the starting point for a 
much more ambitious attempt to redefine a theory of equality which, he contended, could 
help the left to fashion a political project aimed at justice and social protection, adapted to the 
nature of contemporary social inequalities. He argued that the problem with the contemporary 
political discourse on equality, particularly on the left, is that it has been focusing on 
redistribution rather than equal opportunity because the left has been afraid of being accused 
of tolerating actual inequalities (inégalités de fait) and of having converted to liberalism. 
Maurin stated that such reasoning ignores the link between the two types of inequality.313 He 
took French schooling as a case study and argued that the focus (popularized by Pierre 
Bourdieu) on the inequalities created by the school system itself had caused the impact of 
social inequalities on school performance to be underplayed.314 He demonstrated that factors 
like the state of a child’s housing could have a significant impact on their success at school: 
‘plus du tiers des personnes qui ne disposaient pas d’une pièce pour faire leurs devoirs au 
calme quand ils avaient onze ans est sorti sans diplôme du système éducatif’. These statistics, 
Maurin contended, support the idea that there is a connection between actual inequalities and 
inequalities of opportunity because ‘La pauvreté parentale est un facteur très défavorable aux 
conditions de logements des enfants et des conditions de logement précaires sont un facteur 
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massif d’échec scolaire.’315 Maurin thus called for a change of perspective: the reduction of 
actual inequalities should be a means and not an end and equality of opportunity should not 
just be about yet another school reform but part of a society-wide project.316 
The République des idées’s scientific approach has therefore not prevented the individual 
essays in the collection from, at times, taking a more philosophical attitude to the issue which 
could, in turn, help the socialists to devise an updated and comprehensive discourse on 
equality. Furthermore, Cagé emphasized that the difference in aims between the République 
des idées group and the ‘specific’ intellectual has meant that the project as a whole has been 
actively keeping a broader vision in mind.317 The focus on equalities as the central line of 
inquiry has allowed the intellectuals in the group to begin to build a post-Marxist vision 
collectively. Rosanvallon, for example, explicitly hoped that the essays could come together 
to form a coherent whole:  
Il y a un certain nombre de travaux récents qui commencent à éclairer d’un jour 
nouveau la question des territoires, de l’exclusion, du travail. C’est donc cela qu’on 
commence à mieux connaître et à mieux comprendre. Il faut maintenant les 
rassembler et construire une vision d’ensemble. Nous pourrons alors forger des 
outils pour l’ambition politique légitime qui est de vouloir changer vraiment la 
société.318  
In 2011, presumably with the 2012 presidential elections in mind, the République des idées 
thus published an edited collection of shorter essays which aimed to ‘ouvrir des pistes pour 
répondre au délitement du lien social’.319 In the concluding essay, François Dubet drew out 
how one could ‘faire la société par le côté gauche’.320 He suggested that, because society had 
evolved, it was time to transcend the principles and institutions which had historically been 
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deemed to ensure social cohesion. He reflected that society had been broken down by 
neoliberalism but had also been restructured around positive principles like ‘autonomie’, 
‘singularité’, ‘capabilité’ and ‘empowerment’.321 He contended that, in order to combat 
destructive populist responses, the left therefore needed to work out how to create a common 
world adapted to contemporary realties. Dubet proposed that a project to remodel society 
should be organized around three principles: equality (relative equality of social positions), 
the individual (aspirations) and democracy.322 
Beyond this explicit attempt to come up with a common perspective, there is also a sense that 
the ideas from many of the essays in the collection have been starting to build on one another. 
Maurin’s idea that the reduction of inequalities should be a society-wide and life-long project, 
for example, has notably since been complemented by the sociologists Camille Peugny’s 
essay Le destin au berceau. Inégalité et production sociale and Dubet’s L’école des chances. 
Qu’est-ce qu’une école juste?323 Taken together, these works, in different ways, challenge 
France’s and the left’s historic focus on schooling as the central means to create an equal 
society. They advocate, instead, a broader society-wide understanding of the fight against 
inequalities. Peugny, like Maurin, for example, criticized theories which had declared the end 
of a class society by demonstrating that in France social reproduction has in fact been 
intensifying.324 He then similarly contended that reforming the school system was not enough 
in itself; even a perfect democratization would not lead to a meritocratic society. Statistics 
show that those children from disadvantaged backgrounds who leave school with the same 
qualifications as more privileged children have remained at a disadvantage in the job 
market.325 In order to equalize conditions throughout all stages of life, he thus suggested a 
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universal life-long training package which would be guaranteed and funded by the state.326 In 
a slightly different vein, observing that in France the level of one’s qualifications plays a 
strong determining role throughout one’s professional life, Dubet called for the development 
of an ‘individual equality of opportunity’. He argued that rather than simply viewing school 
inequalities (those determined by merit) as a means to eliminate social inequalities, one 
should also consider the impact that these school inequalities then have on social inequalities 
(on society). Dubet criticized the intellectual descendants of the Saint-Simonians who have 
been arguing that inequalities resulting from a meritocracy are just, contending that while one 
sphere of activity may produce reasonably fair inequalities, it is not fair if those inequalities 
then automatically lead to inequalities in another sphere (for example inequalities which 
transfer from education to the economy).327 
The République des idées has therefore chosen to practise a modest scientific form of 
intellectual engagement better suited to making sense of a rapidly evolving society in the 
absence of grand explanatory theories. At the same time, they have succeeded in largely 
overcoming the potential downsides of expert analyses by working collectively and by 
focusing on the underlying theme of inequalities and how to reduce them.  
The République des idées, the PS and the Media  
The République des idées has been seeking to achieve ‘la diffusion la plus efficace, sans 
renoncer à la double exigence de rigueur et de qualité indispensable à tout travail 
intellectuel’.328 The project is undeniably politically engaged; each essay ends with more or 
less specific suggestions on how their findings and ideas could translate into practical policies 
and Florent Guénard noted that the République des idées was ‘left-leaning’.329 As opposed to 
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think tanks like the Fondation Jean-Jaurès or Terra Nova, however, the team has been 
consciously trying to distance themselves from the PS. Guénard insisted that the group was 
not ‘en téléphone rouge avec le PS’.330 Furthermore, when Ségolène Royal’s 2007 election 
campaign book included many of the group’s analyses, Rosanvallon, despite having signed a 
petition in support of Royal’s candidacy, was quick to assert the group’s independence, 
stating that it had ‘aucune relation de travail avec la candidature à l’investiture du Parti 
Socialiste pour l’éléction présidentielle’.331 
The group has thus recognized the challenges of contemporary socialist party culture and has 
sought to adapt its form of intellectual engagement accordingly. The project has been actively 
seeking to influence the PS from a distance. In 2006 at Grenoble, for example, the 
République des idées held a forum to discuss ‘la nouvelle critique sociale’, which deliberately 
excluded politicians. The 2006 forum can be contrasted with the colloque socialiste, also held 
at Grenoble in 1966. The latter was co-organized by the PSU, a party which had close links 
with many of the intellectuals, especially Rosanvallon, who have since been involved with 
the République des idées. Alongside intellectuals, citizens and unions, the colloque socialiste 
tried to fashion a programme for a modern form of socialism. Contemplating the differences 
between the two events and the reasons for the exclusion of politicians in 2006, Thierry Pech, 
the République des idées’s first secretary, stated that in the 1960s ‘les partis restaient des 
lieux où pouvait se faire la synthèse entre les attentes sociales, les projets et les stratégies de 
conquête du pouvoir. Aujourd’hui, il ne reste que les stratégies de conquête.’332 
The project’s distance from the political sphere has not only been a response to the PS’s 
internal problems but also an attempt to take on board and adapt intellectual engagement to 
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the nature of contemporary democracy more broadly. Laurent Bouvet, who was part of the 
project’s founding team, and who has himself worked closely with the PS in his role as editor 
of the Revue Socialiste (1988-2001), has progressively distanced himself from the group. He 
criticized its strong detachment from political institutions, stating: ‘La République des idées a 
publié de formidables bouquins, mais elle reflète cette vision d’intellectuels positivistes qui 
ne croient qu’en la science et en la parole des experts. Pourquoi refuser d’aller dans l’arène et 
se méfier autant des politiques quand on prétend être un laboratoire des idées ?’333 
Responding to Bouvet’s criticism, however, Pech insisted: ‘on influence les partis quand on 
vende les livres à 50,000-60,000 exemplaires et quand on structure le débat.’334 Unlike the 
Fondation Saint-Simon, which targeted ‘le monde dirigeant, politique ou économique’, the 
République des idées has thus been focusing on the public sphere itself.335 Rosanvallon’s aim 
for ‘la diffusion la plus efficace’ has thus been about recognizing the combined challenges of 
party culture and the vibrancy of contemporary civil society.  
The République des idées has thus been hoping to influence politics via public opinion. 
Rather than fostering links with the PS, the group has thus developed important ties with the 
media, no doubt aided by Rosanvallon’s own high public profile and his connections with 
newspapers like Le Monde, where he is an associate editorialist. The ‘nouvelle critique 
sociale’ forum, for example, was organized in partnership with Le Monde, Le Nouvel 
Observateur and France Culture and was prepared with the review Esprit, the magazines 
Alternatives Economiques, Les Inrockuptibles, Les Cahiers du Cinema and the review 
Mouvement. Furthermore, each essay in the collection has tended to be systematically 
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presented in, at the very least, Le Monde and Alternatives Economiques and many of the 
authors have also subsequently been invited for interviews.336 
The project has therefore successfully found its way into the media sphere and, as opposed to 
‘professional, ‘media’ intellectuals like B-HL, the intellectuals linked to the République des 
idées have managed to enter the media in a much more academic vein.337 The publicity has 
largely centred on discussions of their specific essays, ideas and thus the overarching theme 
of inequalities. That said, the demands of the media sphere and the desire to make the essays 
accessible to the widest possible audience do seem to have put constraints on both the content 
and form of the works. The project has thus far struggled to reconcile academic rigour with 
the need for publicity and accessibility. Edgar Morin’s essay, for example, was summed up in 
Le Monde as a ‘petit livre synthétique mais parfois abscons.’338 The limited coverage of this 
essay will have a lot to do with the fact that it was the first essay in the collection, coming out 
before the results of the 2002 presidential elections started to draw increased attention to the 
state of the left. The word ‘abscons’, however, perhaps says something about the particular 
demands of the media sphere. In January 2016, Gilles Finchelstein published an essay which 
also sought to reconceptualize ‘equality of opportunity’. Like Maurin, he called for a form of 
‘pre-distribution’ and he referred in detail to Maurin’s work and to the idea of an ‘égalité des 
possibles’.339 Rather than using the phrase ‘égalité des possibles’ himself, however, 
Finchelstein instead advocated a ‘redefinition’ of ‘equality of opportunity’. In a talk about the 
essay, he reflected that it is more effective and simpler to try to redefine subtly an idea 
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already in common usage in the public sphere than it is to try to popularize a seemingly new 
concept.340 
It was Daniel Lindenberg’s Le rappel à l’ordre. Enquête sur les nouveaux réactionnaires 
which launched the République des idées into the media limelight.341 As discussed in the first 
chapter of this thesis, Lindenberg’s essay lacked rigour because it denounced individual 
intellectuals rather than deeply criticizing or challenging their ideas. Bouvet thus felt that 
Lindenberg’s book ‘est deplacé par rapport aux autres titres de la collection’ because it 
reduces intellectual disputes to ‘une affaire de postures et non de convictions’.342 Despite 
largely defending the work, even Rosanvallon admitted that ‘sur la forme, son mode 
d’exposition pointilliste, son choix de citer nombre d’auteurs assez rapidement entraînent des 
rapprochements et des risques d’amalgames.’343 That it was the République des idées’s least 
academically rigorous essay which received so much media attention and launched the 
project, points, much like the media reception of Vincent Peillon’s essay La Révolution 
française n’est pas terminée, to the media’s continued taste for controversy over and above 
intellectual depth and clarity.344 
To make the essays accessible and attractive to the media, they are short (rarely exceeding 
one hundred pages) and aim to be as non-technical as possible. Given that statistics can often 
be interpreted in many different ways and that the source of statistics should be considered in 
any convincing and balanced academic analysis, the group’s attempt to adapt to the media 
sphere and to target a large and general audience has also, at times, risked undermining their 
aim to overcome unsubstantiated discussions about inequalities through a scientific approach. 
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The desire to redeem certain statistics, combined with the need for brevity, has often been at 
the expense of a wider and more complicated picture. In Maurin’s essay, for example, his 
focus on the impact of economic inequalities on school performance overlooked the part 
played by cultural inequalities.345 Additionally, as the project has progressed it has become 
noticeably less academic. Contrasting Maurin’s 2002 work with Peugny’s 2013 essay which, 
as discussed, deals with very similar questions, it is striking that the latter is much more 
poorly footnoted. Peugny failed to distinguish between different types of sources and, in 
particular, he did not note whether they came from private or public institutions.346  
Impact on socialist politics 
It is difficult to determine to what extent the République des idées and its form of intellectual 
engagement has succeeded in influencing politics. Politicians often combine ideas from a 
variety of different places, add their own and do not necessarily acknowledge their sources. 
The frequent references to the République des idées in the media, however, do seem to have 
been mirrored in politics. Looking at the project between 2002 and 2008, for example, Cagé 
observed that the works have been cited regularly in debates in the national assembly.347 
Referencing intellectuals and even their ideas, however, is not the same as the group’s work 
translating into ideological reform or concrete policies. Despite succeeding in getting its 
presence felt in the political sphere via civil society, the République des idées has still, so far, 
struggled to transcend the problems of socialist party culture and of the political sphere more 
widely. Much as historical figures like Jean Jaurès have been cited superficially by the 
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socialists, so the intellectuals at the République des idées have often been used in a largely 
symbolic fashion. In 2006, for example, Rosanvallon lamented:  
Beaucoup d’auteurs de La République des idées sont sollicités par les 
entourages politiques. Mais ce qui me frappe, c’est que l’on attend d’eux des 
éléments de langage, des expressions neuves… reprise ici ou là – mais pas 
le supplément de complexité et d’intelligibilité qu’ils peuvent apporter. Or 
la démocratie suppose l’intelligibilité de la société qu’elle entend 
reformer.348 
The way in which the socialists under Hollande have been struggling with the issue of 
equality is discussed in detail later in this chapter. However, taking the essay Pour une 
révolution fiscale. Un impôt sur le revenu pour le XIXe siècle, by the economists Thomas 
Piketty, Camille Landais and Emmanuel Saez, as a case study serves as a useful brief 
illustration of how the project has continued to hit up against the problems of socialist party 
culture, despite its success in the media and with the public.349 The three economists analysed 
the French tax system as a whole and demonstrated that ‘Le système est légèrement 
progressif jusqu’au niveau des « classes moyennes » puis devient franchement régressif au 
sein des 5% les plus riches - et surtout à l’intérieur des 1% les plus riches.’350 They then 
proposed a ‘fiscal revolution’ which they believed would make the tax system simpler, fairer 
and easier to understand and would thus help to rebuild a sense of civic confidence in 
taxation.351 In particular, they advocated a new revenue tax which would replace many of the 
existing taxes; it would be individualized, deducted at source and would result from 
combining the existing tax on revenue (IR) and the generalized social contribution (CSG).352  
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Pour une révolution fiscale demonstrates that the République des idées has been having some 
remarkable successes in terms of capturing the imagination of the public. The essay was 
published in January 2011 and from then until the end of the 2012 presidential elections it 
was frequently discussed in the press, radio and television and had sold 40,000 copies by the 
end of 2012.353 Such popularity seems remarkable for a book about the French tax system and 
can probably partly be attributed to Piketty’s already well-established fame. It was also due, 
however, to the intellectual’s effective use of the internet; the essay is accompanied by a 
website where the public can simulate their own tax reform and in 2011 the innovative tool 
succeeded in creating a buzz on social media.354 
The essay was thus able to partially set the agenda for the 2012 presidential elections by first 
and foremost influencing and forming public opinion. Piketty, for example, recalled a 
frustrating meeting he had in January 2011 with Hollande, Fabius, Jérôme Cahuzac and 
Michel Sapin, before Pour une révolutuon fiscale had become such a public success: ‘Je leur 
ai dit que je trouvais qu’ils n’allaient pas assez loin dans leur façon d’envisager la fusion 
entre l’impôt sur le revenu et la CSG. Ils m’ont expliqué en gros que, « si c’était si facile, ça 
se saurait ». J’ai compris qu’à leurs yeux, j’apparaissais un peu naïf.’ Contemplating the 
difference between this meeting and the election campaign, Piketty then noted: ‘Ce n’est pas 
en les [hommes politiques] rencontrant autour d’une table que nous, chercheurs, avons le plus 
d’impact sur les politiques. Il est beaucoup plus efficace d’intervenir dans les medias, de faire 
vivre le débat avec un livre… et de les obliger ainsi à s’emparer d’un sujet qui s’impose dans 
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l’opinion.’355 While partly a respone to the rise of the far-left Front de gauche presidential 
candidate, Jean-Luc Mélenchon in the polls, Hollande’s U-turn on a high revenue tax should, 
in part, be credited to Piketty, Landais and Saez and their essay’s ability to mobilize public 
opinion.356 In a heated television debate with Piketty in January 2011, Hollande had stated: 
‘Je considère que les taux faciaux pour un tout petit nombre de contribuables sont des taux 
inefficaces’ and he had wryly insisted: ‘Je préfère un impôt payé à un impôt fraudé.’357 In late 
February 2012, however, Hollande pledged a 75% tax rate for those earning over one million 
euros. Piketty thus noted: ‘en disant 75%, il [Hollande] est même allé au-delà de ce que nous 
proposions. Comme quoi les idées font leur chemin.’358 
Despite the popularity of the work, however, Hollande and the socialists progressively 
abandoned the ideas of Piketty, Landais and Saez for a fundamental transformation of the 
French taxation system. Faced with divisions in the socialist party over whether to have a 
radical or more gentle reform, Hollande’s ‘grande reforme fiscale’ became increasingly 
vague and non-committal as the 2012 presidential election campaign progressed. He refused, 
for example, to fix a timetable for the combining of the IR and the CSG laid out in the 2010 
socialist party programme. In February 2012, Cahuzac, who was in charge of budget and 
taxation matters in the campaign, stated that the combining of the IR and the CSG would only 
happen in the upcoming quinquennat ‘si les conditions permettent’.359 Without any 
engagement to make taxation more coherent and equal across the system, the promise of a 
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75% taxation rate for individuals earning over one million euros, a level which was 
significantly higher than the essay had suggested and extremely high by international 
comparative standards, was largely a symbolic and unthought-out measure. It also 
represented a return to the socialists’ historic tendency to make far-left promises when in 
opposition, only to revoke them once in power.360 The 75% tax has since been a major source 
of embarrassment for the Hollande presidency and was eventually shelved in January 2015, 
after just two years in place.361 Piketty, who was publicly very close to Hollande and to the 
PS in the lead up to the 2012 presidential elections, has thus since distanced himself from 
them and become virulently critical of Hollande and the socialist government. In 2013, for 
example, he stated: ‘On a devant nous le sommet de la technocratie socialiste au pouvoir, très 
confidante dans ses compétences. Je n’ai pas de doute sur le fait qu’ils ont fait de très bonnes 
dissertations à 20 ans, mais je ne suis pas certain que cela suffise pour entrer dans le XXIe 
siècle.’362  
The République des idées is an example of how left-wing intellectuals, since 2002, have been 
attempting to rethink the issue of equality in order to help the socialists to better understand 
the evolutions of capitalism and of society, so they can articulate a post-Marxist vision of a 
common world which could resonate with the public. The project is also an example of how 
intellectuals have been adapting their form of engagement to contemporary times; they have 
been trying to find a space for themselves within civil society so they can influence politics 
from below. The République des idées has been making significant progress both in terms of 
attracting the media, engaging the public and influencing politics. Despite such advances, 
there are still clear problems and the project has been struggling both with the intellectual 
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limitations imposed by the media sphere and with the socialists’ continued resistance to wider 
intellectual reform proposals.  
Part II: Pierre Rosanvallon, La société des égaux (Paris, 2011)  
Pierre Rosanvallon’s The society of equals is the third book in a series which attempts to 
elucidate the problems of contemporary society through historical analysis and political 
theory. 363 This volume, however, differs from the first two works because it moved on from a 
discussion of institutional mechanisms and procedures to look at an issue of society itself 
(equality): 
In this book I have been guided more than ever by a desire to maintain a 
connection between scholarly research and the concerns of citizens…The political 
point is to demonstrate that the idea of socialism in the twenty-first century will be 
shaped by the reinvigoration of the democratic ideal through an in-depth study of 
its societal manifestations. The time has come to fight for integral democracy, 
which will come about through the mutual interaction of two ideas that have been 
kept apart for too long: namely socialism and democracy.364 
In The society of equals Rosanvallon thus complemented and built on the République des 
idées’s attempt to rethink and promote a form of social democracy for contemporary times 
through the issue of equality. Given that his own area of expertise is history and political 
theory, however, Rosanvallon more directly attempted to turn the nebulous idea of equality 
into a coherent vision and discourse which could help reconnect the socialists with their 
political culture and with their traditional working and middle-class electorate. Furthermore, 
he approached the topic of equality in a much more academic and conceptual vein. 
Rosanvallon consciously chose to move into the academic sphere rather than to pursue a 
career in politics in the late 1970s, after his previous close involvement with the 
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Confédération française démocratique du travail (CFDT) trade union and with Michel 
Rocard.365 Additionally, despite being a public intellectual, Rosanvallon has rarely intervened 
actively during political moments. His individual form of intellectual engagement has been 
firmly anchored in the intellectual sphere and has been deliberately and necessarily non-
partisan. Reflecting on his tendency to conclude books with rough outlines Rosanvallon thus 
wrote: 
L’objet étant à chaque fois de suggérer les conséquences pratiques et 
institutionnelles que l’on pouvait tirer des analyses historiques et des 
conceptualisations élaborées. Suggérer, car il ne pouvait être question de présenter 
ce qui se serait apparenté à un programme détaillé de réformes ou à un dispositif 
institutionnel précis. Pour plusieurs raisons. La première est qu’une telle 
conception aurait risqué de polariser l’attention et de conduire les lecteurs à 
négliger l’apport historique et conceptuel, en limitant les commentaires à des 
considérations superficielles sur les dispositifs pratiques. La seconde, et la plus 
importante, était de laisser ouvert le débat sur ces dispositifs, en ne donnant pas 
l’impression que l’analyse conduit à imposer un modèle… c’est ainsi au nom de la 
conception que je me fais du rapport entre le travail intellectuel et la vie politique. 
Mon but est en effet de donner des instruments d’analyse, d’accroître la capacité 
des citoyens de s’impliquer dans la cité et non de les faire adhérer à un système.366 
As a form of intellectual engagement, Rosanvallon’s use of history in The society of equals 
has complicated understandings of the issue of equality, while the inclusion of political 
theory has allowed Rosanvallon to both eschew the contemporary trend towards increased 
academic specialization and to begin to formulate a conceptual solution which could be 
practically useful to the PS. Rosanvallon’s complex and academic approach has risked 
isolating some of the public and his concluding conceptual outline has left a lot of practical 
questions open. Rosanvallon has, however, largely succeed in shedding light on the issue of 
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equality in all its historical complexity and has thus deepened intellectual discussions on how 
to conceive a post-Marxist idea of equality for contemporary times.  
When Rosanvallon was asked about his understanding of intellectual engagement, he stated: 
The role of the intellectual… can be plotted out by his work itself… his work has 
and ought to have the function of rendering contemporary society’s difficulties 
more intelligible. For me, an intellectual is someone who makes Condorcet’s 
wager. A more lucid society that better understands its questions will perhaps be 
more rational, will be a society in which political deliberation will be able to be 
stronger and more active. Hence I’ve defined the intellectual as someone who first 
and foremost possesses tools of comprehension, tools which may become 
instruments of action.367 
Much like the République des idées group, Rosanvallon the individual has therefore been 
principally seeking to raise and shed light on current problems. His means of achieving this, 
however, has been to put them in their historical context. Rosanvallon’s understanding of 
history and its relationship to contemporary civic concerns, which he terms ‘l’histoire 
conceptuelle du politique’, has been at the heart of his form of intellectual engagement.368 He 
believes that the historian’s role ‘consists in giving the past back its present, so that this 
present of the past helps us consider our own present more effectively, instead of merely 
expounding what might be the necessity of this present’.369  
Rosanvallon shed light on the contemporary crisis of equality by tracing the history of the 
idea of equality, alongside its relationship to changes in the political economy, from the 
eighteenth century to the present. Rosanvallon’s use of history allowed him to demonstrate 
the centrality of equality to the revolutionary democratic project. Daniel Sabbagh thus noted 
that it is Rosanvallon’s historical approach which has rendered his analysis distinctive, 
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compared to that of Anglophone theorists who have also analysed equality as a democratic 
concept.370 Rosanvallon reflected that the French and American revolutions introduced an 
idea of equality as a ‘social relation’. Revolutionary thinkers envisaged the creation of ‘a 
society of equals’ and equality was viewed as ‘a way of making society, of producing and 
living in common’.371 Rosanvallon was thus able to elucidate the current democratic crisis by 
portraying it not just as the result of recent changes to the political economy, but also as the 
long-term breakdown of the revolutionary philosophical ideal. Since the revolutions, he 
demonstrated, there has not been a convincing, universal and positive philosophical theory of 
equality, which could sit behind and legitimize egalitarian public policies.372  
Rosanvallon argued that the revolutionary ideas of democratic equality were undermined by 
the industrial revolution and the advent of capitalism, which led to a ‘crisis of equality’ 
characterized by a series of ‘pathologies of equality’.373 The crisis was overcome by the 
introduction of welfare states and policies of redistribution in the early and middle decades of 
the twentieth century. Rather than being the result of a commonly shared ‘coherent theory of 
equality’ as a social relationship, however, the movement was driven forward by three 
objective factors. The threat of revolution created a ‘reformism of fear’ by rendering social 
reforms a political necessity; the experiences of the First World War ‘nationalized existences’ 
which generated a ‘sentiment of solidarity’ and an intellectual and moral revolution ‘de-
individualized’ the economy and society.374 These exogenous factors, he wrote, no longer 
exist, which explains the contemporary ‘second crisis of equality’, which has been 
characterized by many of the same pathologies as the first, notably ‘nationalism, 
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protectionism [and] xenophobia’.375 Rosanvallon contended that, lacking a natural consensus 
in favour of redistributive policies, it has now become necessary to formulate a conceptual 
framework that would justify such measures in their own right.376 Attempts since the 1980s, 
he demonstrated, have so far failed to constitute a robust, universal and positive theory of 
equality. Alternatives to populist pathologies of equality, for example, have been increasingly 
radical variations of the liberal concept of ‘equality of opportunity’. By viewing equality in 
the negative and by focusing exclusively on individuals, these ‘theories of justice’ have been 
ignoring the societal dimension. Policies of equal opportunity, Rosanvallon asserted, are a 
necessary and valuable component of any attempt to reduce inequalities, but they need to be 
supported and legitimized by a positive theory of equality that is not just economic but also 
political and social.377 
Rosanvallon’s historical approach has its limitations because, despite attempting to give an 
added historical depth to understandings of the contemporary situation, he has paradoxically 
risked oversimplifying it in the process. He portrayed the historical evolutions in the political 
economy and their ramifications for levels of inequality in a general way, which suggested 
that they had been broadly the same across Western Europe.378 The economist and policy 
maker François Bourguignon, however, has demonstrated that, despite the importance of the 
external effects of globalization, a nation’s specific internal policies, institutions and culture 
can also determine the level of inequality within a particular country.379 Furthermore, Pierre 
Serna, an historian who specializes in the French Revolution, while praising Rosanvallon’s 
scholarship, criticized his reading of the French and American revolutions.380 While 
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Rosanvallon argued that the revolutionary political upheavals limited the long-term 
equalizing possibilities of the promise of 1776 and 1789, Serna contended that the violence 
flowed from the fact that the revolutions were first and foremost civil wars founded on at 
least two irreconcilable ideas of equality: ‘Ce n’est pas la Révolution qui fut le cadre dans 
lequel se développa l’égalité, c’est l’égalité qui fut la révolution elle-même et les violences de 
la Révolution le cœur même des conquêtes de cette égalité.’381 
The idea of ‘l’histoire conceptuelle du politique’ has given Rosanvallon’s work wider 
purchase, beyond the field of the history of ideas. It has incorporated political and social 
theory and Florent Guénard thus wrote: ‘L’œuvre de Pierre Rosanvallon est inclassable: elle 
échappe aux découpages académiques traditionnels, elle convoque dans son élaboration 
plusieurs disciplines qu’on a l’habitude de dissocier.’382As discussed in chapter two of this 
thesis, Vincent Peillon’s academic work, which has also been making use of the history of 
ideas to indicate a way forward for socialism in the present, has struggled to make an impact 
outside its own narrow historical specialism. Rosanvallon, however, has really thought about 
how to position his work so that it can provide the widest possible intellectual conversation: 
‘What I am trying to do is to cross different approaches, and to strive - as an ideal - to find a 
way to write a kind of book that could go beyond the usual disciplinary divisions, to be read 
and considered not just by historians, but also by political philosophers and sociologists.’383 
Contemplating his target audience, Rosanvallon wrote: ‘Le public universitaire ne forme 
qu’une partie de celui que je n’ai cessé de viser plus fondamentalement, celui des citoyens 
impliqués et cultivés.’384 The hybridity of Rosanvallon’s work has certainly rendered it more 
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accessible within the academic world and perhaps partly explains its global appeal.385 
Whether it has aided his attempt to engage with the public and with politicians, however, is 
more questionable. The combination of history, philosophy and, especially, the inclusion of 
quite technical and abstract political and social theory, has complicated Rosanvallon’s work 
and could make it difficult for the uninitiated reader to follow the thrust of his argument. 
Additionally, Hazareesingh noted that ‘Rosanvallon’s professorial and rather austere prose 
lacks the playfulness and the rhetorical elegance of his mentor Furet, to say nothing of the 
captivating quality of the French intellectual tradition in its golden age. (He could do with 
Sartre’s rhetorical gift: to make readers feel they are participating in a collective 
conversation.)’386 
The complexity and unfamiliarity of Rosanvallon’s interdisciplinary approach, combined 
with his very academic style of writing, has therefore risked isolating the public and less 
intellectually minded politicians. Such criticisms, however, should perhaps be considered 
alongside the observation that the République des idées’s attempt to seduce the media and 
maximize accessibility has, at times, been at the expense of academic rigour. Given that 
Rosanvallon runs the République des idées, his intellectual engagement on the issue of 
equality can be taken as a whole. The more academic nature of his individual form of 
engagement, through his position at the Collège de France, has been complementing the 
République des idées by pursuing a deeper analysis of the problem, which has the potential to 
develop a wider range of ideas amongst others in turn. 
Including political theory meant that Rosanvallon was able to combine his analysis of the 
problems of equality with a possible conceptual solution. He sketched out a framework which 
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he believed could constitute a positive theory of equality for the present. It is, however, 
difficult to determine how his ideas on equality might come together in terms of formulating 
specific policies and thus be useful to the PS. Despite insisting that his idea for a 
contemporary ‘society of equals’ was a ‘perfectly realistic utopia’, the final chapter is a very 
open-ended reflection on how this might work in practice and is even subtitled ‘A 
Preliminary Outline’.387 Rosanvallon sought to update the principles that formed the basis of 
the revolutionary idea of a ‘society of equals’ by considering how society had changed since 
the revolutions. Firstly, the revolutionary principle of ‘similarity’, he proposed, should 
become ‘singularity’ in recognition of the advent of the ‘age of singularity’ in which 
‘everyone wants to be someone’.388 Secondly, the inescapable interdependence of modern life 
has rendered the revolutionary idea of ‘a society of autonomous individuals’ obsolete.389 
Rather than ‘independence’, ‘singularity’ should therefore be linked instead to ‘reciprocity’ 
which is, above all, ‘equality of treatment and involvement’.390 Finally, in order to recognize 
that the contemporary problem has no longer been simply about ‘shar[ing] political 
sovereignty’, but also about participating together in the making of society, the revolutionary 
concept of ‘citizenship’ should be extended beyond its legal definition to include ‘citizenship 
as a social form’, which Rosanvallon termed ‘commonality’.391 While the revolutionary 
understanding of a ‘society of equals’ was understood as a ‘world of like human beings… a 
society of autonomous individuals, and a community of citizens’, the contemporary vision 
would therefore be founded on the singularity of individuals, reciprocal relations between 
them, and a social commonality.392 
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Serna criticized Rosanvallon’s choice of ‘singularity’, ‘reciprocity’ and ‘commonality’, 
arguing that in a globalized world any vision of equality should transcend individual nations. 
He instead suggested a European political model of equality centred on ‘solidarity’, 
‘federation’ and ‘republicanity’.393 Rosanvallon’s call for a ‘renationalization of democracy’, 
however, is convincing. Since the 1990s, social inequality within countries has been growing 
while levels of inequality between countries have been declining. A national vision of a 
‘society of equals’ has therefore once more become a priority because ‘classes are… once 
again becoming the equivalent of separate nations within the nation.’394 
Rosanvallon did make some practical suggestions about how to approach reinforcing 
‘singularity’, ‘reciprocity’ and ‘commonality’, although they remained underdeveloped. To 
allow ‘singularity’ to flourish, he emphasized the importance of fighting against 
discrimination because it constitutes a ‘pathology of singularity’.395 Quite innovatively, 
however, he highlighted the need to focus on individuals rather than groups and for social 
policies to be redirected with the aim of ‘remov[ing] obstacles that limit the individual’s 
view, confine him to his condition, and prevent him from hoping for a different future’.396 He 
therefore advocated more ‘individualized’ and ‘expansive’ policies of equal opportunity.397 
Secondly, Rosanvallon argued that ‘reciprocity’ has broken down, which has been 
undermining the legitimacy of the welfare state and encouraging an aversion to taxation. 
Rightly or wrongly, he noted, there has been a widely held belief that privileged elites at one 
end of the spectrum and poor immigrants at the other have been taking advantage of the 
exploited working and middle classes.398 He suggested that reciprocity could be rebuilt by 
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forcefully opposing abuse of the tax and welfare system, making state operations more 
transparent and by moving from the current ‘assistance state’ back to a more universalist 
‘redistributive state’ which would include the middle classes.399 Finally, to restore 
‘commonality’, Rosanvallon advocated policies to combat ‘social separatism’.400 Most 
concretely, for example, he promoted increased social mixing through a return to public 
services and a more ‘dynamic urban policy’.401 
Beyond means of fostering ‘singularity’, ‘reciprocity’ and ‘commonality’, Rosanvallon also 
discussed how a ‘general economy’ of equality might work in ‘an age of singularity’ or, in 
other words, how to deal with the tensions between the various dimensions of a democratic 
concept of equality. He focused, in particular, on how to reconcile equality and difference 
conceptually.402 His attempt to answer the question ‘How can we be similar and singular, 
equal and different, equal in some respects and unequal in others’, however, was limited to a 
slightly evasive ‘broad conceptual approach’.403 To determine which inequalities would be 
acceptable and unacceptable and thus what sort of policies to prioritize, Rosanvallon talked of 
an ‘equilibrium of inequality as a social idea, equilibrium being achieved when no individual 
considers himself to be in an irreversible or psychologically destructive situation of inequality 
in a multiplicity of dimensions.’404 To work out the extent to which economic and social 
inequalities should be reduced, Rosanvallon then suggested a ‘lexical order of equality’ and 
contended that because ‘equality as relation’ is universal it should come before ‘equality as 
distribution and equality as redistribution’. Distribution and redistribution then become 
necessary only at the point where economic inequalities threaten ‘equality as relation’.405 
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Rosanvallon’s ‘preliminary outline’ has therefore left fundamental and challenging practical 
and conceptual questions unanswered. To highlight just a few of the most glaring ones: is a 
more individualized approach to inequality possible financially? How would an 
individualized policy of singularity maintain a universal dimension and not appear arbitrary 
and thus risk undermining reciprocity? What level of economic inequalities would be 
compatible with equality as a relation? How can we calculate this? How can national policies 
oppose social separatism in a world of global mobility? 
Trying to draw specific policies from Rosanvallon’s work, however, perhaps misunderstands 
his form of intellectual engagement and fails to appreciate the complex ambition of The 
society of equals as a work. Rosanvallon was not attempting to formulate a political 
programme, but to shed light on the nature of the contemporary crisis of equality, to provoke, 
and to suggest the terms of, a conversation about what sort of new redistributive policies 
could suit contemporary social demand and to lay the groundwork for a theory of equality 
and a vision of a ‘society of equals’ which could help bring society along with such policies. 
It is, however, worth noting that Rosanvallon’s assertion that a revitalized conceptual 
framework is the answer to the contemporary crisis is contradictory. The majority of The 
society of equals demonstrated, on the one hand, how easily philosophical ideas of equality as 
a ‘social relation’ have been perverted throughout history by changes to the political 
economy and, on the other hand, the importance of external factors in bringing about a 
society favourable to redistributive policies. By clinging to quite an abstract understanding of 
equality, there is a risk that Rosanvallon has himself been further contributing to the Bossuet 
paradox.  
Overall, however, Rosanvallon’s academic discussion of equality further illustrates the 
progress being made on the centre left in engaged intellectual circles. While it remains open-
ended and Rosanvallon himself clearly intends to develop his ideas further, The society of 
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equals has suggested that reconciling socialism and democracy with a vision of equality at its 
heart could be a way forward for the left today. Rosanvallon’s individual conceptual work 
has been complementing and deepening the work of the République des idées by seeking to 
reconnect and develop a more reciprocal relationship between society and socialist politics 
through complex historical analysis and political theory. 
Rosanvallon, Equality and the Socialists (2011- ) 
The society of equals was published shortly before the PS’s primary elections in October 
2011. The work was presumably timed to make an impact on PS discussions about equality 
and to influence the intellectual climate of the upcoming elections more widely. Comparing 
Rosanvallon’s idea for an updated positive political and social theory of equality with the 
socialists’ approach to the issue demonstrates that the problems of party culture and the 
nature of contemporary politics have, so far, largely prevented the socialists from rethinking 
equality and from engaging convincingly and in the long-term with the modern social-
democratic ideas being progressively formulated in some intellectual circles. Unable to move 
beyond a concept of equality as redistribution, a discourse which no longer resonates with the 
public, the socialists have gradually stopped talking about equality and have thus been having 
great difficulty devising an inspiring vision of social progress for contemporary times.406  
In 2011, the PS, for the first time, held ‘open’ (to all French citizens on the electoral register) 
primaries as a means to appoint their candidate for the 2012 presidential elections. On the one 
hand, such a significant institutional change represented an attempt to respond to the 
problems revealed by the 2002 and 2007 defeats.407 It was hoped that open primaries would 
help to reconnect the party with the electorate through a more participatory form of 
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democracy. Open primaries have the potential to encourage the candidates to take on board 
the concerns of society and to open the party up to a broader range of ideas. The 2011 
socialist primaries were a great success in the sense that it was the first time that so many 
French citizens were involved with a political event outside standard elections; 2.8 million 
people voted in the second round.408 On the other hand, Rémy Lefebvre has argued that rather 
than being a solution to the crisis of contemporary democracy, open primaries are another 
symptom.409 He contended that they do not allow for ideological renewal because they 
intensify both the personalization and mediatization of contemporary politics: ‘Dans le 
discours médiatique, le jeu, entendu comme la dimension concurrentielle de la compétition 
entre personnalités, tend à prévaloir sur les enjeux, c’est-à-dire la confrontation de visions du 
monde, d’idées, de programmes. Cette tendance contribue à la fermeture du champ politique 
sur lui-même et à la déréalisation des questions politiques aux yeux des citoyens les moins 
politisés.’410 
In 2011, the risk that the primaries would become de-ideologized and descend into a 
mediatized battle of egos was heightened by the fact that Dominique Strauss-Kahn had been 
viewed as the sure winner before he was arrested on 14 May 2011, accused of assaulting a 
hotel maid in New York. Strauss-Kahn’s removal from the race flung the primaries wide 
open between the six remaining candidates: Martine Aubry, Jean-Michel Baylet (the 
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president of the Parti radical de gauche), François Hollande, Arnaud Montebourg, Ségolène 
Royal and Manuel Valls.411 
Two case studies in which Rosanvallon and the PS interacted on the issue of equality in the 
context of the 2011 primaries demonstrate that, despite being a rousing and novel political 
event, which succeeded in mobilizing swathes of the French public, the primaries also 
exacerbated the problems of party culture and of contemporary politics more generally. They 
were largely devoid of considered reflection and nothing akin to Rosanvallon’s coherent 
vision of equality was able to emerge from the process. 
In an interview with Libération on 27 August 2011, Rosanvallon criticized the PS document 
‘égalité réelle’, which had been unanimously adopted by the party in October 2011 and which 
laid out their programme on equality.412 He stated: ‘Quand on regarde le document du Parti 
Socialiste, on n’y voit pas de ligne directrice, mais un catalogue de mesures diverses… On 
peut éventuellement gagner les élections avec un catalogue - si l’on a eu en face un adversaire 
médiocre -, mais on ne change pas la société sans une philosophie sociale et politique.’ When 
invited to respond to Rosanvallon’s comments at the PS’s Summer University at La Rochelle, 
supporters of the candidates for the primaries, rather than truly tackling Rosanvallon’s 
criticisms, or discussing the socialists’ programme for equality, promoted their own favoured 
candidate.413 The primaries thus intensified the personalization of socialist politics and made 
it difficult for the PS to establish a coherent political programme and to renew their ideology 
and discourse on equality after the 2002 and 2007 defeats. Rather than opening the party up 
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to a greater breadth of ideas, these open primaries paradoxically risked further reducing the 
party to an inward-looking electoral machine. Christian Paul, who was backing Aubry, for 
example, despite giving the most coherent response to Rosanvallon, still insisted on peddling 
her candidacy, concluding: ‘Elle [Aubry] est sur l’idée qu’il faut s’attaquer aux racines des 
inégalités.’ Pierre Moscovici, who was managing Hollande’s campaign, refused to comment 
on Rosanvallon’s book, which he was yet to read, and instead simply said: ‘La lutte contre les 
inégalités est centrale. On ne cherche pas à faire une campagne triple A, mais de gauche 
crédible, de gauche qui marche.’ Furthermore, rather than engaging with Rosanvallon’s ideas, 
Najat Belkacem, who was supporting Royal, was determined to demonstrate how they were 
in total agreement. She insisted that Royal and Rosanvallon shared the same objective that ‘Il 
faut s’attaquer au pouvoir incontrôlé du finance, à tous ces sujets économiques qui 
conditionnent l’égalité entre individus’, adding that Royal was promoting ‘plus de radicalité 
et d’efficacité en matière économique et sociale que ses concurrents.’ 
A debate between Rosanvallon and Hollande for the Philosophie Magazine in the lead up to 
the final round of the primaries then illustrates that even when the elections had progressed to 
a run-off (between Hollande and Aubry) Hollande, who was the favourite, was advancing a 
very vague vision of equality.414 Moreover, his somewhat superficial understanding of the 
corresponding problems of contemporary society clashed with Rosanvallon’s complex 
historical approach. There was a clear disparity, for example, between Hollande’s simplistic 
and largely economic perception of the fundamental challenges and that of Rosanvallon. 
During the conversation Rosanvallon, in line with The society of equals, insisted that 
politicians needed to be talking about and conceptualizing equality in order to rebuild society 
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because ‘Le problème clé aujourd’hui, c’est la panne de l’idée de l’égalité.’ Rather than using 
the term ‘equality’, however, Hollande focused on a vague vision of the republic as the 
means to bring about solidarity and to reconnect the PS and the popular classes. He only used 
the word equality when actively prompted by Rosanvallon and argued instead that 
‘republicanism’, which he left undefined, was the theme that would unite the public, 
legitimize his policies on schooling, housing and discrimination and ‘fédère aussi bien les 
salaires victims des délocalisations que ceux qui travaillent dans les nouvelles technologies’. 
Rosanvallon, however, convincingly suggested that Hollande, by failing to talk about 
equality, had not grasped the nature of social demand. In particular, he contended that 
Hollande needed to take on board the fears of the middle classes who ‘ont l’impression d’être 
à une distance qu’elles ne combleront jamais avec le haut de la société et se sentent menacés 
de retomber du côté des plus mal lotis’. 
While equality scarcely emerged as a theme in the primaries, however, Hollande changed his 
register and rhetoric for the presidential campaign and there was a genuine sense that the PS 
was trying to reconnect with this historic left-wing theme. Equality was central to Hollande’s 
speech at Le Bourget, which launched his campaign on 22 January 2012.415 In contrast to the 
above discussion with Rosanvallon, Hollande mentioned the word ‘equality’ forty-one times 
and gave the impression that it would be the priority of a socialist presidency. He stated: 
‘Chaque nation a une âme. L’âme de la France, c’est l’égalité’ and insisted:  
Les Français doivent savoir que, s’ils m’élisent, je ne poserai comme président 
qu’une seule question: avant tout effort supplémentaire, avant toute réforme, avant 
toute décision, avant toute loi, avant tout décret, je ne me poserai qu’une seule 
question: est-ce que ce que l’on me propose est juste ? Si c’est juste, je le prends, si 
ce n’est pas juste, je l’écarte. Seule la justice doit guider notre action. 
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Furthermore, Hollande, like Rosanvallon, attempted to put the battle for equality into 
historical perspective, by referencing French history in general and the socialists’ history in 
particular: 
C’est pour l’égalité que la France a fait sa révolution et a aboli les privilèges dans 
la nuit du 4 août 1789. C’est pour l’égalité que le peuple s’est soulevé en juin 1848. 
C’est pour l’égalité que la IIIe République a instauré l’école obligatoire et l’impôt 
citoyen sur le revenu. C’est pour l’égalité que le Front populaire a œuvré en 1936. 
C’est pour l’égalité que le gouvernement du général de Gaulle a institué la sécurité 
sociale en 1945. C’est pour l’égalité que François Mitterrand a été élu en 1981. 
C’est pour l’égalité que nous avons fait, avec Lionel Jospin, la couverture maladie 
universelle et l’allocation personnelle à l’autonomie.  
There was also a sense that the idea of equality that Hollande was advocating constituted a 
more holistic vision and that he was attempting to move beyond the increasingly unpopular 
levelling state-planned approach to the issue: ‘Qu’on m’entende bien, l’égalité ce n’est pas 
l’égalitarisme, c’est la justice. L’égalité, ce n’est pas l’assistanat, c’est la solidarité. Les 
Français n’ont rien à craindre de l’égalité, rien à craindre de la justice, rien à craindre de la 
redistribution.’ Moreover, Hollande seemed to be promising a more social form of equality 
adapted to contemporary values. He stated that ‘L’égalité doit concerner tous les domaines de 
la vie en société’ and painted a picture of ‘une France du travail, du mérite, de l’effort, de 
l’initiative, de l’entreprise, où le droit de chacun s’appuiera sur l’égalité de tous’. 
During the 2012 election campaign, the socialists, at least in their rhetoric, therefore seemed 
to be reengaging with the battle for equality. Hollande’s concept of equality appeared to have 
moved closer to Rosanvallon’s idea for a coherent political and social vision adapted to the 
nature of contemporary society. Rosanvallon, for example, recognized his ideas in Hollande’s 
speech: ‘L’insistance de François Hollande sur la question de l’égalité dans toutes ses 
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dimensions, dans son discours du Bourguet, est pour moi de bon augure. Ce discours a pris en 
charge les interrogations dont je m’étais fait l’écho dans « la Société des égaux ».’416 
While there was no fundamental ideological renewal, the context of the financial crisis, 
combined with Sarkozy’s reputation for increasing inequalities, created a campaign 
environment favourable to a more radical equality-based reformism and Hollande tried to 
position himself as the ‘president to end all privileges’.417 Once in office, Hollande and the 
Ayrault government (May 2012-March 2014) did try to reduce inequalities through several 
classic left-wing measures, for example making the taxation of capital revenues the same as 
work revenues and increasing the Impôt de Solidarité sur la Fortune (ISF).418 Furthermore, 
L’INSEE demonstrated that such measures reduced the levels of inequalities in France for the 
first time in fifteen years.419 By analysing Hollande’s press conferences, however, 
Finchelstein has demonstrated that, despite these successes, the socialists progressively 
stopped talking about equality. He reflected that the issue of equality has thus become a rare 
example of politicians actually doing a lot more work than they admit to.420 While the left has 
historically spoken in a way that is much further to the left than their actions, between 2012 
and 2014, they were acting and not speaking at all.421 Despite the promising Le Bourget 
speech, the socialists have continued to struggle to transcend equality as redistribution, a 
rhetoric which no longer captures the imagination of the public.422 Finchelstein thus noted 
that when Manuel Valls finally outlined the government’s successful record on the issue of 
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equality and tried to relaunch the theme through the Fondation Jean-Jaurès in 2014, the 
public was distracted or even actively reluctant.423 
During the Hollande presidency, the socialists have therefore so far failed to remodel the idea 
of equality and they have not managed to articulate a coherent vision in line with 
Rosanvallon’s analyses. Unable to renew their ideology, the governing socialists have again 
retreated into political management, which has been preventing any historical approach to 
contemporary problems. In the 2011 debate between Hollande and Rosanvallon, discussed 
above, there was already a sense that Hollande lacked the historic perspective on how French 
society had reached its current point, which has been so central to Rosanvallon’s form of 
intellectual engagement as an historian and to his understanding of equality. As has been the 
case with Vincent Peillon, Rosanvallon’s use of history as a means to contextualize and 
complicate the present has been clashing with the short-termism of contemporary politics and 
with the socialists’ struggle to engage convincingly with historic left-wing themes, like 
equality. There can be no questioning Hollande’s intelligence but, as discussed in chapter two 
of this thesis, he is a professional politician with a highly technocratic intellectual outlook. In 
government, this has manifested itself in a tendency to govern in a reactive fashion. Rocard, 
for example, stated: ‘Le problème de François Hollande, c’est d’être un enfant des médias. Sa 
culture et sa tête sont ancrées dans le quotidien… Le petit peuple de France n’est pas 
journaliste. Il sent bien qu’il est gouverné à court terme et que c’est mauvais.’424 In a similar 
vein, Christophe Prochasson, historian and advisor to the Elysée, insisted, in reference to the 
Hollande presidency, that ‘La politique, ce n’est pas aussi simple que: un problème, une 
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solution. Penser ainsi, c’est la dévitaliser, oublier que la rationalité n’est pas tout. Si on ne 
croit plus au sens de l’Histoire, on se retrouve avec des plombiers, qui s’avèrent plus ou 
moins bons.’425 Much like the socialists’ superficial contemporary use of historical left-wing 
figures like Jaurès, a short-termism, which goes hand in hand with presentism, and a 
mythological and nostalgic sense of history, has been cutting Hollande and the socialists off 
from more complex and academic intellectual analyses. After interviewing intellectuals 
involved with the Hollande presidency, the political journalist Marcelo Wesfreid noted that 
meetings between the government and intellectuals had become increasingly superficial. He 
thus concluded that the intellectual’s role had been reduced to being wheeled out for 
historical commemorations, from the First and Second World Wars to the eightieth 
anniversary of the Front Populaire.426 
The socialists under Holland have thus far failed to get past their old ideas about equality and 
have consequently been struggling to articulate an engaging vision of social progress which 
could resonate with both the realities and concerns of contemporary society. Unable to get 
excited about the fight for equality, the socialists have been turning to other themes, such as 
‘la lutte contre le terrorisme’ or ‘la compétitivité des entreprises’, which have been making it 
very difficult for them to distinguish themselves from the right.427 Despite his optimism at the 
time of Hollande’s Le Bourget speech, in an article for L’Obs four years later, Rosanvallon 
gave a damning ‘autopsy’ of Hollande’s presidency.428 He stated that ‘la gauche est en coma 
artificiel et le gouvernement y a sa très grande part de responsabilité.’ He reflected that, on 
the one hand, the governing socialists had descended into a ‘« gauche de l’adaptation », qui 
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se définit surtout par la lutte contre les « archaïsmes », dont le seul objectif est 
« modernisation » au sens plus large du terme et qui ne s’inscrit pas dans une vision 
progressiste » and, on the other hand, into a ‘« gauche de l’autorité », qui réinvente le vieux 
radicalisme et l’intransigeance laïque, incarnée par Manuel Valls: une gauche qui ne se 
définit plus tant dans le domaine économique et social que sur le terrain de la sécurité et de 
l’identité ». He insisted that neither of these approaches were in any sense truly of the left. 
Conclusion 
Looking at the idea of equality through Rosanvallon’s République des idées group and his 
more academic individual work, this chapter has demonstrated that significant progress has 
begun to be made in some progressive intellectual circles. The advances have been both in 
terms of the development of post-Marxist ideas and in terms of fashioning forms of 
intellectual engagement more suited to the demands of the media sphere and to the more 
educated, informed and involved nature of today’s public. There have still, however, been 
significant obstacles to a well-functioning relationship between left-wing intellectuals, 
socialist politics and wider society. Firstly, by attempting to influence politics from within 
civil society, intellectuals have been struggling to strike a balance between the constraints of 
achieving accessibility and publicity and the need to maintain high academic standards. 
Moreover, despite adopting novel means to get their ideas into politics, their efforts have, so 
far, been blocked by the challenges of socialist party culture and the mediatized and 
professionalized nature of contemporary politics. Different and intelligent intellectual ideas 
about equality are yet to translate into ideological reform or political programmes and it is 
impossible to say whether, or when, the headway being made in the intellectual sphere may 
be mirrored by genuine advances in the political sphere. Finchelstein was optimistic that 
intellectual ideas on equality have already begun to filter through. He observed that at a 
meeting on the theme of ‘La gauche et le pouvoir’ with the Fondation Jean-Jaurès in May 
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2016, Hollande had talked about equality in terms similar to his own ideas and to those being 
put forward by the République des idées. Here, Hollande promoted an idea of equality linked 
to life-long personal achievement: ‘c’est cette conception singulière… de l’égalité que nous 
portons, de la chance que nous voulons donner à chacun, à chaque âge de la vie, quelle que 
soit sa condition, son origine, de pouvoir réussir.’429 Laurent Bouvet, however, has reflected 
that there remains lot of work to be done in terms of rethinking social democracy for 
contemporary times: ‘Une page de l’histoire de la gauche s’est tournée avec la chute du Mur. 
Il faut tout réinventer. Je me demande, d’ailleurs, si ce ne sera pas le travail d’une génération. 
Nous sommes comme des amphibiens qui commencent à peine à s’aventurer hors du milieu 
aquatique et à poser leurs deux pattes sur terre !’430 There is thus still a long way to go in the 
intellectual sphere, let alone in the political sphere, which is historically always a few steps 
behind. 
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Conclusion 
The three examples explored in this thesis have shed some light on the dysfunctional 
relationship between left-wing intellectuals, the PS and wider society in the past fifteen years. 
The space for left-wing intellectuals to make an impact in politics has perhaps always been 
limited. However, a combination of the problems of socialist party culture and the difficulties 
of contemporary democracy more broadly, has meant that it has become increasingly 
restricted, even more so now than in the 1980s and 1990s.  
The socialist defeat in the first round of the 2002 presidential elections, and its aftermath, was 
one moment that profoundly revealed the problem of the decline of the intellectual in French 
socialist politics. A combination of the issues of socialist party culture, the media’s 
hegemony over the content and form of public debates and intellectuals’ own actions, largely 
emptied the socialist campaign of intellectual voices. For some time, the PS had been failing 
to connect with intellectual questions. The continued moral authority of a far left which, 
despite having largely abandoned a commitment to revolutionary rupture, remained hostile to 
wider intellectual reform proposals, was preventing the PS from renewing their ideology after 
the decline of communism. Instead, the party had adopted a culture of management, which 
was significantly limiting the potential for intellectual reflection. Intellectuals who were 
directly involved with the party were largely confined to a technocratic role, while 
intellectuals working outside the PS struggled with the contemporary media culture, which 
was courting controversy and marginalizing more reasoned intellectual voices. Consequently, 
many university academics were no longer striving to perform an intellectual role, a trend 
exacerbated by the narrow disciplinary specialization of the contemporary research world. 
Those intellectuals who were visible in the media were deliberately, or in some cases 
inadvertently, cut off from the socialists; they were not helping to build an intellectual 
connection between the PS and the electorate. 
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It is perhaps tempting to suggest that, in the contemporary period, politics no longer needs 
intellectuals. Could not a culture of management suggest that the socialists have finally 
transcended an erroneous belief in grand totalizing theories? Is the decline of intellectuals 
not, in fact, the sign of a healthy democracy in which civil society has become willing, and 
able, due to new forms of communication, the greater availability of information and higher 
levels of education, to intervene, unmediated, in political life? As Winock suggested, are we 
now perhaps simply all intellectuals?431 On the contrary, the 2002 moment elucidated the 
potential significant wider ramifications that the breakdown of the connection between both 
intellectuals and the PS and intellectuals and society may have been having for the 
relationship between the socialists and the electorate.  
The nature of the defeat in the first round of those elections suggests that the deficit of new 
progressive ideas in French socialist politics lies at the heart of the contemporary crisis of the 
socialist left and, to a certain extent, of French democracy more widely. Ideas and politics 
must connect if the French socialists are to confront the increasing impact of the FN on 
political life and, particularly, its capacity to seduce the socialists’ traditional working-class 
electorate. The 2002 presidential elections, and then the 2005 referendum on the Treaty of 
Europe, demonstrated that the socialists’ failure to analyse contemporary society deeply, and 
to respond to its needs intelligently, was allowing old motifs, such as the French nation and 
anti-immigration, to both take over from historic left-wing political themes and to translate 
into FN votes. A renewal of their ideas is crucial if the socialists are to discover and convey a 
new sense of purpose in the twenty-first century, when Marxist ideas have run their course in 
mainstream politics, when global capitalism is so profoundly and rapidly transforming social 
realities, and when the public is pressing for a more direct involvement in political life. 
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The two very different examples of those few intellectuals who have been trying to respond 
to the problems revealed by the 2002 defeat, by relocating French political and intellectual 
life more deeply in social debates and issues, have allowed for a better understanding of how 
and why intellectual culture can fail - or have a partial success - in providing a bridge 
between the PS and wider society in the contemporary context.  
Vincent Peillon’s failed attempt to reconstruct what he believes to be an historic connection 
between philosophy, virtuous politics and wider society, has further elucidated the difficulties 
of partisan intellectual engagement. Peillon’s attempt to promote a republican socialism, in 
the tradition of Merleau-Ponty and Mendès-France, has so far failed to overcome the PS’s 
continued resistance to deeply intellectual understandings of reformism, which would require 
them to confront historic internal arguments. Thus far, his partisan form of intellectual 
engagement has also been unsuccessful due to the mediatized and professionalized nature of 
contemporary politics. Furthermore, Peillon’s narrow and specialized academic work has 
found little echo in the media and, once in office, his intellectualism manifested itself in a 
tendency to preach from on high. While such an approach was, partly, necessitated by a lack 
of support for his vision for education amongst wider government, it was ill-adapted to a 
twenty-first century public clamouring for more participation in politics.  
The République des idées and Rosanvallon’s individual academic work has demonstrated 
how some intellectuals, consciously working outside the PS, have been striving to reflect 
modestly, and scientifically, on the nature and concerns of contemporary society. They have 
been striving to remodel, in a practical way, the historic left-wing theme of equality in a post-
Marxist intellectual framework. To date, they have had more success than Peillon, although 
their achievements remain limited. The République des idées, by working collectively and by 
always keeping in mind the wider and practical implications of its work, has been able to 
harness the potential benefits of more expert analyses, without them becoming too disparate. 
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At times, the group has also made effective use of the internet and social media, allowing the 
public to interact with their ideas.  
The example of the République des idées thus suggests that working within, and alongside, 
civil society, in order to mould public opinion, could offer a way forward for left-wing 
intellectuals seeking to help the PS to rethink its social mission today. That said, Rosanvallon 
and the République des idées, like Peillon, have also continued to struggle with the PS’s 
internal problems and with the broader challenges of contemporary democracy. They have 
managed to achieve a better balance between the academic quality of their work and 
accessibility than Peillon has. However, they have continued to have great difficulties 
contending with the constraints of contemporary media culture and their successes within 
civil society are yet to translate into political reform.  
If there has been a relationship between left-wing intellectuals, socialist politics and wider 
society in the past fifteen years, it has been largely instrumental. Due to the importance of 
intellectuals in French political culture, and especially left-wing French political culture, the 
PS has been eager to associate with intellectuals. Peillon was able to advance his career by 
selling himself as an intellectual in politics and Rosanvallon and the other intellectuals in the 
République des idées group have been courted regularly by socialist politicians. In neither 
case, however, have these connections represented a genuine attempt by the PS to engage 
with intellectual ideas and to renew their ideology. Both Peillon’s and Rosanvallon’s 
historical approaches to reform have been conflicting with the short-termism of contemporary 
socialist politics and with the fact that mediatized power struggles have been overshadowing 
intellectual debates.  
There is thus still a long way to go, both in terms of rethinking social democratic ideas in the 
intellectual sphere and in terms of fashioning forms of intellectual engagement which could 
141 
 
resonate with contemporary democracy. It remains difficult to see how, and for what purpose, 
the connections between left-wing intellectuals, socialist politics and society at large could be 
reactivated. If, however, historic socialist battles, such as reducing inequality, are to have a 
political future; if France wishes to combat the dangerous and growing environment of 
intolerance that has been creeping into political life; and if the working classes are to be won 
back from populism so that public opinion can be integrated more positively into 
contemporary democracy, then new progressive ideas must, in some way, find their way into 
PS politics.  
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